Terri, I like you have lost a lot in following Jesus; (and I don’t want to elaborate) I know myself; so I know I have ‘triggers’ those hot-buttons, (I’ll read something, or someone will make a cutting remark) and that will bring on pain and anger. I am trying when it ‘hits’ (and I know it is not God) to take the slow, deep breath, and remember how much Jesus loves me. (a kind of count to ten slowly)…and now I find that works. I am not ‘repressing’ the anger, but giving it to God.

Any other suggestions?

(sorry to be so vague)

Keep up the good work!

I think your argument is very interesting. It relies upon a semantics of possible worlds which is controversial, however. You wrote, “any world you imagine is dependent on your existence and, therefore, not existing on its own.” Now for the sake of clarity, we’re talking about modal logic here, so worlds we imagine are not necessarily possible worlds. For example, I could “imagine” a world in which square circles exist [granting it is possible to think about the logically impossible--and I'm not convinced it is]. But if that’s the case, then the set of possible worlds is not identical to the set of imaginable worlds. Now this reveals that the argument you’ve made seems to conflate “possible worlds” with “imagined worlds.” Possible worlds, according to most semantics of possibility, are one of the following: 1) necessarily existing abstract objects [realism]; 2) real, instantiated worlds [extreme realism]; 3) concepts used only for the sake of clarification [fictionalism]. Now, your argument seems like it would work based upon fictionalism, but if one is a realist or an extreme realist, one would deny that possible worlds are the same as imagined worlds and therefore they would deny that the set of possible worlds rely upon our existence.

So I think your argument works, but only if one uses a fictionalist account of possible worlds. I, personally, am more of a realist, so I’m sympathetic to the argument but not convinced.

It could be worth developing if you take into account the nuances of fictionalism, include an argument for that position, and establish the necessary link between existence and possibility.

Now regarding the latter part of your post: you asked if “every time you imagine a possible world, that possible world is depend[ent] on your existence, making you a necessary being for that world alone?”

I would answer by saying this clearly does conflate possible worlds with imagined worlds. I’m not convinced at all that the set of possible worlds just is the set of imagined worlds, so I do not think that I am a necessary being for imagined worlds/possible worlds. Further, it seems one would have to clarify what is meant by “imagined world” because it is definitely being used here with a different sense than that of “possible world.”

Thanks for the interesting comment!