Archaeology
Joshua and Judges as contrasting accounts- Archaeological evidence and apologetic import
Joshua and the Conquest Narratives- Archaeology says otherwise
Dever’s work, Beyond the Texts: An Archaeological Portrait of Ancient Israel and Judah is hyper-focused on the archaeological evidence related to Ancient Israel and Judah. There’s a lengthy section at the beginning about the differences between looking at archaeological evidence and its (largely) “given” nature (eg. a soup bowl is a soup bowl-that’s its use, and arguing otherwise doesn’t change it) as opposed to texts like the Bible or other writings which have interpretation, memory, hyperbole, fictionalization, etc. built in.
The book is full of major insights, and Dever continues to rely almost exclusively upon archaeological evidence to make his points. Eventually, he gets to the conquest narratives of Joshua-Judges. Of the 30+ sites mentioned as being conquered in those books of the Bible, only 3-4 have any signs of destruction in the right time period. Writes Dever:
“[I]n the light of the overwhelming archaeological evidence, there was no large scale warfare on the thirteenth- and twelfth-century horizon, except that initiated by the Philistines along the coast… The inevitable conclusion is that the book of Joshua is nearly all fictitious, of little or no value to the historian. It is largely a legend celebrating the supposed exploits of a local folk hero.” (186)
I kind of knew this already–a major impact point for myself as someone who literally got a degree in apologetics was looking at the evidence in ANE history and trying to reconcile that with the Bible. And broadly speaking, evangelicalism has a severe problem when it comes to the archaeological evidence here.
Dever, however, doesn’t simply unload on the Joshua account and move on. He shows the marked contrast between how Judges shows the inhabitation of the land and how Joshua does so, noting the difference in themes between the two books. Dever concludes regarding the two books:
“The conclusion in light of archaeology is inevitable. The book of Joshua looks like a late, Deuteronomistic construct preoccupied with theological concerns, such as the Sinai covenant, centralization, and the temple, that were paramount particularly in the exilic and postexilic era. Its authors were scarcely familiar or concerned with life in the early Iron Age settlements. The book of Judges, by contrast, has the ring of truth about it. The core of the narrative consists of stories about everyday life in the formative, prestate era, when ‘there was no king in Israel [and] all the people did what was right in their own eyes’ (Judges 21:25). The portrait of as much as two hundred years of struggles under charismatic leaders with other peoples of the land–of a long drawn-out process of socioeconomic, political, and cultural change–is more realistic than that of the book of Joshua, which is really the celebration of a legendary hero” (187-188).
These conclusions are supported broadly by Dever’s own look at the way people of that time period were living, with fascinating insights into the lack of states and lack of even defensive positions throughout the region at the time (see 133ff). Additionally, the conclusions are supported by Dever’s noting of the contrast between how Joshua does not accurately represent that region at the time while Judges even has details of how the people lived at the time portrayed in accurate ways (188). A careful reading of the two books reveals these contrasts, to go along with the list complied by Dever which includes things like Israel being a huge territory immediately conquered in Joshua compared to a small, decentralized entity in Judges. Again, the latter, a group of settlements with little to unify them and no central state, reflects the time period and the archaeological data far more than the concept of a vastly populated land ripe for dramatic, swift conquest. This is all buttressed even more by the fact that many of the sites mentioned in Joshua have been excavated and shown to either be unoccupied or unconquered with no layers of destruction in the time period it supposedly would have taken place.
These aspects present a series of problems for the conservative apologist as one who wants a unified, inerrant text with total historical accuracy. We’ll look at one attempt to do just that below, but for now I want to note the import of moving beyond such a view. Dever’s point of Joshua being theologically oriented to questions of the time in which it was written is vastly important. To say that Joshua doesn’t present an accurate view of what actually happened in the land does nothing to undermine its intent. It is not intended to be historically accurate as an account of Iron Age settlement in the region. Instead, it is focused upon questions of the land, the temple, and the strict monotheism, sprinkled with a heaping helping of hero worship of Joshua and classic Ancient Near Eastern hyperbole. It is only when the book is forced into modern boxes that it becomes problematic. The genocidal violence it portrays did not happen, and therefore does not present a problem for God’s character. While some may press that even this portrayal calls into question the character of God, I’m much less interested in that argument, because once we acknowledge that it is a work of humans attempting to understand God, it becomes, for me, much more understandable that sometimes they get it wrong.
A Contrasting, Evangelical View and Some Problems
Evangelical apologists, a group which once would have included me, have had a confrontation with this evidence in sight for a long time. In Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith?, a group of evangelical authors published with a conservative press (Crossway, 2012) a collection of essays attempting to confront some of the “modern and postmodern” challenges to Scripture. John M. Monson’s chapter is entitled “Enter Joshua: The ‘Mother of Current Debates’ in Biblical Archaeology.” Monson notes that apart from the most conservative scholars, the Joshua conquest account has been taken to be historically unreliable (431).
Monson confronts this presumed unreliability by calling into question a few things related to consensus views of archaeology. First, he plants the seeds of doubt by complaining that archaeology has been “given a privileged role of proving or–through assumed lack of evidence–disproving the biblical record” (431). Note the wording of this first contention. The use of the word “assumed” here carries a lot of weight in the sentence. Monson is implying that people are simply assuming the biblical text is mistaken on the conquest (and other) accounts. But that implies that there simply hasn’t been anything found, and so people are assuming with “lack of evidence” that there is no evidence. That is not the case, however, as Dever and others have demonstrated. Dever’s book outlines a list of 35+ sites mentioned in the Biblical conquest accounts. Of those sites, only 3-4 have any evidence of even possibly being threatened by Israelite incursions, and the majority of those which have been excavated do not show a layer of destruction in the right timeline for the conquest narratives. Thus, it is hardly fair to say people are assuming the biblical account is unreliable based on a “lack of evidence.” Instead, there is positive evidence to suggest that the Joshua conquest accounts are indeed inventions.
Monson, however, goes on in his defense. He argues that archaeology is a younger discipline and that combining its findings with other disciplines remains “fraught with challenges” (435, 439), he suggests that archaeology is simply assumed to be the discipline to confirm ancient writings but implies that such a use is perhaps mistaken (438-439), and he maintains that archaeology, due to its “scattered, random, and incomplete nature” struggles to find the right place alongside the Bible’s account which “is selective, ancient, and theologically oriented” (439). Many of these points are points that resonate with me, particularly the latter. Archaeology, like paleontology, relies quite a bit on luck. Now, both disciplines can rely increasingly on technology to help guide their finds, so “random” isn’t necessarily correct, but there is no corrective for discovering things which simply no longer exist. Like ancient creatures whose entire fossil record may have been destroyed by vulcanism, excavation, construction, or simply lack of preservation, with archaeology there are any number of figments of the past which no longer exist for any number of reasons. To rely too heavily upon archaeology for the construction of the ancient past seems to be the wrong approach. However, Monson’s own words about the Bible being “selective, ancient, and theologically oriented” should suggest to him and other apologetically oriented and/or evangelical readers that perhaps it is their own view of Scripture which is at fault here. If they are going in assuming that a text written with a theological (or other) purpose is supposed to yield faultless history, then perhaps that assumption itself is worth questioning as well. Indeed, why not simply acknowledge that Joshua is attempting to make theological and selective points rather than convey a 100% accurate historical picture of what happened in Israel?
Monson, for himself, goes on to make an argument that Joshua records geographically accurate accounts of coming into the land. When I originally read the book about 10 years ago, I found this utterly convincing. However, reflection now suggests that Monson’s argument is too neat. For one, while it is elegant in attempting to show that Israel’s conquest as recorded in Joshua would make sense along geographic lines, that doesn’t account for the fact that whatever ancient writers/editors of the book would also be well-familiar with the geography of the region and so would be unlikely to invent or embellish an account which did not correspond to the geography of the area. Second, Monson claims that his argument from geography shifts the burden of proof such that it “lies with those who would deconstruct these stories” (452). That may be, but having two alleged campaigns correspond geographically with the reason does not somehow undermine or disprove the archaeological evidence directly showing that multiple sites allegedly conquered during this time period either show no signs of occupation or no signs of conquest. This, notwithstanding Monson’s claims that some of these sites were uninhabited and so wouldn’t have had such signs (I believe I’m understanding his argument correctly on p. 436-438).
Monson’s argument appears to be revisionist and reactionary. While he provides one positive evidence in support of his claim, his entire argument for these two supposed campaigns relies not upon the actual evidence of destroyed sites but rather on the lay of the land. Fascinatingly, Monson is forced into analogical language even in this geographic argument, such as spending extensive time arguing that the Hebrew word for “gate” can refer to geographical features (448-449). That may well be the case, but it is hard to credit Monson for making an argument that supposedly buttresses the Joshua conquest narratives against archaeological evidence when he is to be found arguing not just that “gate” means a geographical feature, but also that Ai, the region being considered, can be referred to as “The Ruin” due to another lengthy argument relying upon the definite article being used with “ruins” (443-444) and that Ai, apparently problematic for a number of archaeological regions, could have, “For all we know,” been “nothing more than a small squatter’s settlement in the vicinity of the imposing ruins of the mighty Early Bronze Age City of the third millennium BC” (437-438). Well sure, but for all we know, that “squatter’s settlement” would then not make a lot of sense as the sight for two massive military campaigns that crisscrossed a whole region!
Finally, the real motivation between Monson becomes clear at the very end of his chapter. After pointing out the text of Joshua shows him remaining faithful to God, Monson writes: “Over a millennium later, another Joshua walked through this same region. He too remained faithful. If we dismiss the real Joshua ben-Nun and his times, what is to stop us from dismissing the later Joshua, Jesus of Nazareth?” (457). This remarkable final sentence of Monson’s chapter is a case study in a loaded question. First, it implies that only by agreeing with the conquest narratives in toto can one agree there was a “real Joshua ben-Nun.” Second, it implies that there is an evidential link between Jesus and Joshua’s conquest narratives. That may be true, but it is unargued for here. Third, it uses scare tactics. Only those who agree with a slippery slope type argument will acquiesce to it, but for those people–presumably inerrantists–it’s a powerful way to thwart disagreement. After all, if the Bible isn’t historically accurate on Joshua, then that somehow means we have to question Jesus! This, of course, is ridiculous, but it’s exactly what Monson is implying. And frankly, this scare tactic shows where Monson is coming from in the earlier parts of his chapter. There’s not a genuine engagement with the evidence happening. Rather, the evidence needs to be massaged, evaded, or simply denied in order to maintain the story of Joshua at all costs; because for Monson, Jesus and the literal, genocidal conquest of Canaan stand or fall together.
Conclusion
It is probably clear to the reader at this point that I think Dever’s account is much more convincing than Monson’s. Yet, I say this as one who remains a Christian. Reading Dever actually gave me a sigh of relief. For so long, I had a bunch of issues with these accounts. Initially it was the ethical problem–why would God destroy these peoples? Later, I had the archaeological problem–now that I’d sacrificed my ethical impulse to condemn the slaughter, what if it hadn’t actually happened? To have someone who studies the archaeology simply lay out the evidence and say “This did not happen, and it was likely a fictitious invention to celebrate a folk hero” is, in a way, a relief. For one, his following that up with arguing that Judges is likely a much more accurate account makes me convinced yet again of something I’ve thought for a while–that once one leaves aside inerrancy, the biblical text becomes not just more readable but less scary in some ways–it doesn’t require you as a reader to constantly defend the indefensible. For another, setting aside the conquest narratives means that it is what I had long leaned towards–that these parts of the Bible are really just people trying to hyperbolically make “their guy” sound better than “the other guy”–seems backed by archaeological evidence. And Christians, we should truly be concerned with truth rather than attempting to support a pet doctrine, inerrancy, that doesn’t work on its own terms anyway.
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SDG.
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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from quotations, which are the property of their respective owners, and works of art as credited; images are often freely available to the public and J.W. Wartick makes no claims of owning rights to the images unless he makes that explicit) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author. All content on this site is the property of J.W. Wartick and is made available for individual and personal usage. If you cite from these documents, whether for personal or professional purposes, please give appropriate citation with both the name of the author (J.W. Wartick) and a link to the original URL. If you’d like to repost a post, you may do so, provided you show less than half of the original post on your own site and link to the original post for the rest. You must also appropriately cite the post as noted above. This blog is protected by Creative Commons licensing. By viewing any part of this site, you are agreeing to this usage policy.
Book Review: “The Philosophy of History: Naturalism and Religion- A Historiographical Approach to Origins” by James Stroud
…Either we will stand behind objective truth or sink into the abyss of relativism in the name of political correctness. (278)
One area Christian apologists need to explore further is the study of historiography. Historiography is, basically, the study of how to study history. It provides the framework in which one might seek truth in understanding historical facts. The way we study history will directly impact the results of historical investigation. John Warwick Montgomery, Michael Licona, and N.T. Wright have done an excellent job integrating historiography into their approach, and there are several treatments of historiography in works on archaeology with apologetic import (K.A. Kitchen is but one example), but there remains much room for development of this essential discipline in the area of Christian evidences.
James Stroud, in his work The Philosophy of History: Naturalism and Religion- A Historiographical Approach to Origins
Next, Stroud turned to an analysis of positivism and academic freedom. His argument is essentially that one should not pre-commit to a “closed” philosophy of history such that one cuts off any and all debate about the presuppositions one uses to interpret history and historical sciences. The winners write the history, but they are also capable of restricting the direction research may turn (49-50). There must be a distinction between the definition of science and science in practice; that is, one should not restrict scientific study through the use of one’s presuppositions to determine what is even capable of being studied or used as a hypothesis. Instead, people should be allowed to follow the evidence where it leads, even if such a project may discover things which lie outside the accepted explanations.
It must be acknowledged that Christianity is, by its nature, a distinctly historical religion: “[T]he truth or falsity of Christianity stands or falls with individual events within history…” (69). Thus, Christianity is almost uniquely capable of being approached in such a manner as to discern its truth through historical claims.
Interestingly, Stroud did not limit his use of “philosophy of history” to the study of history. Rather, he expanded it to include origin sciences, which are, he argued, a kind of historical science themselves. Thus, he examined both the origins of the universe and the origin and diversity of life alongside the historical portions of the book. In these sections on the historical sciences, he presents the design argument both in its cosmological and biological forms.
The meat of the book, however, may be found in the exploration of human history, which comprises approximately half the book. Here, Stroud really gets into stride. One central part of his argument is that “Language, writing, civilization, and religion all seem to be in a fairly advanced stage of development [from the beginning]….” (146). Proposed solutions which argue for a gradual evolution of human culture continue to be confronted by discoveries to the contrary, such as Gobekli Tepe, which shattered preconceived notions of the history of religion (155-157). Language appears to be highly complex from the beginning, and there is little reason to think that some languages are more primitive (in the sense of development) than others (149-150). Stroud relates these points back to the expectations one might get from the biblical text and argued that the biblical text presents a plausible interpretation of such evidence (163ff).
The Flood served as one of the case studies Stroud utilized to make his point. He argued that the preponderance of evidence suggests that the biblical flood is accurate (174-177). The Table of Nations in Genesis 10 also hints at “astonishing” accuracy regarding the historical recordings in the earliest portions of the Bible. Moreover, stylistic evidence within Genesis places its date as very ancient, just as one might expect from taking the book at face value.
Yet Genesis is not the only portion of the Bible which received insight from Stroud’s analysis. The conquests recorded in Joshua have been backed up by archaeological findings. The history of David also garnered attention, and Stroud’s handling of the archaeological data is informative and concise.
The New Testament is, of course, centered around Christ, and Stroud explores the evidence for the Resurrection and the narratives related to Him. One very important point he made is that “…it must be pointed out that the… manuscripts we have for Jesus today did not start as a ‘Bible’ but were later [collected into one]… [T]o dismiss any of this manuscript evidence is in effect to dismiss the most primary sources we have on the Historical Jesus” (240). Yet even sources apart from these can account for a number historical aspects of Christian faith and practice, to the point that it becomes very difficult to reject entirely the Christian story (240ff). Stroud defended the Resurrection itself with a type of “minimal facts” argument, in which he reasoned from several largely established facts of the historical Jesus to the resurrection (248ff).
Naturalism, argued Stroud, fails to account for the historical and scientific evidences for the origins of the universe, life and its diversity, civilization, and the evidence related to the historical Jesus. One should therefore not be constricted to operating within a naturalistic paradigm when one investigates origins or history generally. An a priori rejection of the supernatural is unwarranted.
Thus far, I have shown a number of positive portions of the book. That is not to say there are no areas of disagreement or any problems. First, Stroud’s writing style often comes across as autobiographical, which takes away from the academic feeling of the overall work. Second, there are a number of grammatical errors in the book which are sometimes quite distracting. Third, there is a tendency to overstate the case in some places, such as asserting that any discussion of evolution beyond microevolution is “100 percent speculative” (117) or that “all scholars” in some certain field agree with some fact or another. Fourth, at points Stroud states the view of the opposition in ways that I suspect would be objectionable. One example may be found here: “[T]he vast majority of naturalists confirm that humankind did indeed share a common language…” (177) or the notion that “even the most adamant proponents of naturalism” would admit that the origin of life is unexplainable through naturalistic means with the current understanding (115). I suspect that adamant naturalists would object to this and argue that the RNA world hypothesis or some other origin-of-life scenario does, in fact, explain the origin of life.
Many of these difficulties are minor, but they tend to pull down an otherwise excellent work. It is unfortunate, because it also seems like these could all be solved by a good editor. As it stands, however, one should be careful when reading the work to be aware that in many cases one should perhaps temper the sweeping conclusions Stroud makes. In any field of study, there are rarely (if ever!) times where “all scholars” might agree on something, and the language in the book constantly implies that there are many such agreements in some of the most contentious areas of all historical or scientific studies. Although this does not throw his conclusions out the window, it does somewhat devalue the work, as one must read it with an actively cautious eye.
I don’t often (in fact, I can’t think of ever mentioning this before) discuss the cover of a book I’m reviewing, but I have to say this has what might be the coolest cover for an academic book I have seen. I mean seriously, look at it! It is awesome.
With The Philosophy of History James Stroud has provided much needed development for Christians who might want to look into the study of the methods of historical investigation to develop their own understanding of Christianity. He also applies these methods in sometimes surprising ways. I have noted a number of areas of difficulty found within the work, but it should be noted that these are comparatively minor when compared to the project as a whole. Stroud has provided some necessary development in an area of study that Christians should continue to develop. Historiography is an essential field for Christians to study and become involved in, and The Philosophy of History has provided a broad framework for others to continue the work (and hopefully for Stroud to continue, himself). It is an excellent, thought-provoking read which illumines areas of which many apologists, unfortunately, remain unaware.
Source
James Stroud, The Philosophy of History: Naturalism and Religion- A Historiographical Approach to Origins
Disclaimer: I was provided with a copy of this book for review. The author only asked that readers provide feedback of any kind, including negative, in order to broaden the dialogue in this area.
SDG.
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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from quotations, which are the property of their respective owners, and works of art as credited; images are often freely available to the public and J.W. Wartick makes no claims of owning rights to the images unless he makes that explicit) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author. All content on this site is the property of J.W. Wartick and is made available for individual and personal usage. If you cite from these documents, whether for personal or professional purposes, please give appropriate citation with both the name of the author (J.W. Wartick) and a link to the original URL. If you’d like to repost a post, you may do so, provided you show less than half of the original post on your own site and link to the original post for the rest. You must also appropriately cite the post as noted above. This blog is protected by Creative Commons licensing. By viewing any part of this site, you are agreeing to this usage policy.
Really Recommended Posts 6/2/2012
Another Owl Post edition. This edition of my really recommended posts features a critique of Krauss, archaeology, abortion and polity, an apologetics comic (check it out!), molinism, Christopher Hitchens, and religious diversity. Check out the links and let me know what you think!
Not Understanding Nothing– Edward Feser, one of my favorite bloggers and a fantastic Thomistic philosopher, critiques Lawrence Krauss’ book, “A Universe from Nothing.”
Archaeologists Uncover first extra-biblical reference to Bethlehem– It’s amazing that something so small can be so important!
An Unexpected Confession at the Great Disclosure– A great apologetics comic with a “what if?” scenario.
“They Would Have Believed…” — A Molinist Exegesis of Matthew 11:20-24– Molinism is a theological position I hold strongly because it seems to solve many difficulties of both philosophy and exegesis. Check out this excellent post on the latter.
Christopher Hitchens confessed he would not get rid of all religion. What is, perhaps, most interesting about this video is the discussion of Dawkins, who as a “free thinker” was utterly incredulous about Hitchens’ view.
Do We Need to Prove All Other Religions False?– Interesting look at the rationality of a particular belief in light of diversity.
Abortion Jeopardizes 900-year-old Liechtenstein dynasty– very interesting read about polity and abortion in another country (unless you’re from Liechtenstein, in which case it’s your country!).
J.W. Wartick - Reconstructing Faith 