Comments on: Freedom of Will/Divine Omniscience continued

By: J.W. Wartick

J.W. Wartick — Fri, 21 Jan 2011 22:43:45 +0000

Declaring an argument rigorous does not make it so. It begs the question. I know of no theists who accept any of the premises of argument II, so it is specious. Constructing a valid argument made of premises which are false does not make a sound argument. You must demonstrate the truth of the premises. Of course, Premise 2 is indeed a premise, unless you’re taking it as an axiom, but that too would have to be demonstrated. So far your answers to my arguments have simply been to assume the truth of your arguments. While it may help you think that you are correct to assume that you are correct, it doesn’t do much for arguing your position. I’ve yet to see you offer any arguments in favor of argument II. So yes, it is unsound, and extraordinarily so.

Regarding your other comment, you wrote “The first argument is logically iron tight if (and this is a big if ever since it first appeared), God’s choices can be shown to be subject to time constraints.”

I deny this as well, because the argument is not logically iron tight. In fact, it is a bit non-sequitur. Let’s examine your argument:

1. Having free-will means, at the least, having a choice at one point in time.
2. A choice is always exercised in the present and if so desired, can always be changed at the last moment – at the moment of exercising it, no matter what the person with a choice had decided in the past.
3. Choices have consequences … taking a different choice usually leads to different consequences in the future.

Logically, I don’t see anything iron tight about this. Premise 1 simply states that “free will means…. having a choice at one point in time.” 2 argues that “A choice is always exercised in the present… no matter what the person with a choice had decided in the past”

The conclusion is 3 “Choices have consequences…. taking a different choice usually leads to different consequences in the future.”

It doesn’t take a logician to see that 3 does not follow from 1 and 2. You argue in an attempt to make 3 twist into “God has no freedom of the will” as follows:

By #1 God has a choice to be exercised by him. But being omniscient God also knows the future as it is going to happen.
By #3 we get that at any given moment God is bound by the known future to make choices that lead to it.
This means that god knows what choice he will exercise at any “choice making moment” beforehand and for all such moments, violating #2 and hence giving a contradiction.

Now 3 doesn’t actually show that God is bound by future choices. You’ve made an elementary logical error known as the de dicto/de refallacy. You’ve inferred a de re truth from a de dicto one, without any argument for why it should be de re.

Therefore, I still have absolutely no reason to accept your argument, which is question begging in that it starts with premises the theist generally denies and modally fallacious in that you fail to distinguish between de re and de dicto necessity.

By: etioquaesitor

etioquaesitor — Fri, 21 Jan 2011 19:25:42 +0000

Actually, The first argument is logically iron tight if (and this is a big if ever since it first appeared), God’s choices can be shown to be subject to time constraints.

Would you agree to this ?

By: etioquaesitor

etioquaesitor — Fri, 21 Jan 2011 19:05:38 +0000

I have addressed the “God’s motivation of being good” and “timelessness” constructs at my blog.

Also, as said there, the “premise 2″ is not a premise, it follows from the “statement 1″ which is indeed a premise and the only point lacking in rigour in both the arguments.

“… Therefore, I think the entirety of Argument II is false in every possible way …”

Wishful thinking ?

By: J.W. Wartick

J.W. Wartick — Fri, 21 Jan 2011 04:34:22 +0000

(Repeated and expanded a bit from my comment on your blog): I see no reason to accept Premise 1. or 2. of argument II. I don’t think God created men with free will because he wanted something interesting. Possibly, God created mankind with free will because it is good to do so. Second, premise 2 is nonsensical. I’m curious as to how this atheist purports to know the mind of God to the extent that he assumes that God went about creating just for His own amusement.

Therefore, I think the entirety of Argument II is false in every possible way. Unless you have some substantive arguments to back up your claims, the argument fails.

Really, it is one gigantic straw man. It’s easy to set up an argument so you can define what God wants and how God wants it and then say that it “proves” there is no free will or omniscience. But that argument is totally specious. I reject it utterly because there is no reason to think any premise is true.

By: etioquaesitor

etioquaesitor — Fri, 21 Jan 2011 00:24:40 +0000

I erred a bit. What i meant was:
It is obvious that not more than one of the two things exists: perfect omniscience of god or human free will.

The argument comes from the second proof in my blog:
http://etiologue.wordpress.com/2011/01/19/omniscience-and-free-will

By: J.W. Wartick

J.W. Wartick — Thu, 20 Jan 2011 21:24:53 +0000

An interesting assertion, but without any argument, I find no reason to accept it.

By: etioquaesitor

etioquaesitor — Thu, 20 Jan 2011 21:18:26 +0000

It is obvious that either god is perfectly omniscient (has foreknowledge of all events, past and present) … or we have free will.

By: Molinism and Necessity «

Molinism and Necessity « — Sat, 14 Nov 2009 23:33:24 +0000

[...] almost entirely from William Lane Craig’s The Only Wise God. Shortly thereafter, I wrote a second post that expanded slightly on the ideas. These garnered much discussion, though perhaps more on [...]

By: J.W. Wartick

J.W. Wartick — Wed, 05 Aug 2009 19:05:41 +0000

And I do grant that God does indeed cause some events to happen. I’m just saying in general, not everything He foreknows is caused by Him.

By: J.W. Wartick

J.W. Wartick — Wed, 05 Aug 2009 19:05:18 +0000

I believe molinism, or “middle knowledge.” That God knows any and all true statements. God’s foreknowledge does not determine something, rather His knowledge of an event just means it will happen. It’s not a causal link.