counter-counter-apologetics

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Religious Experiences: Providing Warrant for Belief in God

Religious experience is something that has been shared by a significant minority (although it is perhaps a majority) of the population of the world. Surveys indicate that in 2000 about 36% of the population of Britain reported some kind of spiritual experience (Kwan, 515). 36% is a significant minority, but the fact is that it is possible that this number is too low. In fact, when people were allowed to develop a relationship and then conduct an interview (rather than simply have an impersonal poll), the percent of positive responses when asked about a religious experience increases to 62-67% (Kwan, 515).

The numbers are significant. Many people have what they perceive of as spiritual or religious experiences. The number is literally millions, if not billions. But what does this really mean? Does it reveal anything about the universe? Is there any way to argue for truth from such a subjective judgment?

Richard Dawkins certainly does not think so. In The God Delusion, he discusses the “Argument from Personal ‘Experience’” (note his use of scare quotes). Dawkins uses an illustration in which a man he knew thought he had heard the voice of the devil while camping, and when he shared this with some zoologists, they laughed at him… for the noise was simply the noise a local bird makes (Dawkins, 112).

I believe Dawkins almost manages to make a good point here. We should be skeptical of religious or spiritual experiences, if we ever experience them (1 John 4:1- Test the spirits…).  But does this mean that every religious experience has a naturalistic explanation? Or indeed, does a naturalistic explanation somehow take precedence over a spiritual one?

Dawkins some convoluted argument against religious experience based mostly on the computational theory of mind (see here for a critique of CTM). I don’t think he is successful, but one can judge for themselves whether the CTM has any kind of explanatory power, or if it serves as a defeater for the spiritual (I again think it doesn’t in either case).

I would like to address the assumptions implicit in Dawkins’ story about religious experience in greater depth. If Dawkins doesn’t make this argument, it is certainly an argument I’ve heard many times before:

Conclusion: For any Religious Experience, there is a naturalistic explanation.

In the case of Dawkins’ story of the bird, there was indeed a naturalistic explanation. But there are two counters I would use against Dawkins and others who would argue against Religious Experience:

Counter 1: The claim that every religious experience has a naturalistic explanation begs the question.

Counter 2: A naturalistic explanation does not exclude other explanations.

First, let’s address Counter 1. I argue that the claim that every religious experience has a naturalistic explanation begs the question. What do I mean? Well, the claim that every religious experience has a naturalistic explanation assumes that for every experience, E, there is a naturalistic explanation. It does not allow for any explanation outside of naturalism to account for any E. To see this, let’s look at what Conclusion, above, analytically:

Conclusion: For any Religious Experience, there is a naturalistic explanation.

Thus: Religious Experiences, do, in fact, exist. (This follows from the first part of the conclusion, which assumes that there is such a thing as a religious experience).

Now, the fact remains that those who experience Religious Experiences (REs) certainly believe there is a non-naturalistic explanation. Hence the reason they are called REs to begin with.

It therefore follows that: A person S, who has an RE, believes that the RE has a non-naturalistic explanation.

But then the Conclusion listed above is really:

Conclusion*: Person S believes their RE is non-naturalistic, when in fact, there is naturalistic explanation.

Conclusion* begs the question, as does Conclusion. They both assume the conclusion “there is a naturalistic explanation” without any grounds to do so. In fact, they assume that the category RE is mistaken to begin with, and it is in fact simply a Naturalistic Experience, not an RE.

The burden of proof is on those who wish to claim that every RE has a naturalistic explanation to actually show that every RE has a naturalistic explanation, especially in light of the argument from theistic experience below. Any simple assumption that every RE has a naturalistic explanation simply begs the question against the Argument from Theistic Experience.

Now, Counter 2 must also be examined. “Counter 2: A naturalistic explanation does not exclude other explanations.”

Let us take Dawkins bird example. Let us change the RE in the example from an example of an evil force to that of a good one. So rather than a demonic sound, the man perhaps thinks he hears angels singing, or some such experience of God or His power. Now we know that the sound is actually just some kind of bird, the “Angel Voice” bird, common to the region. But what if the friend never found out that the noises had this naturalistic explanation? I believe anyone would agree he would happily go on assuming that the experience was an RE.

But what is it about a naturalistic explanation that is supposed to serve as a defeater of RE? I think it is generally assumed that the knowledge of a naturalistic explanation for an RE is supposed to defeat the RE. In other words, if the Angel-hearer found out that the angels were in fact just the “Angel Voice” bird, he would have to give up the experience as an RE and assume it is rather a naturalistic experience.

But why?

I don’t think that even the friend’s knowledge of a naturalistic explanation would necessarily serve as a defeater of the RE, for a few reasons:

1. At the time the friend experienced the event, he believed it was an RE. With an RE comes many emotions and other experiences. These emotions and experiences aren’t somehow invalidated by the idea that there is a naturalistic explanation to the RE. For example, think of someone, (A) who has been in love with someone else (B) for many years, believing there was a mutual love. But suddenly, B explains to A that B has never loved A. Does this somehow serve to invalidate A’s love for those years? Further, would A be required to  give up love for B immediately, or at all? I don’t believe so. In the same way, person A could believe that B is an RE, and despite finding out that B was in fact a natural event, could go on believing that B is an RE… leading into:

2. Religious Experiences are compatible with natural explanations. It is said throughout the Bible that nature speaks of the glories of God (Psalm 19:1 “The heavens declare the Glory of God…” Psalm 69, Psalm 93, etc.). God is seen within a Christian ontology as one who works in and through nature to sustain the universe. Thus to claim that nature is somehow a defeater of something God is thought to bring about (an RE) not only begs the question, but also misunderstands the Christian view of nature.

3. There are plenty of things that have known naturalistic explanations that are still seen as God’s work by Christians and people of other faiths worldwide. Some examples are the beauty of a waterfall, the stars, various plants and animals, places like the Grand Canyon, etc. People know why these things occur naturally, and yet freely attribute such things to God. They aren’t multiplying entities unnecessarily (don’t begin sharpening Occam’s Razor yet), because they are simply saying that there is a certain order and beauty in all of these things that points to teleology. Further, even if one does want to use Occam’s Razor here, the first and second points still stand.

I’d also like to point out that if God does, in fact, exist, it would be wholly within His power to order things in such a way that REs would have naturalistic explanations that the people who experience them never find out about (and then continue in their belief of the RE). While I am not comfortable with claiming this is how God works (I don’t believe God works through what could be seen as trickery or deception, but does actually work in and through the world He set up, that being nature), I’m merely stating that it is possible.

I believe that the Argument from Theistic Experience actually helps grant warrant to belief in God.

First, a definition:

PCT: Principle of Causal Trust – “If it seems (epistematically) to me that x is present on the basis of experience, then probably x is present unless there are special considerations to the contrary (Kwan, 508).”

The argument:

1. Type PCT is correct

2. Theistic Experience (TE) is a well-established type of experience

3. It seems (epistematically) to S that God exists on the basis of a TE.

4. The TE is not defeated

5. Therefore, S is justified to believe that God exists

(Kwan, 512)

Now note that I’m not  claiming that God does exist based on this argument, only that S is justified to believe that God does exist. I am thus confronting the de jure challenges to theistic belief–claims that such belief is unjustified or irrational (Plantinga, 167). These kind of challenges to theistic belief are exactly the kind that Dawkins seems to be referencing in The God Delusion, in fact, the book’s title points to the general accusation that anti-theists have brought against theism in general, but particularly against Christianity. The charge is that it is delusional to believe such things.

And indeed, such charges have (and likely will continue to be) been brought against Christianity despite, and perhaps even because of such arguments as the argument from TE. But I think that the PTC is indeed valid, and warrant is granted to those who have had TEs to take that on principal as a justification for belief.

There is of course further application involving a cumulative case argument in which TE can be weighed against simple spiritual experience or experiences of other faiths (such as a connection to the ONE or a feeling of emptiness). I don’t wish to explore that yet, but it is worth noting that there has been, of late, a somewhat significant increase in writings on these subjects.

I do believe that the argument from TE carries some weight, but it is mostly weight for those who have had TEs to counter charges that such ideas are delusional or unjustified, rather than being an argument for the existance of God. I think arguments of this type are fruitful, and I’m looking forward to reading more on them.

Sources:

Dawkins, Richard. The God Delusion.

Kwan, Kai-Man. “The Argument from Religious Experience.” The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology.

Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief.

The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

Debate on Sam Harris’ “Letter to a Christian Nation”

I have received permission to repost this. Some things are quotes from my blog, specifically “But Christians are Bad People” and others are quotes from Sam Harris’ “Letter…” (abbreviated due to laziness, not lack of respect). Some editing was done (i.e. removing names and extra info at the beginning, also added “if you’d like” to my bracketed side note on Matthew 22, and a few spelling errors were corrected).

This is a debate between an atheist and myself on Christianity in general. We decided to use my most recent blog and Sam Harris’ “Letter…” as the starting point. This will likely be only the first of many such posts.

His text is in normal print. My responses are in bold.


“Christians do bad things, so Christianity must be bad.”

I would argue that opponents of Christianity such as Sam Harris, would likely say that “Christians do bad things – and as the Bible specifically instructs in and sanctions such things – Christianity must be bad.”

I realize Sam Harris attempts to outline a case that the Bible commands evil in the beginnings of his book–citing Deuteronomy 13:6, 8-15. He then argues that Jesus does not remove responsibility from the law by quoting Matthew 5:18ff (page 5-6 in PDF form, 8-10 in the book). The problem is that Harris takes the Matthew verse out of context by either unintentionally or otherwise leaving out 5:18 “Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them, but to fulfill them.” One of the core teachings of Christianity is justification. Jesus paid the price. The Law that is written in the Hebrew Scriptures (aka Old Testament) is indeed not abolished, but fulfilled in the person of Christ. Jesus’ statement that He came to earth to fulfill them (the Law He states will not be overthrown) outlines this idea.

Paul makes this point clearer throughout his letters to the churches. Galatians 5:4-6, 14 (the rest of the passage can certainly be read, but I don’t think its wholly necessary to get the meaning)- “You who are trying to be justified by law have been alienated from Christ; you have fallen away from grace. But by faith we eagerly await through the Spirit the righteousness for which we hope. For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision [a requirement of the Law] nor uncircumcision has any value. The only thing that counts is faith expressing itself through love… The entire law is summed up in a single command: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’”

This is ultimately a doctrinal and theological issue. It seems it is one that Harris does not understand. His argument stems from taking Bible passages out of context and arguing against one of the core teachings of not only the church fathers, but also of Paul and Jesus himself–that Christ came as the sacrificial lamb to fulfill the Law, which no man can ever do.

As far as whether Christianity sanctions bad things, I think that is nothing but an unfair charge. Christianity’s command can be summed up by what Paul stated before and by what Jesus Himself said of the law (Matthew 22:37ff [read before it for context if you like]): ” ‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.’ This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments.” It seems clear that the Christianity Christ preaches is not one that condones violence. Whether one wants to twist it to do so is another matter entirely.

“Christians are bad, so Christianity is false.”

In the second paragraph, you have changed the premise of your argument from
“…so Christianity must be bad.”
to
“…so Christianity is false.”.
Those are quite different. If you intend to argue both positions (or rather that someone else holds both positions) that’s fine, but a clearer distinction would be helpful.

“This is blantantly false, and I’m honestly shocked that someone like Sam Harris…”

Again, your first premise is closer to what Harris has stated – the second I find questionable. The second is what you refer to here, and attribute it to Harris. I find no reference in his book that suggests he takes this position – correct me if I’m mistaken. That is, have you a reference that indicates that Harris thinks that because Christians do bad things, Christianity is false?

I should have stated that more clearly. It’s a problem I’ll hope to rectify a bit by taking —’s advice to lessen my amount of posts and increase the editing and thought on each. Harris doesn’t specifically argue that Christianity is false. He does seemingly believe it should be rejected because of the initial premise, however. Though, to be fair, if Christianity is true (i.e. exclusive claim to eternal life in heaven), then it should be embraced by all means. The only logical reason to abandon it would be if Christianity were false. Arguing against Christianity by saying it’s bad does nothing to its claims of truth, making the argument an ad hominem attack on the character of Christians rather than an attack on Christianity.

Harris, it could be said, argues that Christianity specifically teaches bad things, but I’ve already demonstrated his lack of theological knowledge on the first point, and his other points (i.e. condom use, etc.) could be valid against Catholicism, which is not the Christianity I (and about 50% of Christians) ascribe to. It seems dishonest of Harris to assert that atheists are completely different while shoehorning the Christian right into a Catholic view. There were several times, whilst reading his book, that I found myself saying to his “You believe…” statements “No I don’t.” Those times are straw men arguments to me, though I would say that Christians who believe, say, in not having birth control, should try to defend their position (one I disagree with).

“The first is that there is no way to test whether or not removing religion from an area would lead to an increase or decrease in violence.”

I would suggest a simpler test; read the text of their holy scripture, and see if it advocates and/or sanctions said violence. If it does, the religion is violent. If it’s holy scriptures are replete with violent act after violent act, the religion is violent.

Admittedly, I do find (at least) the international data concerning religious vs. non religious nations rather interesting. Though, Harris himself states;

“Of course, correlational data of this sort do not resolve questions of causality…these statistics prove that atheism is compatible with the basic aspirations of a civil society; (and) …that widespread belief in God does not ensure a society’s health.”

“A very good breaking down of Harris can be found in The Irrational Atheist by Vox Day…”

Day states, “By applying his metric to the state-wide voting instead of the more
precise and relevant county,…”
Perhaps you could explain to me why a ‘smaller’ sampling of the public would give a more precise result? When gathering a stat, a larger sample is surely a better indicator? A minor point of contention on my part, but I do find it interesting (perhaps even disingenuous) that he felt the need to invent yet another category of stats, in an attempt to prove the ones used invalid.

Let’s do justice to what Day is pointing out, however. He’s taking the same sample size (i.e. the U.S.) and simply giving a more in depth analysis of what the statistics show. He’s being more specific with the data. Rather than showing that red areas have higher violence than blue areas, they show that blue counties have higher violence on average than red ones.

Examples Day gives: Florida–11 blue counties account for 44% of the state’s population, but more than 50% of its murders and 60% of the robberies. Maryland–5 blue counties with a murder rate of 13.22/100,000 verses 0.89/100,000 in the red counties. Washington, D.C.–voted 91% blue but has the highest murder rate in the nation, almost 7 times the average national rate.

Harris’ examples of cities are also taken by state, but not by county. When one goes by county, 13/25 of the safest cities are in red counties (verses the by state of 8/25), while 21/25 of the most dangerous cities are in blue counties (verses by state 12/25). In other words, when one gets specific with the data, it can be shown that red areas are potentially safer than blue areas.

To say that it is a “smaller” sampling is inaccurate. Rather, it is looking more specifically at the same sampling. An analogy could be the body. Sam Harris points to one’s midsection and says there is something wrong with it. We can use that same data and zero in on, say, the kidney and point to that as the problem area. The same amount of data is there (we have examined the midsection), but the more specific information leads to a more correct conclusion.

“…how is it that showing violence by political beliefs automatically shows a correlation to religious beliefs?”

Because it can be shown that there is a strong correlation between the population’s political and religious beliefs. Therefore, show a correlation between violence and one’s political affiliation, and one can extrapolate from this.

It is fair to say that certain geographical locations in the U.S. are in fact predominately one party or another (thus the whole red state – blue state dichotomy), and that those parties do in fact represent certain religious affiliations more than others – the stats bare this out quite well, and candidates stake their chances of winning an election on it.

e.g. – The ‘deep south’ is predominately quite religious  – compared to say, the much more liberal coastal areas, and to some extent, the mid west. The break down is shown here; http://www.valpo.edu/geomet/pics/geo200/religion/adherents.gif

The blue and red correlates very closely to this reality; http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/election/2008/statemapredbluer1024.png

Certainly it isn’t perfect, but it is quite illuminating, and certainly enough to gain some reasonable insight as to the connections present between political and religious beliefs in the U.S..

Okay, let’s examine this in detail as well. Day points to a 2001 ARIS study that shows that 14.1% of Americans are atheists. About 1/2 of eligible Americans vote. So assuming that every eligible atheist voted, that means that 28.2% of the vote was potentially atheist.

The problem is that exit polls show that atheists were less likely to vote than religious people, accounting for about 10% of voters in CNN exit polls. They went about 2/3 blue. But the problem is that Harris seems to want to use this to show that non-religious people are less violent. This discounts all those who didn’t vote, and it also means that only 16% of blue voters were actually non-religious. It seems kind of ridiculous to attribute all that nonviolent behavior to a lack of religion when it is only 16% of the voting total.

So I stand by my idea that using votes to determine religious belief seems pretty silly. Not only that, but if we do use it as a determining factor, it would show the opposite of what Harris wants to argue.

“…religion does do a lot of good, whether people like Harris want to admit it or not.”

“It is undeniable that many people of faith make heroic sacrifices to relieve the suffering of other human beings.” – Sam Harris
“While there is no doubt that Christian missionaries are also moved by a desire to alleviate suffering, …” – Sam Harris
“While missionaries do many noble things at great risk to themselves,…” -Sam Harris

He has no trouble admitting that at all. (straw man)

I’ll concede again that I should have been more clear here. Harris does admit that religious people do good things, but it seems to me that his argument centers around the idea that no religion = better people. Note especially pages 12-13 in the PDF version of “Letter…” He seems to argue that if religion were removed, more good would be done. I could stand to reword that part of my blog entry, but again I don’t think I’m attacking a straw man when Harris specifically tries to detract from the good that religious people do (i.e. his Mother Theresa example in which he says she was “…deranged by religious faith.”) If she were not so deranged, she would have been better. That seems to be a valid way to argue from what he is saying.

But one major thing could be said here theologically as well. Christianity isn’t about achieving goodness. It isn’t about being good. It’s the fact that we are not good that means we need Christ. Whether or not one wants to say Christians are worse than non-Christians doesn’t do anything to hurt the message of Christ–because it’s not based on being good people, it’s based on being saved people.

“But those who are, say, Christian, are commanded to be good,…”

This is in fact a strike against Christianity in many an atheist’s mind; that the idea of Christian morality is ‘commanded’ of its adherents.
Atheists, while also displaying morality, which you concede (“…people who don’t believe in God do good things too. Okay. I’ll agree,…”), do not require this command, nor the promise of reward or threat of punishment.
As Harris states;
“…which is more moral: helping people purely out of concern for their suffering, or helping them because you think the creator of the universe will reward you for it?”
- or in my own words, ‘because he commands you to do so?’

Here Harris completely misunderstands large amounts of Christian belief. Again the assumption is that being Christian = better morals. But that’s not what Christianity is about.

Also, this explanation of goodness begs the question entirely against the Christian. It assumes that a religious person only does good things out of belief of reward (or perhaps fear of punishment). The conclusion has snuck [edit: sic, blast!] into the premise. It is wholly possible that Christians do good things out of the kindness of their hearts. The Christianity I believe means that I am saved. Any good that I do is for other reasons, not for the hope of reward. The premise in the argument begs the question because it implies that the only reason a Christian does good is for reward, so the good acts they do aren’t as good as one who doesn’t do it for a reward.

“…whilst atheism can at best offer an evolutionary view of morality that is not obligatory”

Perhaps you can explain to me what the negative is here, assuming that the result – a person acting with moral responsibility – is the same?
I should mention also, I find your choice of ‘obligatory’ very interesting! As it is defined; “required as a matter of obligation; mandatory”. Again I refer you to the above question, of which scenario might make one more moral.

I meant to say “objective” not “obligatory.” This was wholly a mistake I can ascribe to lack of sleep. The point you make about the result being the same is interesting, given that you just argued above that it is somehow better to do good things without a responsibility to do so. But again, the use of obligatory was a complete mistake. Read it as “objective” and that is my meaning.

“…unclear as to whether or not institutionalized religion is indeed a major cause of violence.”

I had a ridiculously long list here, and have decided it would be of no avail, at least not in this discussion. The violent history of religion would require its own debate. It does after all entail a couple thousand years of history.
Suffice to say for now, there is more than ample evidence to support the notion that religion not only breeds and justifies violence, it also aids and abets and condones it when it isn’t directly responsible for it. Political violence and the power and persuasiveness of religion have on countless occasion had a rather symbiotic relationship.

One could make the same argument for the history of irreligion. Harris concedes as much when he points out that Christians bring up people like Pol Pot, Stalin, and the like. Interestingly, I think simply looking at an overall # of death rate, it is possible that irreligion has lead to more violence than religion. It is also worthy of note that Harris specifically tries to get around these people by calling them irrational and makes some attempt to try to put them outside of atheism. Page 14 on the PDF version of his book (40ff in the book) demonstrates Harris in a very uncomfortable position.

“The problem with such tyrants is not that they reject the dogma of religion, but that they embrace other life-destroying myths. Most become the center of a quasi-religious personality cult, requiring the continual use of propaganda for its maintenance. There is a difference between propaganda and the honest dissemination of information that we (generally) expect from a liberal democracy. Tyrants who orchestrate genocides, or who happily preside over the starvation of their own people, also tend to be profoundly idiosyncratic men, not champions of reason. Kim Il Sung, for instance, demanded that his beds at his various dwellings be situated precisely five hundred meters above sea level. His duvets had to be filled with the softest down imaginable. What is the softest down imaginable? It apparently comes from the chin of a sparrow. Seven hundred thousand sparrows were required to fill a single duvet. Given the profundity of his esoteric concerns, we might wonder how reasonable a man Kim Il Sung actually was.”

His argument here seems to be that these people are irrational, so they can be dismissed. Yet I’d make the argument that Christians in particular who try to use that belief system for violence are irrational. Either both can be discounted, or neither can.

“Further, is it not obvious that much religion embraces peace?”

No, it isn’t. (begging the question) The Christian Bible is simply one of the most violence-ridden pieces of literature I’ve encountered. Page after blood soaked page espouses more brutal rape, slavery, torture, genocide, sacrifice – and often to the elation of, or under the direct command of, the Creator – than you can shake a stick at.

The Bible does indeed have much violence in it. I’ve argued that things such as killing that is endorsed by God can be logically defensible here. I can sum up:

“In this case, the one presenting the argument is suggesting that:

1. God is morally perfect

and

2. God commands killing

are incompatible. Thus, in order to counter this argument, all that needs to be done philosophically is show there is no inconsistancy. In other words, all that needs to be done is show another alternative. That alternative readily makes itself available:

3. There are some whose moral depravity is such that God will not suffer them to live

This third explanation gives a logical “way out” of the supposed dilemma presented by the first two statements. While this explanation may not seem satisfactory to some who would wish to debate the finer points of individual verses, cherry-picking out-of-context Scripture does nothing in light of the fact that option 3. is logically valid. The defender of the faith need not even demonstrate that this statement is true, only that it is possible.

Thus, I conclude that to have 1. God is morally perfect and 2. God commands killing is not a contradiction in light of 3. There are some whose moral depravitiy is such that God will not suffer them to live.

The case for God’s love could fill numerous volumes, but it is clear from Scripture that God is intentionally portrayed as the definition of Judge, morally perfect, and righteous. The writers of the inspired Word are clearly not recording stories of massed killings in the name of the Lord for the sake of showing God’s moral imperfections (which, I would argue, points even more towards the innerrancy of Scripture, but that’s a whole other issue), but they are rather recording these stories to show that God is indeed God and He is in control. In His moral perfection, there are things He cannot tolerate. Those things are punished in righteousness. Those who argue that the God of the Bible is evil are merely skimming scripture for verses they believe will back them up in out-of-context situations. Further, they are rejecting the Holy Spirit’s role in directing true and upright teaching of the word.

Finally, even if one does not accept Scripture as innerrant, the Word of God, or as being passed on by the Holy Spirit, the philosophical problem of evil in the Bible is solved quite simply, contrary to general belief, by the assertion that God’s role as Judge could mean He cannot allow certain evils to pass unpunished.”

Arguing that God portrayed in the Bible is evil is to not only do so by specifically searching for verses to support the case in light of much evidence to suggest otherwise (just see God’s interactions with the nation of Israel in light of their constant apostasy, the example of Jesus, the Psalms, and all kinds of other verses that deal with the mercy and goodness of God), but it is also to argue without a knowledge of the culture that such a text originated from. In other words, to argue that God is evil in light of the Bible is to look on such acts with modern eyes and completely discount the fact that the Biblical world was a completely different place than the world we have.

“Harris himself actually endorses a religion: Jainism. How is it that one can decry religion while adhering to it?”

There’s a couple of things wrong with this statement – almost to the point that I would respectfully ask that you amend your blog, and make the correction. But that feels beyond the scope of what we’re doing here. I’ll abstain from that request – but do consider what it is you’ve actually said;

First, he does not endorse this religion. He highlights it as an exception to the rule. That is, he notes that it “preaches a doctrine of utter non-violence”, and he does so in order to contrast it with Christianity, which is replete with violence.
He states, “If you think that Christianity is the most direct and undefiled expression of love and compassion the world has ever seen, you do not know much about the world’s other religions.” He then goes on to use Jainism as an example of a more compassionate religion.
This is not an ‘endorsement’. It’s simple compare and contrast for the sake of illustration.

Second, you then choose to use the unfortunate phrase ‘adhere to’ when describing Harris’ statements about Jainism – stating he in fact adheres to Jainism. Certainly you know he does not adhere to this or any religion?
He neither endorses nor adheres to this religion, and never attests that he does. Do consider your words.

This is an issue of semantics and I’m willing to concede the point that Harris does not adhere to Jainism. Though it is clear that he has some interesting views on spirituality (I grant that Wikipedia is not the best source for this type of thing, but the quote from End of Faith, combined to his specific exclusion of Eastern religions from his general attack on religion show at least a predisposition).

“…it is telling that Harris feels the need to include a chapter about Are atheists evil?”

Do tell? I’m not at all clear what you think this exposes about Harris?

I can explain for you why this inclusion was quite necessary in a book of this sort. Day in and day out, the American atheist is absolutely inundated with accusations from his Christian neighbor, that he is without morals, “spiritually” bankrupt, brimming with sin, in a word, evil.
This type of misguided thinking has earned the atheist the ‘least trusted minority’ in America award. A 2007 Gallup Poll showed the following; The question was whether or not you would vote for a particular (minority) for President. The following groups and the percent that ‘would’ vote for them that follows was the result;
Catholic-95%, Black-94, Jewish-92, Woman-88, Hispanic-87, Mormon-72, married three times-67, 72 yrs old-57, homosexual-55, and finally atheist-45%.

The need for a look into the morality of the atheist was an important component of the discussion – esp. in a book addressing a ‘Christian Nation’.

I’d personally never argue that atheists are evil. My inclusion of that little tidbit was generally pointless and I’ll acknowledge that.

“and proceed to try to move atheism as far away from the evils that have been done in the name of rationality/atheism as possible.”

Or more accurately, to show that no such connection can be made. A simple question; Do you honestly think that any of the evil that Stalin, Pol Pot or Mao perpetrated, could be said to have been done in the name of ‘rationality’? I’d be quite curious to hear you justify that if it is your belief. I consider what these men did to be the very height of irrationality.
I should note though, that there is no necessary link even between rationality and atheism. While I certainly see atheism as a rational position, one need not come to it exclusively through rationality. I have encountered atheists that believe in ghosts, for example. Quite irational in my opinion.

Yet Harris, and it seems you, continue to argue using points from people who are Christian and irrational. This doesn’t really seem fair. Also, I doubt that someone like, say, Stalin, would say they were being irrational. My main point is that either both types of irrational extremities (violent Christians and violent atheists) don’t need to be addressed, or they both do.

Regarding the inclusion of atheism in that quote, simply, nothing can be done in the name of atheism. It’s a statement without meaning. As I’m sure you’ve heard many times, atheism is simply the lack of a belief in a god. Nothing more. How you one do something ‘in the name of’ a lack of a belief?

Fair enough, then I’ll say that these men were atheists. The people who did violence and were Christian can still be compared to as a legitimate analogy. Atheists who do violence. Christians who do violence. I’d argue both are bad.

If you wish to tack on some other world view or belief system (secularism, humanism, etc.), they actually begin to carry some baggage, and one might say they did something in the name of some ideal that that particular world view or ideology holds. But then you are no longer talking exclusively about atheism.
Atheism has no system of belief, no doctrine, no dogma, no worldview…only a lack of a belief in a god.
When we say something was done ‘in the name of a religion’, it is precisely because religion does include all of the things I mentioned. It is quite simple to open any cherished scripture, and find justification for practically any evil man can dream up. No such thing is possible by simply not having a belief in a god.

Belief in a God can, however, give an objective standard by which all actions must be judged. Thus there is a better basis by which to reject certain actions than if there is no objective standard.

“Sam Harris accuses Christianity in particular…He goes on to attempt to disassociate atheism with these obvious atheists” by saying “While it is true that such men are sometimes enemies of organized religion…”  [Here I'd like to note that this is completely deceptive."

I will agree, within this section anyway, that he did seem to directly avoid saying that the men were atheists. It felt disingenuos to me. He does elsewhere, but that isn't relevant. I have to concede that he might have been more direct here. I don't appreciate the dodge either. That said...

"These men absolutely were enemies of organized religion and wholly atheist. Harris is attempting to downplay the evil of these men.] “

It’s entirely honest on his part to say ‘sometimes’ in this case, as Hitler was in the list. Hitler’s atheism, as you know, is quite debatable, and he was a staunch bedfellow with the Church as well (however opportunist that relationship may have been). It would have been inaccurate to claim that ‘all’ of his list were enemies of religion and that they were all atheists. I can’t say for sure that this is why he stated it this way, but it would have been inaccurate to do other wise.
I saw no effort on his part to downplay the evil the men did either.

“Isn’t it obvious that those who champion murder in the name of God are just as irrational as these atheists that Harris, Dawkins, and the like are quick to condemn as irrational?”
Yes, it is quite obvious to me that they are indeed just as irrational. The point is they have centuries of dogma and scripture to justify (or lay blame on if you prefer, not really the point) their horrific actions, as I explained above.

Arguing this is false in light of the points I’ve already made, but it seems to be the central issue, so I’ll address it again. To argue that Christianity is violent is to go against the core teachings of Christianity from its founding (and indeed the person of Christ) to the present day. Not only are the two core law statements to love God and neighbor, but Christ specifically condemns violence in all forms. To argue otherwise is to beg the question. Again, it would be easy to pick out violent examples from Scripture and debate them on a verse-by-verse basis, but that is not the core issue. Christianity teaches the entire Bible points to Christ at the center. What does Christ teach? Nonviolence.

This may sound like a variation of the “No True Scotsman” argument, but it isn’t, as we do have a strict definition of what it means to be Christian in the Bible. One need only look at what Christ Himself says and one can find what is indeed a “true Christian.” Not only that, but Paul, Peter, etc. are further examples of what Christianity means.

“Either Christians are evil because of religion and atheists are evil because of a lack of religion”

Again, I refer you to the above statements. Christians can use the very scripture their religion is based on to justify the evils they do. Atheists have no such justification. An atheist committing an act of violence must assume the responsibility solely on their own. There is no dogma to point to and say “See, that’s what happens when you are an atheist.”. No ancient scripture or holy text, no authorities from whom rules and such are handed down, only an individual making a choice.

Christians who use the Scripture to justify violence have missed what Christ himself says about violence. There can be nothing more clear than this when one simply reads what Jesus says.

“I’d argue that atheists like Stalin could defend their killing from an atheologically defensible position as well: personhood doesn’t matter, so we can kill as we please.”

There is no such position in existence. Not having a belief in a god says nothing of one’s beliefs about the worth of a human life. It does not put special value on it, nor does it devalue it – it says nothing at all about it – or anything else for that matter. It only denotes that one has no belief in a god.

Conceded. Though the atheism you are describing is a “soft atheism” that goes against the definition of atheism as seen in both the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. See further points about that here.

“I do, however agree that either side can use those beliefs (or lack thereof) to condone violent actions.”

How is it you arrive at some belief system (that would ‘condone’ an action), from the statement that one dose not have a belief in a god?
How is it one would use a ‘lack of a belief in a god’ to justify any particular action, let alone a violent one in particular?
I urge caution and thought here. What I am asking is how you arrive at that solely from a lack of a belief in a god, which is precisely what atheism is. Anything extraneously tagged on, and you are no longer discussing atheism.

“His examples include preaching abstinence over use of condoms,…All of these are ad hominem attacks (or ad Deum)”

How is mentioning that the church preaches abstinence an ad hominem attack? I submit that it most certainly is not.

“One of the most pernicious effects of religion is that it tends to divorce morality from the reality of human and animal suffering. Religion allows people to imagine that their concerns are moral when they are not—that is, when they have nothing to do with suffering or its alleviation. Indeed, religion allows people to imagine that their concerns are moral when they are highly immoral—that is, when pressing these concerns inflicts unnecessary and appalling suffering on innocent human beings. This explains why Christians like yourself expend more “moral” energy opposing abortion than fighting genocide. It explains why you are more concerned about human embryos than about the lifesaving promise of stem-cell research. And it explains why you can preach against condom use in sub-Saharan Africa while millions die from AIDS there each year. You believe that your religious concerns about sex, in all their tiresome immensity, have something to do with morality. And yet, your efforts to constrain the sexual behavior of consenting adults—and even to discourage your own sons and daughters from having premarital sex—are almost never geared toward the relief of human suffering. In fact, relieving suffering seems to rank rather low on your list of priorities. Your principal concern appears to be that the creator of the universe will take offense at something people do while naked. This prudery of yours contributes daily to the surplus of human misery.”

This seems ad hominem to me. Rather than attacking any specific argument, he is attacking, say, Catholics, for preaching abstinence. I’m almost willing to concede your point here except for the virulent nature of his attack in this section. I may be reading too much into it, but this passage seems full of emotional appeal and very much like an attack on people who would dare believe such things and less like a legitimate complaint.

I won’t comment on your subsequent three fold explanation – mostly in the interest of length (this is already ridiculously long!). I’m quite interested in discussing morality as it pertains to religion and atheism in the future though. Let’s hope we can return to this.

Well. That’s quite a lot. More than enough for now, I’m sure. Hopefully it wasn’t too terribly dull, and I’ve left you with something worthy of response. Hope to hear from you soon,

Another thing I’d love to point out is that Harris is a wonderful example of the argument from atheism (page 5 in PDF) which I address http://jwwartick.com/2009/07/24/the-argument-from-atheism/.This argument is demonstrably false because by definition a theist is not an atheist, check out the blog for a longer rebuttal.

Counter-Counter Apologetics 2: Gross Misunderstandings of the Ontological Argument

In this second in my series countering counter-apologetics, I will examine arguments that are supposed to counter the Ontological Argument, which I personally believe is both logically valid and unavoidably true.

There are two main sources I will use to show the anti-theistic counter. Iron Chariots and Richard Dawkins. It is telling that I personally believe that Iron Chariots, a Wikipedia-offshoot site for counter-apologetics manages to make a better case than Richard Dawkins.

The Ontological Argument comes in a very wide range of forms. There is no way I could discuss all of them individually in a limited space, so I won’t. What I will do is simply lay out a very basic template that underlies most ontological arguments, show the counter-arguments and counter those.

The Ontological Argument is basically as follows:

1. It is possible there is a being that is the greatest conceivable being.

2. That which exists in reality is greater than that which exists in the understanding.

3. Therefore, the greatest possible being must exist in reality by definition.

This is by far the most basic possible way I could strip the argument down. I’d like to put a mini disclaimer here and say I am no professional philosopher, so I may have taken too many of the finer points out of the Ontological Argument, but I think this is the best summing up.

There are a few ways that anti-theists attempt to counter this argument, by making a parody of it, by challenging the first premise, or by judging it as unintelligible.

I will deal with the latter argument first. The challenge is made that the Ontological Argument is unintelligible. This is, I believe, the general point Richard Dawkins is trying to make in his amateurish attack on theistic arguments in The God Delusion. He points to a few things in order to try to get around it. The first is reducing the argument to the “language of the playground (104).” I might point out that I would gladly put his entire book in such language, because I wholly agree with him when he states that “I am a scientist rather than a philosopher (107).” Poking fun at an argument is an interesting tactic, but wholly ineffective. I honestly have nothing more to say about this first apparent attack, because all it shows is Dawkins’ own ineffectual method of argumentation: discarding the rules of philosophy in favor of elitest bickering.

His second attack is stating that, “The very idea that grand conclusions could follow from such logomachist trickery offends me aesthetically, so I must take care to refrain from brandying words like ‘fool (105).’” Dawkins breaks his own rule several times, not using the word fool, but berating the religious in general throughout his book. Further, the fact that logic offends him aesthetically speaks volumes for the amount of mastery he has over philosophy. His claim that an argument such as the ontological one is “trickery” really does nothing to the argument, because once again it’s not actually an attack on any of the premises, but rather simply being offended by a logically sound argument.

In his third approach, Dawkisn simply tries to point to the argument as unintelligible by quoting a story of a debate between Euler and Diderot, in which Euler was said to have stated “Monsieur [sic], (a+b^n)/n=x therefore God exists!” I’m not entirely sure I’m drawing the correct conclusion from Dawkins random placement of this quote in his supposed dismantling of various theistic arguments, but it seems he’s comparing the Ontological Argument to just pulling random things out of a hat. Unfortunately, that is not the case, because the Ontological Argument is logically valid, and the only way to get around it is to challenge a premise, which Dawkins either can’t, due to his ineptness with philosophy, or won’t, due to his general misrepresentation of theism in general, do.

Further, how exactly is it that the ontological argument is unintelligible? It states simply that it is possible to think of a being that is the greatest of all. That’s not so hard to comprehend. The argument doesn’t depend on us being able to conceive of this being in its entirety, just to have a concept of possibility. This idea that God is possible is intelligible to even those children who would use the “playground language” dawkins attempts to reduce the Ontological Argument to. The other points of the Ontological Argument follow, so the argument itself is intelligible.

Iron Chariots takes a different route, presenting some of the more interesting challenges to the Ontological Argument (in fairness to Dawkins, he did show a parody of the argument, but I don’t think it’s any better or worse than those presented at Iron Chariots).

The Ontological Argument is generally thought to be most susceptible to parodies. This is essentially taking an argument and constructing a new argument with the same logical structure to come to an absurd conclusion.

Iron Chariots presents three parodies. They are all almost identical, so I shall show the two classic versions:

“Unicorns:

  1. Let us define a unicorn as a magical equine being that has one horn, and that exists.
  2. By the above definition, such a being must necessarily exist.
  3. Therefore unicorns exist.

Shangri-La:

  1. Shangri-La is the greatest place on earth.
  2. A place that exists is greater than one that doesn’t.
  3. Therefore, Shangri-La exists. (Iron Chariots) “

The problem with these parodies is that they seem to miss the entire point of the Ontological Argument, which is that it is discussing a necessary being. Unicorns, by definition, are contingent beings. That is, their existence is not necessary, they are not necessary in our universe for our universe to be as it is. The same goes for locations such as Shangri-La. The theistic God, however, has tied into the concept necessity. According to theism, God is not a contingent being, but a necessary one. Therefore, these parodies don’t actually do anything to the Ontological Argument because they missed one of the core premises. Now I will concede my mini-Ontological Arugment doesn’t explicitly state necessity, but other versions do. It can also be shown through logical analysis that these kind of paraodies are invalid.

The final attempt at invalidating the Ontological Argument is another parody, known as “Gasking’s Proof”:

  1. The creation of the universe is the greatest achievement imaginable.
  2. The merit of an achievement consists of its intrinsic greatness and the ability of its creator.
  3. The greater the handicap to the creator, the greater the achievement (would you be more impressed by Turner painting a beautiful landscape or a blind one-armed dwarf?)
  4. The biggest handicap to a creator would be non-existence
  5. Therefore if we suppose that the universe is the creation of an existing creator, we can conceive a greater being — namely, one who created everything while not existing.
  6. Therefore, God does not exist.

There are many problems with this attempt to parody the Ontological Argument and prove God doesn’t exist. These are all problems with the premises. Premise 1 states that the creation of the universe is the greatest achievement imaginable. How so? Are there not achievements that could be greater? Could not the greatest achievement be creating infinite universes? For the sake of argument, however, I’ll concede step 1. Premises 3 and 4, I believe, has the greatest problems. Premise 3 assumes that doing things with a handicap makes something logically greater. I’d love to see a proof of this. The premise makes an appeal to common sense, but that is invalid in logic. I’m not at all convinced that having a handicap and doing something makes that achievement itself greater. This is made more problematic by the fact that premise 1 points to the universe as being the greatest achievement. This would seem to mean that an achievement is a finished product, not the steps leading up to the product.

For example, the Cubs winning the World Series after over a century without doing so may seem a greater achievement than the Yankees doing so, but it would be hard to show that logically, for both have the World Series as the finished product. I’m willing to grant premise 3, however, just for the sake of argument.

Premise 4 is where the argument really breaks apart. How is it that non-existence is a handicap? Handicaps can only be applied to things that do exist. To imply that something has a handicap assumes implicitly that it exists. Thus, premise 4 essentially says that a being both exists and does not exist, which is logically impossible. I assume that this premise was in order to counter the idea that existing-in-reality is greater than existing-in-understanding, but note that both of these are existing. In other words, the choice in the Ontological Argument is not saying that something that doesn’t exist exists, just that something that exists-in-the-understanding rather exists-in-reality. Premise 4 is therefore completely invalid both logically and in relation to the Ontological Argument.

I may talk further about Ontological Arguments, but that’s what I have for now. As William Lane Craig states, the Ontological argument leaves anti-theists with no way out. If the concept of the theistic God is even possible, than God exists, necessarily.

Counter-Counter-Apologetics 1: Redeeming Pascal’s Wager

When I first started to get into apologetics, one of the first sites I stumbled upon was Iron Chariots, a counter-apologetics site.

This site’s mission statement is “Iron Chariots is intended to provide information on apologetics and counter-apologetics. We’ll be collecting common arguments and providing responses, information and resources to help counter the glut of misinformation and poor arguments which masquerade as “evidence” for religious claims. “

Note especially the scare quotes they use around evidence. This is a tactic atheists are very prone to using. Anything they disagree with, they put quotes around to make it look less true. Atheists are “right.” See? Fun, isn’t it? Does it do anything of value? No.

Anyway, it was sort of disturbing to see that there are those who are trying any means necessary to get around theism. I left the site a little scared, wondering if Christian Apologetics was all it is said to be. Well it is. After much more studying and forgetting completely about this site, I stumbled back upon it the other day, and decided to see what the anti-theists are saying about apologetics. Not much of value, in my opinion. And because I feel like it, I’m going to start countering their counter apologetics in a series of posts that will happen randomly interspersed with my others. These posts won’t just include arguments from this site, but will also include things like my counter for the “Argument from Atheism” (AKA “One Step Further Argument”).

This article will focus on Pascal’s Wager. Before I proceed, I should note that I absolutely do not think Pascal’s Wager is a good tool for witnessing, nor is it all that great as an argument. But it is, I think valid, and while it should not be used as a reason to believe, it does provide what, in logic, is called a dilemma for the atheists.

Pascal’s Wager is essentially as follows: God exists or He does not exist. If He does exist, there is infinite reward for believing in Him, but infinite loss for not believing in Him. If He does not exist, there is nothing to lose. “Nothing to lose, everything to gain,” is often the summing-up of this dilemma.

Iron Chariots accurately, in my opinion, points out that there isn’t nothing to lose by disbelieving. If there is no God then,

“For one thing, if you go through life believing a lie, that is a bad thing in itself. Besides that, there is more to being a believer than just saying “Okay, I believe now” and getting on with your life. Serious believers spend a lot of their time in church, and contribute a lot of money as well. There’s a reason why some towns have very affluent looking buildings for churches, and why large and elaborate cathedrals are possible: they’re funded by folks who donate a tenth of their income throughout their lives to tithing. This is surely quite a waste if the object of worship isn’t real.”

The article then goes on a rant about property taxes, persecution, etc., things which will not be discussed here because, frankly, I find these arguments ineffably dull, though I may be forced to talk about them in the future.

So yes, I concede that there is a reward for not believing if there is no God. They also accurately show that there can be finite rewards for believing in God even if He doesn’t exist, because of psychological benefits, society, etc. Unfortunately, they plug these positives into a table of good life vs. bad life instead of actually in Pascal’s Wager. So I’ll just do the work for them.

Pascal’s Wager
God Exists |      God Doesn’t Exist
Belief           ∞ +            |     Finite +
Disbelief    |  ∞ -          |      Finite +

Okay so the table isn’t working so well. I think it can be figured out. Anyway, the main argument is that there is after all, a reward for not believing if there is no God. The problem is that even if that reward outweighs the finite reward of believing in a non-existant God, that still must be weighed against the infinite negative of not believing if there is a God. The argument that there is a reward for not believing, so it is logical to not believe breaks down when you weigh the infinite negative of disbelief if God exists verses the finite positive of disbelief if God does not.

There is one final point I’d like to make. That is, that the same site continues to argue that another problem is which god to believe in. I’d like to counter that by saying that isn’t the point of Pascal’s Wager. Belief in a god is better than belief in no god, because the probability for infinite reward still increases (in that it will be 1/however many gods to choose from) verses the probability for infinite negative (which would be certain if there is a God). So Pascal’s Wager still stands. I grant that the probability increase would be very low, so some may then argue that it’s not worth giving up the finite reward of not believing in a god. The response could then be that there is still a granted finite reward in believing in a god if god doesn’t exist, and any increase in probability for infinite gain verses infinite loss would outweigh the any loss of finite reward that could be gained from disbelief. In other words, the increased probability plus the finite reward of believing in a god would outweigh the definite probability of infinite negative if there is a God combined with the finite reward of not believing in a God.

Sorry for the drawn out post, but I wanted to respond thoroughly. There is more I’d like to say, but that’s where I’ll end for now.

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