philosophy

Abortion: What logical arguments are there?

I’ve written about abortion before a few times. In fact, in my last post on the topic, I issued a challenge:

“I challenge anyone who is pro-choice to attempt to justify their position while maintaining some kind of civility. I challenge them to think about their position, and the ramifications that the arguments they make carry.”

No one accepted that challenge, despite over 200 views of that post since I wrote it.

What arguments are there for abortion that actually can logically justify it? I don’t think there are any. The key is the realization that we are indeed talking about human beings. There is no way to deny scientifically or philosophically that the unborn “fetus” (baby) is human. It is an established, empirical fact. What else could it be? A fish? No, it is a human fetus, and it is a human being, complete with a completely unique set of DNA, a 50% chance of being a different gender, and (often) a different blood type.

The question then is, according to those who are pro-choice, whether this “human being” is a person? While some may balk at such a strange question, that is indeed the question those within the pro-choice camp must put forth, for once it is acknowledged that a fetus is a human being, one must look to other means by which to justify killing this human being.

The argument is often made that while it is inside the mother, it is part of her. This is, in fact, completely false. Something that is part of the mother will have the same DNA as the mother, it will have the same blood type. An arm is not the same as a fetus.

To finally make this point as clear as possible, I cite none other than the “Pro-Choice Action Network”, which states “..even though a fetus is biologically human, it’s definitely not a person (legally and socially), and it’s questionable whether it’s a human being (physically)” (Arthur, cited below). Even the “Pro-Choice Action network freely acknowledges that the fetus is biologically human. The question they try to press is whether its a person. Further, they try to question “whether it’s a human being (physically)”. I don’t even know what this means. What is the difference between being biologically human and physically human? I see no difference whatsoever. It’s telling that these are the hairs the pro-choice network must try to split to make their case.

How is it that being transported outside the mother magically turns a baby into a “person”? Take an example of a baby premature by three months. What makes the 6-month old baby inside the mother less of a person than that baby outside of the mother?

Let’s turn again to Joyce Arthur’s article for the Pro-Choice Action network. “Another key difference is that a fetus doesn’t just depend on a woman’s body for survival, it actually resides inside her body. Persons, by definition, must be separate individuals who operate independently of others. They do not gain the status of persons by virtue of living inside the body of another person – the very thought is inherently ridiculous, even offensive” (Arthur, cited below).

I’m curious as to who made this definition of persons. Not only that, but I’m curious as to how this means that babies are persons? Babies cannot operate independently of others. They will die if left alone. Are babies no longer “persons”? Further, we see a wonderful example of the “straw man” fallacy here. The argument pro-life individuals make is not that babies gain the status of persons “by virtue of living inside the body of another person”. No, the argument is that babies gain the status of persons by being human beings. No other reason is needed. Personhood is not something to be bought and sold, defined and taken away. It’s not something to be arbitrarily defined as we see fit. That is exactly how such people as Hitler managed to murder millions of people. When we redefine personhood to fit our desires, we kill persons.

The chilling response is often that we can somehow justify killing this baby, for it is a “choice.” As Magda Denes wrote, “I do think abortion is murder–of a very special and necessary sort” (quoted in Alcorn, 99 [cited below]). How is it that murder is ever “necessary”? What other cases of murder can be “necessary” if there is such a thing as a “necessary” murder?

I’m confused as to what arguments remain. The inconsistencies in the pro-choice camp abound. They acknowledge that a baby outside the mother at 8 months is indeed a person and should not be killed, but that same baby, most would say, could be killed just hours before its birth! What kind of “logic” is this? Where will it lead? Where has it lead already?

I reissue my challenge to any pro-choice individual. Make your case. Make it without using ad hominems. Make it, acknowledging that science has shown that the fetus is human. Make your case for “necessary” murder of human beings.

Sources:

Alcorn, Randy. Pro Life Answers to Pro Choice Arguments. Multnomah Books. 2000.

Arthur, Joyce. “The Fetus Focus Fallacy.” The Pro-Choice Action Network. http://www.prochoiceactionnetwork-canada.org/articles/fetus-focus-fallacy.shtml. Accessed March 24, 2010.

——

The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from cited material which is the property of its respective owner[s]) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

Omniscience, Necessity, and Human Freedom

I’m continually frustrated when the concept of freedom of the will comes up among people, even in Christian circles, because it seems that inevitably people start to deny that freedom of the will is incompatible with the God of Classical Theism. I am a firm believer in human freedom of the will and I believe it is fully compatible with omniscience. (Though I do not deny that our human will is corrupted by the fall into sin and that salvation is the act of God, not a work of man… These things are most certainly true.)

Generally the objection is something like this: If God knows everything and is all-powerful, then everything is pre-determined.

I still have not seen any solid argument for why this should be the case whatsoever. The key, as I understand it, is the connection between foreknowledge and causation.

I don’t see any reason to believe that if a being that is omnipotent and omniscient knows that x will happen, that being somehow causes or determines that x must happen. Why should this be the case? Simply knowing with certainty what will happen in the future does not somehow mean that this being has somehow made a causal link between its knowledge and the future, rather, it just means that this being knows what any other being is going to do.

What connection is there between knowledge of an event in the future and determining it? I’d like any kind of analytic argument to try to deny that human freedom and omniscience are compatible.

I’ve argued elsewhere that these concepts are compatible, and I’d like to make this point more clear now.

Take “P” to mean “God [in Classical Theism–i.e. omniscient, omnipotent, etc.] knows in advance that some event, x, will happen”

Take “Q” to mean “some event, x, will happen”

1. □(P⊃Q)

2. P

3. Therefore, Q

I wanted to draw it in symbolic logic to make my point as clear as possible. It is necessarily true that if God knows x will happen, then x will happen. But then if one takes these terms, God knowing x will happen only means that x will happen, not that x will happen necessarily. Certainly, God’s foreknowledge of an event means that that event will happen, but it does not mean that the event could not have happened otherwise. If an event happens necessarily, that means the event could not have happened otherwise, but God’s foreknowledge of an event doesn’t somehow transfer necessity to the event, it only means that the event will happen. It could have been otherwise, in which case, God’s knowledge would have been different. The problem many people make is that they try to make the syllogism:

1. □(P⊃Q)

2. P

3. Therefore, □Q

This is actually an invalid argument. The only thing that follows from □(P⊃Q) is that, “necessarily, if P then Q,” not “if P, then, necessarily Q.”

It is true that “necessarily, if God knows that some event, x, will happen, then some event, x, will happen”… but then it doesn’t follow from this that some event, x, happens necessarily. Thus, the event x is not predetermined simply by God’s foreknowledge of an event.

The objection is sometimes simply put forward as: Necessarily, God cannot error in his knowledge. If God knows some event x, will happen, then x will happen. Therefore, necessarily, x will happen.

Take P and Q as above

Take R to be “God cannot error in his knowledge”

1. □R

2. P⊃Q

3. Q

Again, this simply is an unsound and invalid argument. Simply stating that □R doesn’t show that for every event x that God knows, □x. It simply means that □R. R does not have a causal link to x (or Q above). It is true that □R on Classical Theism, but this does not mean that □Q or □P. There must be some argument to make P or Q necessary in order for there to be some kind of predetermined future, and I have no idea how an argument like that might go.There are ways that I can think of to formulate it, but it involves simply assuming that □R means that □P or □Q, so it would then be question-begging.

Perhaps I could take an example. Let’s say that I’m going to go to classes tomorrow (and I do hope I will, I don’t like missing classes!). God knows in advance that I’m going to go to classes tomorrow. His knowledge of this event means that it will happen, but it doesn’t mean that I couldn’t choose to stay in and sleep for a while, or play my new copy of Final Fantasy XIII, or do something more useless with my time. If I chose to, say, play Final Fantasy XIII (a strong temptation!), then God simply would have known that I would play FFXIII. His knowledge does not determine the outcome, His knowledge is simply of the outcome.

I’m open to hearing any analytic argument that manages to show how necessity can be transferred to events simply by God’s knowledge of them, but I’m skeptical as to the prospects of whether it can be done.

This argument can be seen in William Lane Craig’s writings like The Only Wise God and also in his podcast episodes on the doctrine of God.

——

The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from citations, which are the property of their respective owners) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

The Ontological Argument: Therefore God Exists

The Ontological Argument is probably the most widely misunderstood and maligned of all the theistic arguments. Counters to it often entail little more than mud-slinging, calling such an argument “wordplay” or “trickery,” but few get to the meat of the argument. Often counter-arguments include attempts to parody the argument (as here) or a dismissive strategy. But does anyone truly confront the argument? Rarely. Here I’ll present two forms of the ontological argument, and discuss them in some detail.

The first version of the argument that I will present is Alvin Plantinga’s “Victorious Modal” version of the argument. I actually don’t think this is the strongest version of the ontological argument, but it is one step towards the strongest version. First, the argument:

“1) The property of being maximally great is exemplified in some possible world

2) The property of being maximally great is equivalent, by definition, to the property of being maximally excellent in every possible world

3) The property of being maximally excellent entails the properties of [at least] omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection

4) A universal property is one that is exemplified in every possible world or none

5) Any property that is equivalent to some property that holds in every possible world is a universal property

Therefore,

6) There exists a being that is essentially omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect (God) (Maydole, 573)”

Now let’s analyze this argument. The long story short is that this argument is logically valid. The conclusions follow from the premises. This can be shown with deductive symbolic logic (Maydole, 590). Thus, one cannot argue against it as being invalid, rather, the argument must be attacked for soundness.

Let’s sum it up in easier-to-understand language, shall we? The first premise simply claims that in some possible world (out of infinite or nearly infinite), the property of “maximal greatness” is exemplified, that is, some body has this property. Premise 2) argues that this property is equivalent to maximal excellence, which is explained in 3) as (basically) the attributes generally believed to be possessed by God in classical theism. Premise 4) states the obviously true statement that if a property is universal it is in either every possible world or none. This is a simple tautology, it is true by definition. One could just as easily say a property that exists in every possible world or none is universal. X = X, this is true. Then, Plantinga argues 5) that maximal greatness is a universal property. This is key to understanding the argument. Basically, in his book God, Freedom, and Evil (and elsewhere), Plantinga makes the point that if a being is maximally great, then that simply entails being maximally great in all possible worlds. For a being that is maximally great in, say 200 worlds is not  greater than one that exists in 2,000, but then this continues up the ladder until you have a being that is maximally great in all possible worlds, which then excludes the possibility of other beings with that property (for they would then, necessarily, not be the maximally great being). Finally, premise 6) follows from the previous premises (for if the maximally great/excellent being exists in all possible worlds, it exists in our own).

The question for this argument is then whether it is true. The premise on which this argument hinges is 1) “The property of being maximally great is exemplified in some possible world”. This seems to be perfectly clear. Denial of this premise means that one would have to argue that it is logically impossible for maximal greatness to be exemplified in any possible world at all, not just our own. This means someone must have infinite knowledge of all possible worlds. Therefore, it seems as though this argument is almost airtight. But suppose someone insists that one can deny premise 1), well then the whole argument falls apart. I must admit I don’t see how anyone could logically do so, but I don’t doubt that people will do so. So if someone wants to deny premise 1), and then–in my opinion–become rather dishonest intellectually, they can deny the soundness of the argument.

I don’t think that there is a way around this argument, but it is actually possible to make the Ontological Argument even stronger.

The most powerful version of the ontological argument, in my opinion, is presented in the book God and Necessity by Stephen E. Parrish (previously discussed here).

The argument goes as follows:

1) The concept of the GPB is coherent (and thus broadly logically possible)

2) Necessarily, a being who is the GPB is necessarily existent, and would have (at least) omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection essentially.

3) If the concept of the GPB is coherent, then it exists in all possible worlds.

4) But if it exists in all possible worlds, then it exists in the actual world.

5) The GPB exists (Parrish, 82)

This argument is also deductively valid. Premise 1) argues that the Greatest Possible Being is coherent–that is, there is no logical contradiction within such a being. 2) further defines what a GPB would be (Plantinga’s argument outlines this thoroughly). Premise 3) states the major part of the argument in a different way. Rather than arguing that it is possible that “maximal greatness” is exemplified in some possible world, Parrish argues that the concept of the GPB entails logical necessity along with such maximal greatness, and thus 3) follows from the previous premises, just as Plantinga’s version of the argument does. The key is to remember that in Parrish’s version of the argument, the coherence of the GPB is what is important, not the possibility (for if it is coherent, it is possible). 4) This is tautologically true. 5) follows from the previous premises.

What Parrish does here is actually takes out the possibility of denying premise 1) in Plantinga’s argument. Let’s look into this closely. Parrish argues that the concept of the Greatest Possible Being is coherent. Why is this so important? Well, because if we grant for a moment that the GPB exists, such a being could not fail to exist due to some kind of chance mistake or having some other being or thing prevent the GPB’s existence (Parrish, 105). The first point (that chance could not prevent the GPB’s existence) is true because the GPB would be logically necessary (it would either exist or not exist in all possible worlds). This claim is reinforced by the idea of maximal greatness being a universal property (above). The second point (nothing else could prevent the GPB’s existence) seems quite obvious. If there were a being or body or thing, etc. that could prevent the GPB’s existence, the GPB would clearly not be the Greatest Possible Being. If some other being were powerful enough to prevent the GPB’s existence, then that being would be greater.

So the only thing that could prevent  the GPB from existing is self-contradiction within the concept.

Why is this? Well, after a little investigation it seems pretty clear. If the GPB is a coherent (and logically possible) concept, then such a being does exist. Let us say that the GPB is coherent. Let us then take some world, W, and see whether the GPB can fail to exist.

The  concept of the GPB includes logical necessity in all possible worlds. The GPB has all the properties of maximal greatness. This means that these properties are universals. We can simply refer back to the argument above. If the GPB exists and has omnipotence, omniscience, etc. then it must exist universally, because, again, if some being is the GPB in only 200/1,000,000,000 possible worlds, the being that is GPB in 2,000 is greater. But this seems ridiculous, for the truly Greatest Possible Being must exist in all of them, for if there was a possibility for some being to exist in all the worlds that the GPB exists in +1 and exemplify the maximally great attributes, then that being would be the GPB (and the previous one would not really have omniscience, etc., for the GPB would be more powerful, existing in all possible worlds, and being sovereign in all possible worlds) . Now let us return to W. It now seems completely clear that W could not be such that, if the GPB is coherent (and therefore possible), W could not fail to exemplify the GPB.

But have we then demonstrated that coherence is really the issue here? Is it possible that we are just thinking up some thing, calling it the GPB, and then arguing it into “supposed” existence? Logically, it does not seem so.

The reason is because we are arguing that the GPB entails these properties. Things have, essentially properties. I exemplify the property of “having fingers.” I also exemplify the properties of “being finite,” “being human,” “having two feet,” etc. These properties don’t belong to me simply because someone sat around and decided to assign them to me, rather they belong to me because of the kind of thing I am. (Parrish argues similarly, 55). But in the same way, we could answer such objections by saying that these properties are part of the concept of God because that’s the kind of thing God is. Certainly, there have been all kinds of “gods” claimed throughout history that are finite in power or activity, but those aren’t the “gods” whose existence we are arguing for. Rather, we are arguing for the existence of the God of classical theism, and that God has such properties as necessary existence (in the analytic sense), omnipotence, omniscience, etc. This objection really doesn’t have any weight. But again, let’s assume for the sake of argument that it does.

Let’s assume that the objection may be true. We are just taking some “X” and arbitrarily saying that it is omnipotent, necessary, etc. Does that preclude such an object existing? I don’t see how this could be true. But even further, some claim that this doesn’t match up with Christianity’s concept of God. This seems preposterous. One needs only to open a  Bible to find that, while words like “omnipotence” are not used, words like “Almighty”, “Most High”, and the like constantly are. And what kind of objection is this really? Is the person making this objection going to concede that it is possible that there exists some nearly-omnipotent-but-not-actually-omnipotent creator of the universe? No, the objection is beyond logic and into emotional repugnance at the thought of God actually existing.

But we can even go further. For let us simply define God as the Greatest Possible being. This seems like it could very easily operate as a definition of what  “God” is, at least on classical theism. Well then, what properties might this Greatest Possible Being have? And then we simply build them up. Omnipotence seems obvious, as does omniscience, as does necessity, etc. So this isn’t some arbitrary assigning-to of properties, but rather such properties are part of the GPB simply because of what the GPB actually is, if the GPB existed.

Now we can return to the matter at hand. Does God exist? Well it follows from all of this that yes, God does exist. The theist has established that there are some arguments that deductively prove that God does exist. The only “way out” for the atheist is to attack premise one and argue that the concept of the GPB is, in fact, contradictory. And let’s be honest, there have been many attempts to do so. I can’t possibly go into all of them here, but I can state simply that I remain unconvinced. Often these arguments are things like “Omnipotence and omniscience are impossible to have, because if God knows in advance what He’s going to do, He can’t do anything else!” This argument is obviously false, for simply knowing what is going to happen is not causation. I know that a sheep is an animal, this does not cause the sheep to be an animal. I know that I am going to finish typing this post, that does not cause me to do so. Rather, I choose to continue typing and finish this post.

Of course, one might say “You can’t really know you’re going to finish this post! Your computer might explode and you may get brain washed, etc.” Well that is a whole different debate, but I think that such objections, ironically, actually apply not at all to God. For if God is omniscient and omnipotent, it seems clear that God actually would be above such things! For nothing could prevent God from finishing something He knows He’s going to do! Not only that, but God’s knowledge is such that He actually would know He is going to do something, and freely chooses to do so. I don’t see why God’s foreknowledge of an event somehow limits omnipotence, especially when one considers that God is part of agent-causation, so God chooses to do the things He is going to do. Thus, the argument falls apart.

But now I’m already farther off track than I was (and thus preventing myself from finishing this post, AH the irony!). Suffice to say that I very much doubt that any objection to the coherence of the GPB even comes close to succeeding. But then, if that is true, God exists.

Therefore God exists.

(Edit: I’ve included below a proof of Plantinga’s argument)

Let
Ax=df x is maximally great
Bx=df x is maximally excellent
W (Y) =df Y is a universal property
Ox = df x is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect 1) ◊ (∃x)Ax pr
2) □(x)(Ax iff □Bx) pr
3) □(x)(Bx⊃Ox) pr
4) (Y)[W(Y) iff (□(∃x)Yx ∨ (□~(∃x)Yx)] pr
5) (Y)[(∃Z)□(x)(Yx iff □Zx)⊃ W(Y)] pr
6) (∃Z)□(x)(Ax iff □Zx) 2, Existential Generalization
7) [(∃Z)□(x)(Ax iff □Zx)⊃W(A)] 5, Universal Instantiation
8 ) W(A) iff (□(∃x)Ax ∨ (□~(∃x)Ax) 4, Universal Instantiation
9) W (A) 6, 7 Modus Ponens
10) W(A)⊃ (□(∃x)Ax ∨ (□~(∃x)Ax) 8, Equivalence, Simplification
11) □(∃x)Ax (□~(∃x)Ax) 9, 10 Modus Ponens
12) ~◊~~(∃x)Ax ∨ (□(∃x)Ax) 11, Communication, Modal Equivalence
13) ◊(∃x)Ax ⊃ □(∃x)Ax Double Negation, Impl
14) □(∃x)Ax 1, 13 Modus Ponens
15) □(x)(Ax iff □Bx) ⊃ (□(∃x)Ax ⊃ □(∃x)□Bx) theorem
16) □(∃x)□Bx 14, 15 Modus Ponens (twice)
17) □(x)(Bx ⊃ Ox) ⊃ (□(∃x)□Bx ⊃ □(∃x)□Ox theorem
18) □(∃x)□Bx 16, 17 Modus Ponens (twice)
19) (∃x)□Bx 18, Necessity Elimination
(taken directly from Maydole)

Sources:

Maydole, Robert E. “The Ontological Argument.” The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Edited William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland. Blackwell, 2009.

Parrish, Stephen E. God and Necessity. University Press of America. 1997.

——

The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from citations, which are the property of their respective owners) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

God’s “Purposively Available Evidence”

If God exists, then what kind of evidence should we expect about his existence? How exactly would God operate in allowing for evidence or inquiries into his existence? These are some questions I have been pondering a great deal recently.

Paul K. Moser places questions like this in his book The Elusive God which I recently reviewed. Moser argues therein that questions like “Do we humans know God exists?” must be rephrased because if that (perfectly loving, etc.) God exists, then we should consider how God would interact with humans (4). Thus, argues Moser, such questions should be rephrased as “Are we humans known by God in virtue of (among other things) our freely and agreeably being willing (i) to be known by God and thereby (ii) to be transformed toward God’s moral character of perfect love as we are willingly lead by God in volitional fellowship with God, thereby obediently yielding our wills to God’s authoritative will?” (4, Moser’s emphasis). But even this question must be seen in light of a third rendering of the question “Do we humans know God Exists?” which is “Are we humans known by God in virtue of… our freely being willing to receive an authoritative call to… fellowship with God…?” (4).

I think that Moser raises some very valid points here. If God does in fact exist, then the question “Does God exist?” takes, of necessity, a different tone. Rather than expecting some kind of sterile evidence that makes no demands of us, this evidence may indeed be seen as some kind of authoritative call. Moser’s argument, I believe, is unfortunately not well developed, despite the 280 pages he dedicates to this very issue. My purpose here is not to try to expand on his argument, but to bring it into a context that reflects more what I believe and would therefore use instead.

I believe Moser is on the right track when he argues that God’s purposes in revealing Himself are very important when discussing His existence. Thus, God would not coerce us into belief. Moser argues in “God is Great, God is Good” (cited below) that God, assuming He exists, could seek “to offer a profound existential, motivational challenge to wayward humans” (53). On the other hand, and here is a point Moser seems to make but never develop, the “authoritative call” aspect of God’s existence is something that I believe is of vital importance to an understanding of God’s existence and reality.

He does argue that we need to let God be God (which I read as an assertion of sovereignty) even in the areas of inquiry into His existence. Thus, we cannot make demands of a sovereign God, which would be counter-intuitive. Rather, God can make demands of us.

So how do we answer the question of God’s existence? Moser makes an argument for the existence of God that is essentially an argument from religious experience (see my own posts advancing this argument here and here). His argument is outlined in The Elusive God:

“The transformative gift [is defined as] via conscience, a person’s (a) being authoritatively convicted and forgiven by X of all that person’s wrongdoing and (b) thereby being authoritatively called and led by X both into noncoerced volitional fellowship with X in perfect love and into rightful worship toward X as wrothy of worship and, on that basis, transformed by X from (i) that person’s previous tendencies to selfishness and despair to (ii) a new volitional center with a default position of unselfish love and forgiveness toward all people and of hope in the ultimate triumph of good over evil by X” (134-135) Which leads to:

“1. Necessarily, if a human person is offered, and unselfishly receives, the transformative gift, then this is the result of the authoritative leading and sustaining power of a divine X of thoroughgoing forgiveness, fellowship in perfect love, worthiness of worship, and triumphant hope (namely, God).

“2. I have been offered, and have willingly unselfishly received, the transformative gift.

“3. Therefore, God exists” (135).

I’m still pondering this argument and trying to decide how weighty it is. The more I’ve looked it over and thought about it, the more interesting it seems to me. For now, I’ll advance my own argument, based on Moser’s writings and my own input:

1) The question “Does God exist?” must be asked in such a way that we humans acknowledge that if God does in fact exist, the question of His existence involves, necessarily, a life-changing, “creating anew” (2 Corinthians 5:17) that is the work of the Holy Spirit, which is a gift of God, not by our works (Ephesians 2:8-9). This is because i) if God exists, then, necessarily, His existence would apply to every aspect of all things (specifically, our lives).

2) Evidence of God’s existence thus entails an entirely life-changing event that is the work of God and not of ourselves (e.g. baptism). It can thus be seen (Moser’s words) as “purposively available evidence”–evidence with the purpose of justification/creating a new [see 1) above].

3) God allows people to reject such life-changing evidence

4) We humans are often in rebellion against God and refuse to acknowledge 1), 2), and 3)

5) If we are in rebellion against God, then we reject the life-changing gift as seen in 2)- faith worked by the Spirit

6) Therefore, God’s existence may indeed be justifiably inaccessible to humans who are in rebellion against God, for the most powerful evidence of God’s existence can be found in 2)–the life-changing gift of the work of the Holy Spirit, and humans who are in rebellion against God reject such evidence, despite its being (purposively) available

I believe that this argument avoids some of my theological objections to Moser’s brand of (some kind of) universalism while still advancing an answer to “Why doesn’t God make his existence blatantly obvious?” I agree wholeheartedly with Moser that God could certainly have reasons for keeping his existence hidden. These reasons could be innumerable, but for now I’m content to settle with the argument that God’s purposes are to use evidence for His existence such as to be life changing through the means of grace (eg. baptism, communion, other religious experience).

My argument is obviously not so much an argument for the existence of God as it is an argument about how exactly we should go about trying to discover the answer to the question “Does God exist?”. I am not here begging the question of the existence of God. Instead, this argument is pointing to the means by which one might go about further inquiring into the question of God’s existence. If Christianity is true, then this argument is (I believe) completely sound.

Now it is appropriate to return to Meister’s argument for the existence of God and similarly modify it.

1)If the God of classical theism exists, He is sovereign

2) If the God of classical theism God exists and is (therefore) sovereign, then His existence would likely be purposively available (see argument above)

3) If there is purposively available evidence that is available and life-changing (read: applicable to every aspect of everything, specifically our lives), then God exists

4) I have perceived such purposively available evidence of God’s existence (as a gift of the Holy Spirit through baptism, communion, and religious experience).

5) Therefore, God exists.

Clearly this doesn’t solve any issue of religious pluralism, which is something  beyond the range of this post. What it does say, however, is that someone may be justified in holding the belief that God exists based on religious experience of purposively available evidence. Thus, such belief is not irrational or unjustified.

These reflections were based on information found in the following sources: Paul K. Moser, The Elusive God. I’ve also read his discussions in two other places: the book “God is Great, God is Good” (edited by William Lane Craig and Chad Meister) and the publication “Philosophia Christi” (Volume 11, Number 2, 2009) which is published by the Evangelical Philosophical Society (a society that I am a student member of!).

——

The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

Book Review: The Elusive God by Paul K. Moser

I’m going to write more on the ideas present in this book, as I find them vastly important, but because of time constraints and the fact that I want to put up a normal review for this book, I figured I would post a review first.

The Elusive God by Paul K. Moser was, for me, an exercise in frustration. I was very excited to get a hold of the book, as I felt the topic it explored would be truly interesting. I had very high expectations. It was certainly interesting and Moser makes some good points throughout the book. The Elusive God seems repetitive in some aspects and misses the mark on some vital theological issues, but, ultimately, it is worth a read by anyone interested in this question within theism.

Moser attempts to tackle the rather impressive problem of why God, if He exists, is not obviously evident at all times. He argues that evidence of God’s reality would be “purposively available” to humans, which means “available in a manner and only in a manner suitable to divine purposes in self-revelation” (2). Moser’s key point is that such questions as “Do we humans know God exists?” must be rephrased because if that (perfectly loving, etc.) God exists, then we should consider how God would interact with humans (4). Thus, argues Moser, such questions should be rephrased as “Are we humans known by God in virtue of (among other things) our freely and agreeably being willing (i) to be known by God and thereby (ii) to be transformed toward God’s moral character of perfect love as we are willingly lead by God in volitional fellowship with God, thereby obediently yielding our wills to God’s authoritative will?” (4, Moser’s emphasis). But even this question must be seen in light of a third rendering of the question “Do we humans know God Exists?” which is “Are we humans known by God in virtue of… our freely being willing to receive an authoritative call to… fellowship with God…?” (4). This page has most of what Moser will expand on for the rest of the book.

From these modifications of the question “Does God exist?” (my rendering of the question), one can essentially draw out what Moser’s argument is. God, if God exists, is a morally perfect, loving being, so rather than asking why God doesn’t simply reveal himself to us indiscriminately, we should model ourselves to be agents capable of receiving His authoritative call. Thus, the question “Does God exist?” can only be answered if we humans cease asking this question as a kind of non-interactive, sterile question, but instead ask it in the terms of being a truly life changing or reinventing question.

Moser argues that “…we gain evidentially and thus cognitively as we turn from (that is, “repent” of) our selfish ways in order to get in line with a perfectly loving God…” (27, Moser’s emphasis). Central to Moser’s argument is the idea that evidence of God’s existence as God allows for it would have to be capable of being rejected (39). In other words, God would not force people to believe in Him or coerce them into belief by doing something as blatant as writing “BELIEVE IN ME- GOD” in the sky or something of the sort (he refers to this as “spectator evidence”–evidence that doesn’t ultimately mean anything in the life-changing way, which, Moser argues, is necessary for God’s loving purposes [see p.47, 35, 149, 93, etc.]). God would be “…a God of intended redemption as reconciliation of humans to God” (47).

Further, argues Moser, there is no reason that God should provide us with the kind of “spectator evidence” (see above) that we may desire for evidence, but rather, God, being the absolute authority in the universe, could make demands with authority, as well as making demands about the state of being that those whom He would reveal himself are in.

Moser seems to really avoid any kind of analytic nature to his philosophizing (which is greatly aggravating to me, as I vastly prefer arguments to be laid out analytically and then expanded on, but this is a mere preference), but he does present an argument for the existence of God in an analytic fashion:

“The transformative gift [is defined as] via conscience, a person’s (a) being authoritatively convicted and forgiven by X of all that person’s wrongdoing and (b) thereby being authoritatively called and led by X both into noncoerced volitional fellowship with X in perfect love and into rightful worship toward X as wrothy of worship and, on that basis, transformed by X from (i) that person’s previous tendencies to selfishness and despair to (ii) a new volitional center with a default position of unselfish love and forgiveness toward all people and of hope in the ultimate triumph of good over evil by X” (134-135) Which leads to:

“1. Necessarily, if a human person is offered, and unselfishly receives, the transformative gift, then this is the result of the authoritative leading and sustaining power of a divine X of thoroughgoing forgiveness, fellowship in perfect love, worthiness of worship, and triumphant hope (namely, God).

“2. I have been offered, and have willingly unselfishly received, the transformative gift.

“3. Therefore, God exists” (135).

Central to his discussion of this argument is the assertion that “We… can’t separate God’s existence… from God’s… character” (135).

While I don’t personally find this argument to have any evidential value for anyone but the subject of such a transformative gift, I am still pondering whether it is useful in the field of apologetics at all. I think this is a large part of the problem with most of Moser’s work: it doesn’t seem as though it will do anything to convince anyone who is not already sure that God exists.

Not only that, but the book is exceedingly repetitive. It weighs in at about 280 pages, but it honestly could probably have been reduced to about 1/10th that, 28 pages, and still have been as effective in getting the point across. Even as I was writing this review, going over the parts I underlined or wrote notes on, it is very clear that certain points are simply repeated many, many times throughout the book.

One may note that I didn’t even write about most of the last part of the book. This is because the latter part of the book involves Moser outlining what he thinks philosophy should be now that one acknowledges the existence of God. I’m not sure I stand convinced. Certainly Christian philosophy should be oriented around theistic beliefs and what it means if God exists and the promise of Christ is true, but that doesn’t mean that other pursuits are somehow excluded from usefulness. I think that if God does indeed exist (as I believe He does, very strongly), then, necessarily, any knowledge at all would relate to God in some way. Thus, any philosophical pursuit would be essentially related to God.

A final note I’d like to make before my conclusion is that Moser’s view of Christ seems wrong. He appears to downplay the divinity of Christ (though he does refer to him as Lord in a couple places), but he also apparently argues for some kind of belief that those outside of Christianity are saved. On page 198 he claims that people of other faiths may be worshiping the same God as we are, which is absolutely contrary to Scripture (Jesus answered, “I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the father, except through me.” John 14:6). He also criticizes N.T. Wright for his (in my opinion, phenomenal) work on the historicity of Christ. Moser suggests that Wright doesn’t give us any reason to think that Jesus is good news now. I honestly don’t see this at all from Wright’s work. I think that Moser is reading into it in a rather large way. Wright’s task in such works as “Jesus and the Victory of God” seems to be more focused on what happened historically, from a historian/apologist’s viewpoint, than on an evangelical witness. Wright does, however, provide ample reasons for thinking that Jesus is good news now in his work “The Resurrection of the Son of God” and “The Challenge of Jesus.”

Overall, I think that Moser makes some interesting points, but many of them smack in some ways of “choice theology” which I firmly oppose (i.e. somehow making ourselves acceptable to God’s call). I do, however, believe that Moser has some things that can be used effectively by the apologist here. I would rework some of what he says for my own use, but that’s a task that I will tackle some other day. I think that The Elusive God is an okay read, but its redundancy is frustrating and his argument doesn’t seem at first glance as though it is going to be useful for the average apologist without some extensive effort. One who wants to get the main points Moser makes in this book could just as easily pick up the work “God is Great, God is Good” edited by Craig and Meister, as Moser presents a condensed version of the argument therein.

The Elusive God is, however, an essential read, in my opinion, for the Christian philosopher. It addresses a question not often discussed in philosophical discourse, and while I’m still unsure of how useful the book will be, it has forced me to think about the major points for several weeks now. I think Moser really has something with his concept of “purposively available evidence” but I’m trying to figure out whether it is question begging.

The “Triumph” of Our Era: Institutionalized Death

It is  Pro-Life Sunday (which I tend to think of as every Sunday, but that is beside the point).

As such, I will post again on that massacre of our day, abortion. I have written about it in the past. I’ve presented arguments against it here, and I attacked the institutionalized death again here. In this post, I will continue to make philosophical and scientific arguments against the institution of death.

It seems that arguments in the Pro-Choice camp are continually pushed back. I will examine this in detail in a moment, but for now let me sum up what I’m saying.

1. Some argued that the fetus was not a human. That has been obviously and scientifically refuted.

2. They retreated and then argued that the fetus is part of the woman. This has also been completely destroyed by scientific and common-sensical arguments.

3. Some then denied that the fetus was not a person and as such did not have the rights of other persons. This ridiculous claim is a slippery slope that, once started down, cannot be recouped.

4. Finally, the extremists argue that one’s right to one’s body justifies infanticide.

I’m not outlining every argument made by the pro-choice side, but rather showing how much they have been forced to retreat. It went from “a fetus is not a human” => “a fetus is part of the woman” => “a fetus is not a person” => “Okay, the fetus is a human person, but my rights trump the rights of it because it is inside me”

What a society we have become when we attempt to justify killing those whom we acknowledge are the same as us in every way, but unborn! This is the “triumph” of our era: institutionalized death.

First, there was the argument that the fetus was not a human. I don’t think I need to dwell on this point much at all. Clearly, the fetus is human. It is not a whale fetus, it is not a cat, it is not a unicorn, it is a human. It is biologically a human in every way. To deny that the fetus is human is to acknowledge that one has given up any attempt at rational inquiry into truth, as this is a simple fact.

Then, the argument became that the fetus was thus a part of the mother. Just as one had an arm, a leg, or an appendix, the fetus was a part of the body of the mother. This can be refuted in a way that is almost identical. The arm, leg, or appendix are made up of cells that are genetically coded by the mother’s DNA. The fetus, however, has a unique genetic code, often a different blood type, and 50% of the time is even a different gender than the mother. Thus, it is clearly not just some part of the mother that can be cast off. But here’s what makes this argument really strange to me. Even if the fetus were classified as part of the mother, does that mean that one is allowed to do whatever one wants with “it?” Do people routinely cut off their legs or arms, rip out a kidney, or do some other kind of self-mutilation? Obviously not. So what makes the fetus different? This argument is extremely confusing to me to begin with, but the fact that is entirely based on falsehoods means I don’t see a need to delve into it further.

The next stage of argumentation was then that a fetus is obviously human but not a person. While this claim may seem completely ludicrous, it is one that is used very often in debate on the abortion issue. The challenge I lay before one making this argument is to come up with an argument that does not exclude infants, young children, the elderly (senile), people with comas (that they are likely to recover from), etc. from being persons as well. If we are to play with the definition of who a person is, we must acknowledge the ramifications of such foul play and the potential for exclusion from basic rights that it can bring to all of us. And of course this is not to mention the obvious similarities in trying to strip personhood from the fetus with the Nazi efforts to strip personhood from various portions of the population.

A recent and disturbing trend in such argumentation that I have seen, however, is to acknowledge all of these points and still be pro-choice. Someone posting on another blog I was reading stated that they did agree that the fetus was a human person with such rights, but “If the entire human race is inside my womb, I am allowed to commit genocide.” Really? Are you? Is genocide now permissible for the sake of convenience? There really doesn’t seem to be a response to this argument, as the person making such an argument has shown that they literally have no qualms about killing at will. How long before being inside someone isn’t the only way this argument can be applied? Babies rely on their mothers for nourishment and care, so they clearly could be murdered as well, for it is not my duty (on such a view) to care for someone who is not me! This is morally disgusting.

I would like to cover a few other points before I close. There are a few more common arguments that I find equally ridiculous in their attempts to justify Institutionalized Death.

1) It is unfair to bring unwanted babies into the world.

2) It is unfair to bring babies into situations that are not beneficial to them

The first argument basically claims that it is not fair to children to be born to families that do not want them. What the person making such an argument seems fully willing to ignore is that it seems a lot more unfair to kill children who are unwanted! It’s striking that once the baby is born, if the mother doesn’t want it, and say, kills it, we charge her with murder. If she abandons it, we charge her with abandonment, etc. Not being wanted does not strip someone of their rights.

The second argument is often made with such claims that it is unfair to have children born into poverty, etc. I ask in response, “What right do we have to judge the quality of someone’s life before they live it?” In America, particularly, it seems that being born into poverty isn’t such a terrible thing, considering poverty here is rich in most other places. But not only that, I must press home the question, who are we to judge whether someone should live or die based on a guess that they will live in poverty (or some other situation). It seems obvious that a great many people in poverty are quite happy (and one needs only to read the tabloids to see how happy the rich are). There is no guarantee that someone born into poverty (or another situation) will always be there, and there is no way to objectively judge how much they will or will not enjoy their life. So what right do we have to kill people because we may think their lives aren’t worth living?

There are, as always, more points to cover, but I will save those for another post. I challenge anyone who is pro-choice to come here and present their arguments to me without being ad hominem in their attempts to refute me. I challenge anyone who is pro-choice to attempt to justify their position while maintaining some kind of civility. I challenge them to think about their position, and the ramifications that the arguments they make carry.

——

The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

Religious Experience: Evidence for Beliefs About God

I think that perhaps one of the most often dismissed evidences for the existence of God is Religious Experience–that is, an experience that someone takes to be an experience of God of the supernatural. I have experienced more than one such experience, and this claim is of course met with ridicule or at least massive skepticism by non-theists, and surprisingly enough even by many Christians. Why is this? I personally think that it is due to 1) on the side of the Christian or theist who doubts it, the granting of a kind of empirical belief that such things should be viewed quite skeptically and only believed in light of massive evidence and 2) on the side of the non-theist, an obvious presupposition that such things are obviously false and explainable naturalistically.

So, is there really a case for believing that Religious Experience can give any grounds for belief in (here I’ll more be arguing for beliefs about) God at all? I believe there is a rather strong case. I’ve argued elsewhere that such an experience can grant at least some amount of warrant for belief in God. But I believe that there is more to be said.

First we must discuss sense perception. What does it mean when someone senses something (here “sense” meaning using one of the five senses to ascertain knowledge of something)? There are a number of explanations, but I believe the most obvious one is simply that (in the case of sight) someone (x) sees something (y). Thus, I believe there is a kind of immediacy to sense perception. (Just a side note–this doesn’t go against my beliefs in a kind of Theistic Idealism, as my form of idealism involves a “real world” in the sense of Husserl’s “empty x” that we can perceive.) Now of course sense perception can be wrong, but the main idea is that when x sees y, it is just the case that x sees y, not the case that, say, x believes that x sees y or something even more drawn out.

But then what exactly is our justification for believing that sense perception has warrant? There really is no non-circular way to justify a belief based on a sense perception. Yet we continually believe that we are reliable when we form beliefs based on perceptions. The most common argument for the validation of sense perception in epistemic warrant is to say that our beliefs are justified because sense perception continues to feed us valid data (i.e. we are justified for believing that we are being appeared to “redly” because it is most often the case that when we believe we are being appeared to “redly” we are, in fact, being appeared to “redly”). But of course such a kind of justification is quite circular. It basically boils down to saying that our beliefs formed because of sense perception are valid because sense perception confirms such beliefs. So why do we trust our sense perceptions? It seems as though we have a few alternatives here (not trying to be comprehensive, merely illustrative): 1) we can simply not trust our sense perceptions, or 2) we can agree that it is possible for some system of epistemic justification to validate itself through repeated confirmation (as in the case of being appeared to “redly”). But if 2) is the case, as it almost certainly is, then we must be consistent with ourselves on this regard (this argument is based off Alston’s, cited below).

So then let us return to religious experience. Beliefs from religious experiences are, it seems, justified epistemically in the same way. The subject forms a belief based on the confirmation of that belief within the system. Let us say that some subject has a religious experience in which they believe that God is presenting himself as good. The subject then justifies this belief on the basis that they believe they are being appeared to “goodly” by God and that this is backed up by other experience (perhaps the belief that God continually sustains all things). While this may be circular in nature, one cannot object to the circularity unless they wish to subject sense perception to the same objection. Either both must be rejected, or neither. And if neither is rejected, then it is possible to have justification for a belief about God based on a religious experience.

There is more to say, of course. I mentioned above that I believe it is the case that when x sees y, x simply sees y. That can be applied to religious experience, especially those varieties of religious experience in which the subject claims to have a kind of sense perception of God (like “I saw a great light…” or something of the sort). Thus, when it is the case that the subject, x, experiences in a religious experience some sensation, y, it is simply the case that x experiences y, without any intermediaries.

Here now I’ll turn to a very commonly raised objection to religious experience. It may be claimed that when one experiences such a perception, they are subjected to a kind of euphoric state, either by drugs, by their own control over their brains (they want so badly to experience the religious that they cause it, unknowingly, to happen), or some other factor. These experiences can then be boiled down to a kind of reduction to brain waves, chemicals in the brain, etc. And because these experiences can be explained naturalistically, they are invalid for epistemic justification.

I believe this claim is utterly false. Again we can point to sense perception as being subjected to the same kind of reduction. If religious experience is merely the matter of neurons firing in the brain (among other things), then so is sense perception and indeed all knowledge in itself. But then we must reject everything that we perceive by our senses! For if we are to be consistent in our claim that if something can be reduced to natural causes, it has no epistemic warrant, then yes, religious experience could possibly be reduced to simply brain activity, but so could the existence of things outside of our heads, for we could observe brain activity happening when we observe things and form beliefs about them. Thus, for the sake of consistency, we would need to reject the reality of objects outside of our heads! This is of course not something that someone who raises such an objection is willing to do, but if they want to raise such an objection, their own beliefs are subject to the exact same scrutiny, and it will turn out to be the case that there is no such thing as a belief at all, if indeed all things are just brain activity (a hypothesis I utterly disagree with).

So it seems to me that it is indeed the case that people can form beliefs based on religious experience. I will write more in the future about whether these experiences can have any kind of warrant for those who did not experience the same thing, the problem of religious diversity in regards to claims of religious experience, and more on the concept of warrant with religious experience. For now, however, I’ll leave this as it stands. People can indeed be justified in believing something based on religious experience, if one wants to object in any of the ways outlined above, they simply must be consistent and reject sense perception, material objects, and the like.

Sources:

Alston, William P. Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cornell University Press, 1991.

Kwan, Kai-Man. “The Argument from Religious Experience.” The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Blackwell, 2009.

——

The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

Naturalism and Groundless Truth

I’ve been reflecting on the concept of “Warrant” a lot as I’m reading through Alvin Plantinga’s trilogy on Warrant (including the books Warrant: The Current Debate, Warrant and Proper Function, and Warranted Christian Belief). Just how is it that we can claim that someone is justified or warranted in believing something? This got me thinking on naturalism. I remember an example someone quoted as being Plantingian in origin (edit: I’ve finally figured out where I originally read it: it’s found in a similar form in Warrant and Proper Function), but I’d like to use my own version of what I remember from his example. I do not believe that, on naturalism in particular, but atheism in general, there can be any grounds for believing that we as humans have the cognitive means by which we can discover truth. Further, on naturalism specifically and atheism in general, there is no reason to suppose that what we regard as “truth” is in fact truth.

I think perhaps the best way to argue this would be by using an example (and it is in this example that I borrow from Plantinga… I think. It has been heavily modified by myself into a form that doesn’t resemble the original form that I remember all that much). Let us consider the case of Tim the Tiger Lover and Suzy the Warrior.

Tim the Tiger Lover has formed false beliefs that a) wild tigers are warm and cuddly and b) the best way to pet them is to sneak away from them silently. Suzy the Warrior has formed the beliefs that a) wild tigers are ferocious critters and b) they must be killed to insure the survival of mankind.

Tim and Suzy are walking through the jungle one day, when they spot in the distance a tiger. Now, Tim immediately begins joyfully sneaking away, believing that he will soon be petting that warm, cuddly tiger. Suzy dashes forward to attempt to strangle the beast with her bare hands. Suzy dies, though it seems clear that her beliefs were at least partially true (wild tigers are indeed ferocious). Tim, however, succeeds in escaping and surviving, despite this not actually being his goal.

Now, on naturalism, it seems quite obvious that Tim has succeeded. He has survived, and will thus pass his genes on to the next generation. Indeed, it seems quite likely he will pass along his false beliefs as well. For let us modify the scenario only slightly and say that it was quite dark. While Suzy was being torn to bits by the tiger, Tim happened upon a tiger cub or some other beast he took to be a tiger cub. He immediately, happily danced with it and cuddled it for a while before sneaking away to go home, having quite happily reinforced his false beliefs. So Tim, with his false beliefs enforced by some data that they are in fact true (after all, he sneaked away quietly from the tiger and managed to pet tigers), also manages to survive, and therefore pass along his genes and his false beliefs.

But this means that, on naturalism, Tim has succeeded! His genes have been passed on, and he has, in a way, won the race for survival by having done so. But if this is the case, then why should we not suppose that there are any number of these cases in fact? For there is no reason to suppose that, granting atheistic naturalism, this case and many hundreds, thousands, millions etc. of others should not be actual. Indeed, there seems to be no non-question-begging way for naturalism to claim that evolution in particular or naturalism in general is truth-oriented or truth-seeking.

Why should we then, on naturalism or atheism, suppose that we even have the cognitive capability to learn truth or discover it? The most common answer that has been given is that it is to our evolutionary advantage to know truth and use it. But this, as seen in the case above, does not seem to be true all the time, and there really is no reason to suppose it must be true any of the time. I’ll grant that we must at least learn some truths if evolution is true in order to survive, but why suppose that our species is necessarily truth-seeking? It seems clear to me that there is no reason to suppose this, and thus there is no reason to think that, granting naturalism and atheism, we should think that we know the truth or indeed can know it! For our evolutionary past could be  utterly filled to the brim with Tim the Tiger Seekers! There are any number of beliefs that we hold now, from our evolutionary forefathers, that are in fact utterly false! But we have no reason to know that or even be able to discover that, especially if they are falsely confirmed!

So if naturalism and atheism are indeed true, then there is no reason at all to suppose that anything we know constitutes true knowledge or true beliefs. There is no ground for truth in naturalism, and indeed I believe there is sufficient reason to think that naturalism would likely have us forming all kinds of false beliefs, without ever finding out otherwise. Sure, we may eventually eliminate some of them, but only while we are forming more false beliefs in the meantime!

Thus, I find this another reason to reject naturalism, which I’ve already discussed as being unintelligible and undermining things it should hold most dear.

Theistic Idealism

I’ve written about Idealism (which I’ve also referred to specifically as Immaterialism) before. I’ve also written about what I call the paucity of objections to Berkeley’s Immaterialism. Now I would like to return to the subject of my first post (the first link above) and discuss briefly (my definition of briefly is likely different than that of others’) what the philosophy known as Idealism can do in interactions with Theism. I am certainly both an Idealist by philosophy and a theist by religion, so these naturally combine for me.

I do not, however, think that Berkeley’s Immaterialism is correct. Rather, I see it as a step along the way to a kind of Idealism that I’ve been developing by piecing together Berkeley’s Immaterialism, some parts of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Husserl’s Phenomenology, and my own ideas. Berkeley has a great point, in my opinion, when he starts out by pointing to the idea that “to be is to be perceived (or to perceive).” But one of the things that Berkeley leaves out (at least in the writings of his that I’ve read–currently reading through Three Dialogues) is the demand for the ego or the “I” to be the view of reality. Berkeley makes no claims of exclusivity of mind for interpretation in the sense of demanding that the mind is where all perception must start. He assumes that people should know this, but, as with anything in philosophy, that’s not fair to the audience, no matter how studied. I believe that the ego must first be established in order to maintain an idealist philosophy. Further, I believe that there is literally no way to escape the inevitable conclusion that it is indeed “I” who ultimately interpret reality for myself (note that I’m not saying I determine reality or create it or sustain it, only that I am the ultimate arbiter for interpreting). Because “I” cannot escape myself (such an attempt would indeed be ludicrous) I must start off with glancing from myself to others. But it is the ego that ultimately interprets reality, this is a crucial point that cannot be stressed enough. But anyway, I’m getting ahead of myself and into issues I’m not planning to address here.

The problem, I believe, is that people tend to simply grant that objects in themselves are not only possible, but actual. I don’t see any grounds for granting that objects can or do exist of themselves, as mind-independent things, for there is no way for us to give something any kind of properties, modally or otherwise, that are not dependent, ultimately, on the mind. Assuming a priori that objects-in-themselves are actual is unfounded because, as our ego is the interpreter of reality, we cannot actually demonstrate that objects are mind independent, for there is no way for us to escape our ego in order to do so. We cannot become some being outside of mind that can objectively view such things.

Husserl, in a work with an extremely long title that I’m not going to type out here despite the fact that I will type it below and have now used more space than I would have just typing it out to begin with (and it is usually just referred to as Ideas anyway, which means I’ve spent a whole lot of extra time typing that I really did not have to), states, “…all real unities are ‘unities of sense.’ Unities of sense presuppose… a sense-bestowing consciousness which, for its part, exists absolutely and not by virtue of another sense-bestowal” (Ideas… 107, emphasis his). This is where theism comes into play. While Husserl was not here referring specifically to God, one can find the roots of immaterialism and idealism throughout his Ideas (something which apparently alienated him from his earlier followers). Husserl rightly notes that the thing which the physicist explores is necessarily the thing that is perceived, it is not something outside of perception (Ideas, 99). He states earlier that “…one must not let oneself be deceived by speaking of the physical thing as transcending consciousness or as ‘existing in itself'” (Ideas, 89). Husserl’s goal in Ideas was to found phenomenology as a science that explored essences (I’m heavily summing up), but I think he clearly has some very insightful thoughts on idealism in these and other passages. Husserl, mind you, does believe in a world external to our minds. I agree.

Here again theism permeates my philosophy, for I see the physical, external world as the ideas of God, who views them objectively (in the sense of absolutely, not in the sense of “as objects”) whereas we view them subjectively (here in the sense of not absolute, perhaps flawed, not complete, etc.). So without this absolute sense bestower (to use Husserl’s terms), there can be no perception, no sense. For in Him we move and have our being (Acts 17:28). So within our ego we have a kind of inescapable interpretation, we view reality from this perspective that we cannot escape. But we can clearly show that for any two people A and B, A and B’s perceptions of the world are going to be different on a number of points. But there must be some kind of objective (absolute) world from which we derive sensations and perceptions. However, because we cannot discuss any object as mind independent, this objective world is not mind-independent either, or if it is, then it is such in a way that we cannot access or understand, and in either case it is dependent on something else. So, in either case we have a metaphysics, not a physics, for physics deals with that which is perceived. If we want to establish how that which is perceived came to be, we must move into the realm of metaphysics, beyond the clutches of naturalism, beyond the access of science and firmly into the realm of philosophy, which governs both naturalism and science to begin with.

Sources:

Berkeley, George. The Works of George Berkeley, Volume I. Bibliobazaar.

Husserl, Edmund. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1982.

——–

The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

Abortion: Further Issues

I’ve written arguments against abortion before, but I’ve come up with/read about some other ones and I wanted to bring them up as I think they raise some unique issues.

One argument I read recently (over here, though I can’t seem to locate the exact post) is that abortion seems to be very anti-men. Those concerned for the rights of individuals should, in order to be consistent, care about both women’s rights and men’s rights. The reason abortion is anti-male is because men don’t have the choice over whether the woman gets an abortion or not. Now, obviously, there are many cases where men (unfortunately) push their significant others for abortion, but what I’m pointing out is that if an adult woman wants to have an abortion, the man can’t stop her if she just goes in and does so. But here’s the punch line: if the woman decides to have the baby, and the man didn’t ever want him/her, he still has to pay child support. So the man can’t decide to have the baby, but if the woman does and he didn’t want him/her, he still has to pay the child support. I’m clearly not saying that men should not want babies, but this is an extreme double standard.

Another issue to raise is the fact that abortion is completely devastating certain minority communities, African Americans in particular (see here for a very interesting site, but if you doubt the validity of this claim, just google it and you’ll find plenty of statistics).

Abortion destroys objective human value. One great point that was brought to light in my eyes a while back (see other post) is the question of how is it that coming through the birth canal suddenly changes this fetus/nonhuman tissue/tumor/whatever term one wants to use to hide the “personhood” of the baby into a baby? What makes the “thing” a baby outside the mother, but not a baby inside the mother, at the exact same stage of pregnancy? How is it different to kill a baby inside the mother (abortion) or kill it outside (murder)? Just being inside a woman doesn’t somehow make the fetus/etc. part of the woman, particularly if it can survive outside of the woman. Though–and here is a very important and chilling point–if one wants to argue that direct dependence on the woman for survival is the difference, then children are not “persons” either until they are capable of taking care of themselves all on their own. A newborn baby, for example WOULD NOT SURVIVE without parental (or other) care. Does this mean the baby too is not a “person”? What definition of personhood is being used, and how does it avoid the points I raised in my other post that I have linked a few times?

Part of my reflections on abortion have lead me to try to see it through the eyes of  a pro-choicer. Some of this has come through simply reading from blogs of pro-choice individuals. One thing that is surprising to me is how angry a lot of pro-choice people tend to be. They seem to think that pro-life people are specifically targeting women and trying to “keep them down” in some way. Is it really that hard to acknowledge that there is another side of the debate that might have legitimate reasons for being pro-life? Well, I at least am going to try to acknowledge that pro-choice individuals genuinely raise some good concerns. One of these is a concern for the rights of women. There is no reason to fault someone for wanting to be sure that men and women have equal rights (though interestingly, as above, it seems that men are sometimes pushed aside in this). Pro-choice people show a wonderful concern for women who are struggling with hard decisions, a concern that I think we pro-lifers need to acknowledge and adopt in our own testimony for our side of the debate.

Pro-lifers are not part of some agenda to “keep women down” this is completely ridiculous, and it is in fact a great example of the use of a “straw man” fallacy in argument. I wish that logic was incorporated more into this debate, because all too often I see people on both sides just shouting each other down or using all kinds of fallacious statements. Something this important to both sides, however, seems to alienate logic. I pray that one day this will not be the case. If any real headway is to be made, both sides need to sit down and discuss the issues in a logical way, while allowing for the other side to have some truth.