apologetics

God, Human Freedom, and Necessity

Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom is a topic I have written on in the past. Initially, I wrote a post that was derived almost entirely from William Lane Craig’s The Only Wise God. Shortly thereafter, I wrote a second post that expanded slightly on the ideas. These garnered much discussion, though perhaps more on Facebook than on here.

In all of these discussions, I had a nagging feeling. I believe the viewpoint I hold is fairly well defended, but I felt as though I wasn’t defending it correctly. Questions kept arising that I was on the verge of having answers to, but was unsure of how exactly to explain. But as has often been the case in my life, I read more, learned more, and want to discuss more.

In my first post I outlined an argument that basically stated that while:

Argument A:

1. Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen.

2. If God is omniscient, God foreknows x.

3. Therefore, x will happen.

is true

Argument B:

“1. Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen.

2. If God is omniscient, God foreknows x.

3. Therefore, x will necessarily happen.”

is not.

The problem was in how to explain the fallacy in the second statement. After reading Plantinga’s The Nature of Necessity, (my review here... ever the shameless plug for my site!)  however, I started to figure it out. It was only today that the idea kind of sprung on me (divine providence?).

The fallacy is in confusing de dicto and de re necessity. The first syllogism grants de dicto necessity, but not de re, while the second argument unjustifiably concludes de re necessity from de dicto.

Of course, a definition of terms is necessary (pun intended):

De dicto necessity is: “a matter of a proposition’s being necessarily true”

While de re necessity is: “an object’s having a property essentially or necessarily” (Plantinga, V)

Here’s an example:

I am sitting on a chair (a comfortable one, I might add) as I write this. Thus, it is necessarily true that I am sitting (for x=x necessarily, I am sitting, therefore I am sitting). But this kind of necessity is de dicto. It does not follow that I am necessarily sitting in the de re sense, for if that were true, I could simply not do otherwise. I could never get up.

But let us return to freedom and divine omniscience. The first syllogism states de dicto necessity: If God knows x will happen, x happens. But the second syllogism argues for de re necessity:  if God knows x will happen, necessarily, x will happen. This is the fallacy. There is no de re necessity here. God’s knowledge of x does not assign x any essence or property. Rather, God’s knowledge that x will happen simply means x will happen. God’s knowledge of x does not assign any kind of necessity to x, but merely means that his own knowledge is true. God’s knowledge of x does not mean that x could not have been otherwise, only that it will not be.

Thus, we can reveal a few errors. The first is the error that God’s knowledge of some action x somehow makes x itself necessary. The second is the error of tying God’s knowledge of x in with his causation of x. Oftentimes, one can read works where people write believing that God’s knowledge of an event x somehow determines or even causes x to occur, and it could not be otherwise. While God may indeed choose to cause x, just because God knows x doesn’t mean it follows that x is necessarily true.

Perhaps another example might help:

Let’s consider the moon. God created the moon. He also knows exactly what interactions it has with other objects in the universe. But it seems quite obvious that God could have done otherwise concerning the moon. The moon could have been created with a smaller mass, a different color dust, an atmosphere. But to say that, as some would, Argument B is true would mean that the moon exists as it does, and because God knows this it could not have been otherwise. But this seems obviously false. There is nothing inherent in the moon itself that means it is necessarily true that it looks the way it does or has the mass it does. Rather, the only necessity, if any, that can be assigned to the moon is de dicto, not de re. (I realize there are some problems with this example, such as using an object rather than a proposition, but it is to illustrate a point.)

Thus, those who believe God’s foreknowledge of some action x determines x necessarily have committed the de dicto – de re fallacy. It is quite an easy error to commit, but on further examination it can be demonstrated fallacious.

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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

Why ask the “Why” question?

I can’t help but continue to think about the suffering in the world and how it relates to Christianity. I don’t think people who are not Christian, or indeed not religious at all, don’t wonder about these concepts also. Quite the contrary, suffering so permeates our world that anyone who attempts to downplay it seems obviously wrong. But I continue not to think about the “why” part of the question, but the “how” question. Rather than asking “Why is there suffering?” I ask “Why do people have the concept of suffering?” The former question is answered on the Christian view of the fall into sin (or in various other ways in more depth, see here for a longish response). The latter question I believe Christianity also has an answer for.

I believe that the very question actually presupposes at least the concept of some kind of objective standard of good and evil. Suffering is often defined with such terms as “pain.” The very concept of suffering presupposes that there is some line between what is good and bad, what is pleasure and pain. But these concepts can exist in almost any epistemology. What sets this issue in a new light for me is the very fact that we ask questions about it.

How are we justified in asking questions like “Why is there suffering?”? I don’t see any reason that one can be justified in asking such a question unless they are supposing that there is a very real right and wrong. Someone is suffering. That is wrong. Why must they suffer? But what I must then press is my own question: Why do you think you’re justified in asking that question? It seems to me that a naturalist certainly cannot be justified in asking this question, because on naturalism the concepts of good and evil or right and wrong have evolved into us and are part of nature. They serve evolutionary functions, and no more. So what could justify someone who follows this epistemology to ask a question like “Why is there suffering?”? A possible answer could be that the reason there is suffering is because we have evolved some capacity that understands the world in such terms as right and wrong (similar to Dawkins discussion about the reason we observe that the universe seems remarkable and we seem unlikely within it [my comments here]), but these aren’t objective (we  could have evolved a different experience of the world which would perhaps give us entirely different concepts of what suffering is, or a lack of the concept entirely) and therefore can’t serve as an objective answer to a question that seems to demand it. It seems completely unsatisfactory, especially in light of the fact that the question demands an objective answer. Some may be satisfied by it, I’m not arguing against that, what I am arguing is that naturalists haven’t answered the question in an objective sense. They can only pose it as a challenge to competing epistemologies.

So it seems to me that, on a naturalist ontology, we cannot be justified in asking these kinds of “Why” questions. The only answer to be provided is that it is natural. The question demands more. It begs for more. But in order to justify the question, one has to dig deeper than a naturalist ontology (which may be uncomfortable to accept for other reasons) can provide. One has to delve into that realm of theism. It is only when the objective meaning in the universe is personal that such personal, objective questions can be asked. We cannot ask a meaningless, eternal (or circular? self-existant? etc.) universe “Why is there suffering?” when the question itself demands an answer to “How can suffering be allowed?” We cannot ask the universe of deism or naturalism “Why” and claim we are justified in expecting a response other than “Because.”

This answer leaves us wanting. Others may refer to theism as a crutch. They may see a reliance on God as a way to strengthen a weakness in oneself. It’s not. Rather, it’s the answer. God can answer the “Why” questions that are so synonymous with our nature. And a God who suffers provides an even more personal answer. It may not be the answer we’re looking for. It may not be an explanation. Rather, the answer can come as an understanding. God understanding suffering and even suffering Himself.

The book of Job in the Bible examines this question in some detail. Job suffered. He suffered at the permission of God (Job 1:12). But Job’s faith remained strong, despite the verbal throttling he received from those around him. He says “Shall we accept good from God, and not trouble?” (Job 2:10).  And Job suffered greatly. But why? What answer would God give to Job? God does answer, “Will the one who contends with the Almighty correct him? Let him who accuses God answer him!” (Job40:2) and “Brace yourself like a man; I will question you and you shall naswer me. Would you discredit my justice? Would you condemn me to justify yourself?” (Job 40:7-8). He continues, saying, “Who has a claim against me that I must pay? Everything under heaven belongs to me.” (41:11)

Job is left without answers to these questions from God. “Surely I spoke of things I did not understand, things too wonderful for me to know… Therefore I despise myself and repent in dust and ashes” (42:3, 6). It would seem here that God’s answer to the question “Why is there suffering?” may be a “You don’t understand” or even, “You can’t understand.” Job is content with this, but God isn’t. In the person of Christ, in whom all the fullness of the Deity lives in bodily form (Colossians 2:9), God suffered Himself. Not only that, but instead of answering “Why,” God delivered the ultimate answer: Jesus. This earth may be a time of suffering, but in the end there is eternal joy.

It is here, however, that the Christian now may be accused of not providing a satisfactory answer to the question. “Forget about all this theological garbage [1 Corinthians 1:18-31] and answer the question!” This is where the Christian can thank God for the gifts of logic and reason, for the answer to the question can be determined from them. I’m not going to rewrite everything, as I’ve already gone through the question here.

It therefore stands, in my mind, that the justification for such “Why” questions can only be had on theism. Naturalism, without objective right and wrong, has no stance from which to ask the question, and no answer that it can give achieves the transcendental meaning it demands.

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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

Dawkins discussing “The Greatest Show On Earth” (Attempts to Counter Teleology)

There was a video I found online of Dawkins talking about his latest book, “The Greatest Show On Earth.” Naturally I had to watch it and I honestly found myself laughing out loud at a few points. Dawkins is surely a good speaker. I find him quite a natural at sounding amiable despite spitting blasphemy and utter illogic the entire time.

Now I have not read the book. I cracked it open at Borders recently, but that’s about it, so these comments only come from the video.

Dawkins’ brand of argument is one that I am honestly baffled by. Basically, what Dawkins says, is that the reason we see so much apparent design in the universe is because it could not have failed to be any other way, given the fact that we are here to observe it. I have heard this argument before but never really reflected on how ridiculous it is before now.

“The fact of our own existence is perhaps too surprising to bear… How is it that we find ourselves not merely existing, but surrounded by such complexity, such excellence, such endless forms so beautiful… The answer is this: it could not have been otherwise, given that we are capable of noticing our existence at all and of asking questions about it.”- Dawkins, in the interview at the link above.

The argument seems at first to be as follows:

[1]

1. There is apparent design in the universe that brought about our existence.

2. We exist.

3. The reason we see apparent design in the universe is because we exist.

What!? I don’t even want to delve into the depths of how many fallacies there are in this argument, as I may have constructed it wrong. Perhaps the argument is, instead:

[2]

1. We exist

2. There is apparent design in the universe that brought about our existence.

3. Therefore, we are here to observe that design.

Again, what!?

But on further reflection, perhaps these arguments are unfair to the original statement. It may be that the argument is not meant analytically, and instead should just be seen as a brute statement of fact:

Conclusion [1]: The apparent design we see in the universe is observed simply because we exist to observe it.

Another way to state this could be:

Conclusion [2]: We read design for our existence into the universe because we exist to do so.

I still can’t get over how utterly question begging all of these assertions are. Perhaps I could answer with a parody that begs the question in favor of teleology:

Conclusion [3]: We read design for our existence into the universe because it actually is there.

I think that my conclusion has about as much [or more] validity as the argument Dawkins [and others] makes.

Basically what Dawkins and others who make this argument have done is acknowledge the tremendous weight that the teleological argument brings to the table, and then decide to beg the question against it in their own favor by saying, “Well of course it seems designed for us, we’re here, aren’t we?”

But let me be perhaps more fair. Maybe Dawkins is really trying to say that:

Conclusion [4]: Because we are here to observe all of these things, it follows that they should appear to be designed for us, for we could not have come about if such conditions had not occurred.

This may, at first glance, seem more valid. But let us examine it further. How is it that it somehow follows from this conclusion that the design is not in fact intelligent design? How does it follow that the design does not point specifically to creation? I don’t think there is any good way to try to exclude either of these alternatives. What Dawkins has in fact done is not eliminate design from the equation, but introduce evolution as an alternative explanation. He acknowledges design, and then throws evolution into the mix as a possible explanation (“How is it… it could not have been otherwise”). It’s essentially giving up on trying to explain away design and instead admitting it and trying to explain it within evolution.

It follows that such people have been thrown into a trilemma:

1. Admit design and then beg the question against it

2. Admit design and modify the theory of evolution in an ad hoc manner [which again begs the qeustion]

3. Deny design entirely

The third option has become increasingly untenable, so people like Dawkins have tried the first two. Unfortunately, in doing so they have abandoned the very logic they claim to cling to.

But again, perhaps I may be accused of erecting a straw man. “It’s not that Dawkins is saying there is design, just that there appears to be design, because we are here.” I answer again by saying that this is completely question-begging against teleology. It smacks of a complete ad hoc modification of one’s view.

But I think there is a stronger argument I have left out. Perhaps Dawkins means to argue:

[3]

1. If some species X exists, then the universe would appear designed for X.

2. X exists.

3. Therefore, the universe appears designed for X.

Okay. How does this in any way eliminate or discredit design? I don’t see any reason to accept the view that it does. All it states is what is obvious. It doesn’t, however, eliminate the following argument:

[4]

1. If some species X exists, then the universe is designed for X.

2. X exists.

3. Therefore, the universe is designed for X.

Nor does it do anything to somehow discredit this latter argument. All it’s done is formulate a weaker version of the teleological argument, which is the argument many theists are using nowadays to begin with.

But there is even one more argument I have forgotten:

[5]

1. If species X exists, then it is impossible that conditions are such that X would fail to exist.

2. X exists.

3. Therefore, it is impossible that conditions are such that X would fail to exist.

I think this is perhaps the strongest form or Darwins’ argument. According to this argument, it simply follows that if any one species (or probably, any being whatsoever) exists, then conditions could not have been anything but what they are. I believe this is not a straw man largely because it is formulated almost exactly from what Dawkins says (see quote above, specifically “The answer is this: it could not have been otherwise…”). In other words, if something exists, then it is simply obvious that conditions would have to be such that that thing exists. I would answer:

There are major problems for the evolutionist holding to this view. For in stating that it would be impossible for conditions to be otherwise, one making this argument has made it necessarily true that every species that does exist, exists. In other words, the universe exists in such a fashion that it is necessarily true that humans came to exist. Similarly, it is necessarily true that walruses, cardinals, and the like came to exist. But what does that say about evolution? Where did the natural selection go? Where did the random chance go? What has happened to those conditions that factor into making species diverse? For if the species that exist today exist because of a necessary chain of events leading up to the species that currently exist, it follows [due to necessity] that the speceis that exist now could not have failed to exist, nor could there have been other species. I think that this kind of argument should make the atheistic evolutionist quite uncomfortable, for if it is necessarily true that humans exist, all they’ve done is actually acknowledge that the universe was arranged in such a way that humans would actually exist.

And I see no way to make this argument without including necessity in it. For if necessity is left out of argument [5] above, then it suffers from the problem of not actually eliminating design. But if necessity is included in the argument, then it follows that species that exist now exist necessarily, and therefore the universe is such that humans have come about necessarily because of pre-existing conditions, which many theists would gladly acknowledge, and perhaps even cling to.

I conclude with restating my exact quote from Dawkins’ mouth. I leave out his paltry answer this second time, for his question remains unanswered in light of his illogic. Thank you, Dawkins, for acknowledging that the universe was specifically designed for us.

“The fact of our own existence is perhaps too surprising to bear… How is it that we find ourselves not merely existing, but surrounded by such complexity, such excellence, such endless forms so beautiful?”

I answer: God.

The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

Book Review: The Recalcitrant Imago Dei by J.P. Moreland

This is the first of what will probably be many book reviews. Yes, it is indeed just another way to put easy content up on my site. Since school started I have less time for this, but I’m still reading as much as I can. Any feedback would be wonderful. I’ll post the review criteria at the bottom of this review, and probably make an individual post about it so the criteria can be easily accessed. Also, any suggestions for other categories to review would be appreciated (or suggestions to remove categories).

J.P. Moreland’s The Recalcitrant Imago Dei is a work that outlines a case against naturalism based on what a Christian would define as the “image of God.” These recalcitrant (as far as naturalism is concerned) facts include consciousness, free will, rationality, a substantial soul, objective morality, and intrinsic value.

J.P. Moreland has, I believe, outlined a rather magnficent critique of naturalism in this work. Chapter by chapter, he lays out philosophical defeaters for naturalism that are based on some of the most basic facts of human life. Each chapter contains clear, though often intellectually challenging, arguments against naturalism based on such things as consciousness or free will.

The chapter on Consciousness was, I believe, great, but I’ve read almost all the material in other works (specifically, J.P. Moreland’s Consciousness and the Existence of God and William Lane Craig/Moreland’s Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology). I believe that current apologists are certainly on to something when they consider the argument from consciousness, which I would consider a rather impressive defeater of naturalism. Moreland’s version of the argument is actually an argument for theism, and as far as I’m concerned, that makes it even better.

The next chapter considers the case of the freedom of the will. I believe that Moreland is correct in suggesting that naturalism generally, and physicalism specifically are almost certainly defeaters of the freedom of the will. Morelands argument in this chapter is again similar to some of his other works (here it would be Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview), but there is some material here that is both not recycled and very useful. I believe that this is a chapter I will continue to open to in my debates with physicalists.

One argument that continues to pique my interest is the argument from rationality. In this chapter, Moreland doesn’t so much employ an argument from reason for the existence of God as he uses the existence of reason as a defeater for naturalism. I believe many of the aspects of the argument from reason tend to mirror some of the teleological argument’s claims, and because of this I generally am biased against it, but I find Moreland’s methodology of using it against naturalism rather than as a proof for God quite interesting and will probably use it in application.

The chapter on the substantial soul is, I believe, less useful as an argument against naturalism (I think naturalists who argue that the soul is a physical object are, well, generally ignored nowadays), but the chapter contains several pages of highly useful definitions. It’s another chapter I will almost certainly continue to open to in order to clearly outline my responses.

Objective morality is a continual problem that I don’t see naturalism having any way around. I’m a huge advocate of the moral argument, and while Moreland doesn’t advance any specific moral argument in this chapter, he uses the idea of objective morality as a defeater for naturalism (and vice versa). Further, he argues that naturalism has no way to give humans intrinsic value, due to the idea that, according to naturalism, humans are merely animals and have no significant differences between them and, say, a dog as far as the physical world is concerned. His discussion in this chapter and the previous chapter on the errors of various philosophers using species relations when they should be discussing genus relations is highly interesting, though I’m unsure of the applicability.

The appendix has a few useful things, but it is mostly just Moreland observing various philosophical trends. He does offer an argument against naturalistic dismissivism that I will probably make use of in the future.

Overall, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei is a fantastic work. Although some portions of it are clearly recycled, including almost an entire chapter, it is a work that I will almost certainly use again and again. Moreland’s style of writing is almost always clear, but he sometimes suffers from an overuse of philosophical terms that are usually obvious in meaning, but could probably have been better said in a simpler fashion (like qualia, desiderata, etc.). I got this book hoping it would have some good arguments in it to help formulate a general critique of naturalism and I was not disappointed. I recommend this book highly, but be aware of the fact that it is certainly not easy reading.

Contents:

Naturalism, Theism and Human Persons: Identifying the Central Crisis of Our Age —1

Naturalism, Consciousness and Human Persons —16

Naturalism, Free Will and Human Persons —41

Naturalism, Rationality and Human Persons —67

Naturalism, a Substantial Soul and Human Persons —104

Naturalism, Objective Morality, Intrinsic Value and Human Persons —143

Appendix: Dismissive Naturalism: Responding to Nagel’s Last Stand —165

Scores:

Quality of Arguments (if it applies): 8

Overall Content: 9

Difficulty: 7

Clarity: 9

Theology/Doctrine: N/A- other than fairly fundamental Christian belief, this doesn’t really have enough to judge the work based on Doctrinal or Theological stances

Value (price): 8- Amazon has it for around 30-40$ The book’s actual material (before the notes/index start) comprise 180 pages. Normally I think this is a little low for a 40$ book, but there is no wasted space here.

Relevance: 9

Review Criteria:

The Quality of arguments is just what it says. Obviously this is subjective. Do I think the arguments presented in the book (if there are any) are valid and/or useful?

Overall Content is a general judge of how good I felt the book is.

Difficulty is the amount of work it takes to get through the work. Higher values don’t necessarily mean the book is better, just more difficult to read.

Clarity simply outlines how clear I believe the author was.

Theology/Doctrine is my judgment, clearly based on my presuppositions, of how good I felt the author’s theological or doctrinal content was (if there is any).

Value is a determination of whether I believe the book is worth the asking price.

Relevance outlines whether I think the book has real-life applications. A low score in this doesn’t necessarily mean the book is bad, just that I believe there may not be much to use. In other words, a book could score low on this criterium, but I might still find it quite good.

Physicalism: Rejected on the Grounds of Unintelligibility

Physicalism is the view that everything is physical. Every thought, mental state, etc. we experience is reducible to physical explanations. It can be said, according to physicalism, that neurons firing or chemicals being released are an emotion or mental state.

I believe physicalism can be rejected on the grounds of unintelligibility. One reason for this is that physicalism forgets the idea of causation. It equates a cause with an entire process. One can agree that there are physical causes for a mental event, but does not have to accept that this means that a mental event itself is physical. An emotion is not a firing of a neuron or some amalgam of chemicals. Mental states are described from a first-person subjective viewpoint, and cannot be equated with the physical world, which is described in physical terms.

The most commonly used argument for physicalism is the “argument from causal closure”:

–“If an event e causes event e*, then there is no event e# such that e# is non-supervenient [edit: supervenient generally means dependent] on e and e# causes e*.” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

The problem with this view, of course, is that it can be countered by simply rejecting premise 2 “there is no event e# such that e# is non-supervenient on e and e# causes e*.” One can simply point out that it is possible for there to be an event e# to exist.

Further, what exactly does it mean to say that mental states are wholly physical? I believe that is ontologically untrue. One can simply examine one’s own thoughts and realize that, say, thinking about a pink elephant is not ontologically a pink elephant. Physicalists would have to try to describe this mental image wholly in physical terms, for that is all there is to the world according to their methodology. But it is then almost impossible to distinguish between the image of a pink elephant and the pink elephant itself. Try that thought experiment. Describe yourself “thinking about a pink elephant” in wholly physical terms. Do not slip into saying such words as “mental state”, “mental”, “thinking”, “I”, and the like. It may be possible, but it ends up being something utterly ridiculous which doesn’t seem to really describe the event (thinking about a pink elephant) at all. It describes the things that are causing one to think of a pink elephant.

Physicalism also leads inevitably to determinism. If all things are wholly physical, there cannot be any kind of freedom of the will. All things are determined by physical processes, meaning there is simply no individual to possess freedom.

Physicalism can be faulted for either not adequately explaining or completely rejecting: mental states, the will, individuals, liberetarian freedom, freedom of permission, freedom of personal integrity, and freedom of moral and rational responsibility.

What exactly does it mean, within physicalism, to have the “want to do something?” For example, I am moving my things from one room to another. I want to lift up and move my couch on my own, but I cannot. Physicalism does not seem to have an adequate explanation for this. Wanting to do something could be causally linked to certain parts of the brain showing activity, but it could not explain the desire itself.

What would it mean if, say, a scientist could monitor the brain and know every thing a person was thinking about? Imagine being able to do such a thing. Looking at a screen, one could see that a person could think about a “dog” and one would not actually know what that person is thinking. Or, perhaps the technology is such that the dog which the person was thinking of would be entirely described. It’s a black lab the person owned in his or her childhood, it has a scar on its nose from a fight with a cat, its fur has a bluish sheen in certain light, etc. It still does not mean that one could literally read this person’s mind. For the mental image of a black lab, down to the tiniest detail (i.e. fur length, etc.) will be different from one person to the next. Even if we could literally think of every detail, including the length of each individual hair on that lab, etc., the mental image we had would be different, for we all think of such details in different ways. Descriptions of colors, scents, sounds, etc. vary widely from person to person.

But then, what if we could project an image onto the screen of that dog, in every detail? Two things would prevent this from allowing an identical image: 1. any emotional attachment to the image, and 2. the subjective interpretation of sensory imagery.

Another way to try to explain this scenario into possibility for the physicalist would be to say that technology could allow us to transfer that image, with its emotion, etc. into someone else’s mind. But then, we still have problems. 1. Even if we could project the exact image, along with it’s emotional responses, into someone else’s brain, that person’s brain would still interpret that image for itself. It would be presented with certain emotional states, sensory details, etc., but it would be filtering all of those through its own system. 2. There’s no clear way to say that even if we could eliminate problem 1, the image would be exactly the same with both people.

Even if one could project all the emotion, history, details, and the like of an image from one person to the other, it would not be the same. Why not? Because of another problem with physicalism: emotional states are not the same. What one person experiences as pain can be entirely different for someone else. Let’s say that, sticking with the black lab, subject A has a positive experience of this animal. This brings with it the feeling of pleasure at recalling the image, and calmness related to feeling protected by the dog. When it is projected into the brain of subject B, these emotions may not be the same. For even if one could capture the intensity of these feelings, there’s no way to say that the conotations they’d carry would be the same. Subject B would have pleasure related to recalling the image projected into his or her brain, but this pleasure would have to be intepreted by Subject B before it was presented as an image. The pleasure could feel different from subject A to person B, despite the exact same physical processes involved.

But what if we could project literally every aspect of this image into someone else’s mind (from person A to B)? What if we could somehow get past the interpretation problem? Would this then prove physicalism has weight? I don’t believe so. The problem here is threefold: 1. The problem of “self” in regard to the image. If the image were projected in such a way from person A to B, would it then be person B’s thought/image or would it still be person A’s, just projected into another brain (or mind)? For physicalism to be true, the image would have to be person B’s and identical to person A’s, but it seems like this is not the case, both by the nature of the whole experiment and by the fact that the image exists within person A’s brain originally. Not only that, but 2. it ignores the fact that there is such a thing as the image itself. Even if 1. were not a defeater of physicalism in this case, it seems to be defeated by the fact that the image is itself not made itself all the factors that go into making the image, but is simply an image. The image itself is different from the causation. There is not a black lab within someone’s brain. There is the image of this black lab within their brain. The fact that it must be discussed in such terms goes against physicalism. Cause is not equal to effect. 3. If this entire scenario were about an image that was imagined in person A’s head, rather than a real black lab he or she owned, it runs into a whole host of other problems. What does it mean to have something that doesn’t actually exist, existing in two people’s brain/minds? How is it that physical explanations give rise to a non-physical thing (something that is imagined does not exist physically, so it does not have physical space, qualities, etc., and cannot therefore be reduced to physical qualities, as it does not posess any)?

The point of this scenario is to point out that physicalism discounts some of the most self-evident qualia we experience. Physicalism cannot account for such differences in pain, pleasure, and other feelings or emotional states. It cannot account for the differences in experience when the physical causation is the same.

Point 3. has in it yet another blow against physicalism. What of imagined things? It seems possible that we could physically explain how we bring forth the image of something that is imagined (such as a flying pig), but that does not explain in physical terms what exactly that imagined thing is. What is it, in terms of physicalism? It is not real or physical, so how can it be reduced to something physical? And we certainly cannot say the image does not exist, because anyone with an imagination can think of a flying pig! But even if we were to assign it physical properties (i.e., wings, pigs feet, curly tail, etc.), it would not actually possess any of these. It is something that simply does not exist physically, and it would beg the question to assign it physical properties.

Ontologically speaking, physicalism seems shot full of holes. It can be simple to talk about all mental states, images, and the like as if they were merely physical, but in the real world, does it really mean anything to say that? It is evident from one’s own experience that one can think in terms of self, in terms of intentionality,  and in terms that defy physical explanation. What does it show to say that such things don’t actually exist? It makes our personal experiences meaningless.

It is unintelligible to embrace physicalism, for it means nothing to say that our “self” is not a “self” but a mixture of physical explanations. It means nothing to say that our emotions don’t exist except in physical terms. It means nothing to say that the mind is not a “mind” but a physically reducible thing. It means nothing to say that imagined things don’t exist (they exist within the brain [or mind] of anyone with an imagination), and it begs the question to say that they possess physical properties.

Physicalism, at best, can serve only as a causal explanation of mind states, mental images, and the like. Yet the thesis itself claims to have superior explanatory power in that it can explain everything (via physical means). Finally, physicalism has inadequate explations for, or outright rejects, things that are evident simply through introspection (imaginary objects, the concept of “self,” etc.). Its claims about such things are either meaningless or unintelligible. I therefore reject it on the grounds of unintelligibility.

Debate Part 2

Part 2 of a continuing debate. Part 1 can be found here. This is a debate between an atheist and myself. The non-bolded text is his (when he’s quoting he is quoting my responses in part 1). The bolded text is my response.

“He then argues that Jesus does not remove responsibility from the law by quoting Matthew 5:18ff…leaving out (5:18 – I understood) “Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them, but to fulfill them.””.

I didn’t intend to argue that point (the fulfillment of the law), and have at least a rudimentary understanding of this. I was attempting to interject some connective tissue into your original comment to more accurately reflect what I thought Harris was referring to. I will at least mention a couple of points that I’ve questions about to get your take on them.

Indeed, Jesus said “I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them.” (It’s impossible for me to think Harris is not aware of this. I wouldn’t speculate as to why it was omitted. Being that he and likely any of his readers know full well the concept and the passage, it seems something dubious was unlikely).

I would ask how you reconcile the next line, “I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear,…” with the one before it that you mention? ‘Until heaven and earth disappear’ – surely this has not yet happened, and it would follow that the rest of the verse, then, still applies today and until that does happen (“…not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law…”). It seems that that which must come to pass before the law he spoke of would be fulfilled, has not.

I notice as well as the verses continue that Jesus in fact, quite opposed to rendering these laws somehow null by fulfilling them, seems to systematically magnify and amplify each. It follows logically that he has not yet ‘fulfilled’ them in a sense of completion. Anger is elevated to the sin of murder and a lustful look elevated to that of actual adultery. It seems he not only didn’t relegate these laws to the past, but raised the bar quite a lot on what actually constituted sin.

The first and easiest thing to point out is that you’re assuming knowledge you don’t have: what Harris is or is not aware of, and that his readers “know full well the concept and the passage.” How is it that you know this information? Are you suggesting that everyone who reads Harris knows what comes before the verses he cites, and that they know enough of Scripture to interpret it in light of context and other verses?

But your claims to knowing of others’ background knowledge aside, this argument from Harris and others seems to show a misunderstanding of both the concept of justification and the concept of the separation of Law and Gospel. A simple response can be found in one of the greatest Doctrinal works of the Lutheran Church: Pieper’s ‘Christian Dogmatics,’ Volume I, page 532 “Holy Scripture also determines exactly which laws applied only temporarily and locally, for instance, only to the Jews under the covenant of the Law, and are therefore not the divine norm for all men of all times. A great and harmful confusion of the consciences of men is, even to our day, caused by generalizing temporary and  local laws. With reference, for instance to the commandment given Exodus 31:14-15 “Ye shall keep the Sabbath… everyone that defileth it shall surely be put to death,” and Leviticus 19:26 “Ye shall not eat anything with the blood,” and Leviticus 11 and Deuteronomy 14 (the catalogue of clean and unclean beasts), the New Testament distinctly says: “Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of a holy day, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath days,” Colossians 2:16. We get this result: Only that is divine Law for all men which is taught in Holy Writ as binding on all. Not even the Ten Commandments in the form in which they were given to the Jews (Exodus 20) are binding on all men, but only the Ten Commandments as set down in the New Testament, as we have them… Commandments given to individuals, e.g. the commandment received by Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, do not obligate others. In general, the rule to be applied to the life and acts of the saints is, in the words of the Apology [to the Augsburg Confession]: ‘Examples ought to be interpreted according to the rule, i.e., according to certain and clear passages of Scripture, not contrary to the rule, that is, contrary to Scripture.’”

Acts 10:15 is another example: “’Do not call anything impure that God has made clean.’”

To say that Jesus expanded the Law is inaccurate. He clarifies it and outlines largely which laws God intended for all peoples. Surely one would not suggest he does so for all of Levitical law and otherwise. One of the rules of Biblical interpretation is to interpret scripture in light of scripture, and when one does so in the case of the Law, one can see that to argue that all people are to follow the ceremonial laws and others is not formed on the basis of a Scriptural argument, but on pulling only certain verses and ignoring others.

As far as reconciling “Until heaven and earth disappear,” with what I’ve said, it becomes clear after the previous explanation. Jesus is affirming the presence of the law which continually acts as a mirror to show us our sin and need for Him. He is not abolishing the Law, but affirming it. He’s fulfilling it on our behalf, because we all inevitably fail—especially when compared to the standards He sets in Matthew 5:21ff. His statements must be taken in light of the rest of Scripture. The ceremonial laws set in Leviticus were for the Hebrew people in the Covenant of the Law. We are not bound by these laws, as stated in other passages (Acts 10:15, Colossians 2:16, Galatians 5:6, and elsewhere). To argue otherwise is to argue against Scripture.  It is to argue by selective observation (a logical fallacy).

**I’ve taken a question out of chronological order here, which I generally don’t do, as it felt a bit like a summation to me. As this will likely be the final formal response from me in this particular debate, I thought I’d use it as a conclusion of sorts. It is now the final response**

“Arguing against Christianity by saying it’s bad does nothing to its claims of truth, making the argument an ad hominem attack on the character of Christians rather than an attack on Christianity.”

You mention two separate things here;
1) Arguing that Christianity is bad, and
2) arguing that Christian’s are bad.
Though I would suggest that there is no way to disassociate one from the other. You need only imagine everyone that self labels as a Christian suddenly vanishing from existence – does the religion remain? Of course not. The people ARE the religion.
Arguing that Christianity is bad does indeed call into question the claims of its truth, as it is claimed to be good. If it is shown that it is bad, it is also shown that it is false. Showing that Christians are bad, at best, would show that either the message is terribly unclear (and after two millennium, likely undecipherable to the degree that anything more than a negligible consensus can be achieved), and at worst that it simply, as a system, doesn’t work.

To illustrate with analogy; I imagine a company manufacturing some product. It is shown, let’s say, that none of this company’s worker’s produce anything of merit (or very few if you prefer). Perhaps they are lazy, have a poor work ethic, or arrive to work drunk each day. Whatever the reasons, they each produce substandard products that make it out the door. An outsider visits the company site, and sees all of the substandard products and remarks that the company is substandard. How could one maintain that this company is good despite it continually turning out inferior products? I argue that they couldn’t. Reverse engineer the old garbage in, garbage out saying. If after thousands of years there is still no consensus as to the meanings contained in the bible, and evil is still routinely performed in its name, it is time to reevaluate the merit of the texts.

This is an example of a false analogy. It also again shows a misunderstanding of the core of Christianity. Just as you feel the need to correct me by saying atheism is not a belief, I must correct you by saying that Christianity is not about being good people. To argue against Christianity on the basis that its people are bad is to ignore the central claim of Christianity, that we are sinful, that Jesus washed away our sins in His fulfillment of the law and offering as a sacrifice for our sins, and that Jesus Christ is Lord God over all.

If you want to argue against the track record of the organized religion of Christianity, one can do it in the fashion Harris is doing. But that is to ignore the truth claims of Christianity. Not only that, but Christians acknowledge their own sinfulness that has been around since the fall into sin. It sets up a straw man in place of the truth claims of the argument by saying “you claim to be good [I don’t], and your religion claims to make people good, so you should all be good or your religion is wrong” Christianity is about the core beliefs I outlined above, not about being good. To say a Christian sins is to confirm what the Christian knows: all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God (Romans 3:23). The institution of the church itself is not inerrant.
“(i.e. condom use, etc.) could be valid against Catholicism, which is not the Christianity I (and about 50% of Christians) ascribe to.”

Certainly you aren’t writing off one of the most powerful and influential churches in history, along with over a billion adherents, as not relevant to a discussion about religion?
I think it reasonable to assume that when he addresses those that hold such beliefs about condom use for example, that it’s understood that he is actually speaking to those that have that particular belief, no? He was after all, addressing the entire nation, of which a good quarter of are Catholic.

I must simply point out that once again a stance of the Catholic Church or other church on an individual issue is to argue about points that aren’t central to the teachings of Christianity. The church can mess up, the church can error. This is because we are human, and it does nothing to the claim that Jesus is savior.

“It seems dishonest of Harris to assert that atheists are completely different…”

I would ask that you give a single example of something that all atheists share other than the lack of a belief in god, if you found that dishonest. Or was it merely the comparison?

It was for comparison.

Day states, “By applying his metric to the state-wide voting instead of the more
precise and relevant county,…”

OK, brakes please. Though I dread the thought of this, if you would like to proceed with these mountains of data, I will be obliged to do so – but only after I check all of these numbers for myself, and from both angles mentioned. I am not prepared to take either of these men’s assessments on…faith, any further. I was willing to stick out my neck a tiny bit as to the veracity of Harris’ method, but to debate specific numbers from his and another source, neither of which I have verified myself, is a bit much – not my style. I couldn’t in good conscience do so. This would of course take a bit of time, so let me know if you wish to argue this to its end.
I can be rather obsessive with research, and will hand you the specifics on a platter with references sited, likely with better detail than both of them. But I ask you be certain this is something worthy of your debate, as it will take quite some time to compile, and it was not my original intent. That said, I am willing.

I will continue to assert I believe that either way this statistic is utterly unimportant. I would like to simplify any search you want to make by pointing to the CIA World Factbook on the U.S. (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html ) and its stats on religion: “Protestant 51.3%, Roman Catholic 23.9%, Mormon 1.7%, other Christian 1.6%, Jewish 1.7%, Buddhist 0.7%, Muslim 0.6%, other or unspecified 2.5%, unaffiliated 12.1%, none 4% (2007 est.).” Atheists are decidedly a minority. It seems illogical to point to atheists as the reason for less violence in an area. It also is reading into statistics, a lot. Overall, I just think this entire argument is nothing but irrelevant. Unless you really want to argue that it is relevant somehow, I’d be happy to drop it.

“Day points to a 2001 ARIS study that shows that 14.1% of Americans are atheists.”

Again, the research would need to be done on my end to go much further with this.

“I’ll concede again that I should have been more clear here. Harris does admit that religious people do good things, but it seems to me that his argument centers around the idea that no religion = better people.”

I think that’s a fair assessment of what he says, or at the very least, that religion is not required to do that same good. But I believe what you’ve said here is valid, yes.

“He seems to argue that if religion were removed, more good would be done.”

I believe he does, if for no other reason than the impediments that religion erect – i.e. the issue of condoms mentioned (and the hordes that die because of it), the IUD (birth control) issue and the related cancer tat results, the stem cell research issue… – all of which that, if it were not for the church, would save innumerable lives.
So yes, if religion would stop attempting to legislate morality, much more good could be done. Removal of said religion would likely produce the same effect, though I am not advocating it’s ‘removal’. I’m unclear as to whether or not he is. I didn’t get that impression, but it would depend on how you mean removal, of course – and by what means would be of utmost importance.

This is utilitarianism to the max: What makes the greatest good for the greatest number of people? I don’t think this is a valid moral stance to take whatsoever. The biggest problem is one of the classic examples against utilitarianism: Let’s say that there are 1,000,000 people whose happiness would increase if a minority group of about 100 people were killed. Simply following utilitarianism, one would have to advocate killing these 100 people. A counter argument could then be made that being dead is a very big unhappiness, while the 1,000,000 people wouldn’t be super happy about it, just a little happy. But what if 1,000,000 people would be happier if 1 innocent person were tortured? What if they’d be happier if 1 innocent person were just beaten? Either of these cases seems wholly within the utilitarianist view of ethics. But we can see they are clearly wrong (unless one wants to argue that torture or beating an innocent person can be a good thing). To argue on the basis of a utilitarian view is to accept that ethical stance as a standard of judgment, which, as we’ve just seen, is awkward at best.
“I could stand to reword that part of my blog entry, but again I don’t think I’m attacking a straw man when Harris specifically tries to detract from the good that religious people do (i.e. his Mother Theresa example in which he says she was “…deranged by religious faith.”) If she were not so deranged, she would have been better. That seems to be a valid way to argue from what he is saying.”

When you stated “whether people like Harris want to admit it or not.” you in fact posited something that he did not say, and then refuted it. That is essentially what a straw man is, to set up and refute a position that your opponent did not take.

With regards to Mother Theresa, I have very little information as yet – though it is now  apparently available. Hitchens also has some pretty scathing things to say about her in ‘God is Not Good’. Regardless, I would hesitate to argue her virtues, but would also caution you until you can digest information that surfaced (I believe from her personal letters?). It’s worth taking a look at from what I gather, as it is rather illuminating and casts her in a grim light after all. It was this information that he was basing things on, not the old, untarnished saintly image she’s enjoyed in the past. It’s something I need to look into as well.

Harris wants to discredit the good that religious people do by name calling. Attacking Mother Theresa is simply an ad hominem fallacy. Further, I’ve read some of these things from her diaries, etc. They point to her having the same struggles as all people of faith do—wondering if we’re doing what’s right, wondering if God exists, etc. That doesn’t seem damaging to me.

“…doesn’t do anything to hurt the message of Christ…”

This is one thing we may agree upon, for I have no particular malice towards the figure of Christ, nor much of his teachings. Not all mind you, but much of them. It is religion as a whole, and the behavior of its adherents that I find to be a problem, not the teachings of one philosopher. It is the interpretations of that philosopher, the justification – however ill advised – in his name, the imposition of this code of morality through legislation on to those who do not share the beliefs, etc. Not the man.

Christ claimed to be God. To call Him simply a philosopher does no credit to what He did and said while He was on earth. I’d agree that Christians do not always (or perhaps even often do not) follow the teachings of Christ. This is something I think the church does deserve criticism for—embracing a morality that wasn’t Christ’s. Dietrich Bonhoeffer does a good job in his book “The Cost of Discipleship.” But that is a whole other issue, seeing as how we agree truth claims are untouched.
“It is wholly possible that Christians do good things out of the kindness of their hearts.”

Agreed, it is possible.

“…it implies that the only reason a Christian does good is for reward,…”

I’ve certainly heard this argument, yes. There are many Christians that do just this – as wrong-headed as it may be. But I would tend to focus more on the ‘do good because they are commanded to’ aspect myself. I argue this from personal experience with a rather substantial number of Christians, both on line in and in real life. The quotes from many-a-video for example of Christians stating that;
1) If it weren’t for biblical morality spelling things out for them, they’d likely be completely immoral (I kid you not – perhaps you would be surprised by how many say such things?). -that what prevents them from committing these acts, is that it says so in the bible. ‘How else would one know right from wrong?’ they say.
coupled with;
2) Their complete inability to grasp that an atheist, because they do not have this book that they follow, can still be quite moral indeed. It seems utterly unfathomable to them. That to me says a great deal about their morality.

I am deeply saddened to hear #1 and 2 together. The Bible even says that “(Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the law, since they show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts now accusing, now even defending them.)”-Romans 2:14-15.

Thus, Scripture itself shows that those without belief can know and do the requirements of the Law. The core argument, however, is based on an assumption [that Christians only do good for reward] that is not a logical truth and is invalid.

“The point you make about the result being the same is interesting, given that you just argued above that it is somehow better to do good things without a responsibility to do so.”

It seems you are confusing the result, with the intent? Yes, I maintain that the intent of said act is important when attempting to assign a value judgment to that act – even if the outcome is identical.
For example, giving a large sum of money to charity when one has little to give would rightly be considered more altruistic, than giving money when you’ve plenty to give because you expect to get a tax write off.

Your correction from obligatory to objective is noted. Though if I were a student of Freud… 😉

Again this whole argument is based on the assumption that Christians have questionable intentions when they do good (i.e. they do it for wanting a reward). This may be true for some, but it is untrue to apply it to all. It also seems to assume that the only reason atheists or nonreligous people would do good is out of the kindness of their hearts. This also seems an invalid assumption, as [you noted] tax write offs and other rewards (a feeling of being a good person, having others see how charitable one is, etc.) could influence some.

“One could make the same argument for the history of irreligion.”

By irreligion, are you referring to essentially every cause not directly tied to religion (as it can mean absence of, indifference to, or hostility towards religion)? If that’s the case, then I would certainly agree. Religious reasons for violence vs. every other possible reason for violence…religion might stand a chance in that instance!

It seems like you had access to “The Irrational Atheist” by Day judging from your more recent e-mails, and so can see that from the Encyclopedia of War one can determine that religion is the cause of 6.98% of war. This seems to undermine the idea that it is a major cause of war in the world.

St. Augustine said “We are never to judge a philosophy by its abuse.” I believe that violence in Christianity is not just abuse of Scripture, but it goes against the core tenants of the teachings of Christ and the beliefs that the church was founded on. The same beliefs that exist in the core of Christianity today.

“I think simply looking at an overall # of death rate, it is possible that irreligion has lead to more violence than religion.”

I don’t know that that would be possible, but I would be interested as well in the results of such a tally. One reason of the cuff, is that the inherent inequalities in technology, transportation, etc. presented by the times would make comparable calculations impossible. Much like how we adjust today’s value of a dollar to day’s of old to see how much something was worth a hundred years ago.

By the time a man could openly admit being atheist without fear of being say, burned alive by the church, technology had progressed by leaps and bounds which always, always translates into more advanced warfare. So certainly these (atheist) leaders that you site had much more gruesomely efficient ways of disposing of their fellow man than did their theist predecessors. I shudder to think of the Catholic church (for example) having in their possession advanced WMDs during the dark ages.
I’d still be morbidly interested in the count if it were possible, but it would hardly be equatable.

Your use of “Dark Ages” exposes a presupposition against religion. Historians in general are completely abandoning the phrase because it paints a picture different than what is historically true.

Arguing that the church being in possession of different technology would mean they would have killed more people is an example of a non sequitur argument. It doesn’t follow logically that the church would have used those weapons. It also is arguing from common sense—yet another fallacy. We can’t know what would have happened in this case. You can only argue that it “makes sense” that the church would have killed more. This does nothing in the sphere of logic.
“It is also worthy of note that Harris specifically tries to get around these people by calling them irrational and makes some attempt to try to put them outside of atheism…His argument here seems to be that these people are irrational, so they can be dismissed. Yet I’d make the argument that Christians in particular who try to use that belief system for violence are irrational. Either both can be discounted, or neither can.”

I think we’ve touched on this already, but it bares repeating even if we have. He attempts to stress, as does any atheist thinker I have read, that one can not be said to do something ‘because’ they are atheist.
This is because there are no tenets, beliefs, dogma, rules, laws, scripture…nothing necessitated by atheism, excepting a lack of belief in a god. This leads to nothing necessarily. Humanism, for example, may indeed have some things to answer for. I’m not the one to ask.
But atheism in and of itself says nothing, asks nothing, certainly instructs or demands nothing. It is a lack of belief. Period.
Therefore, one can not attribute any particular act to an individual ‘because they are an atheist’. I hope this becomes clearer to you as we go.

But one can say that an atheist does an action, i.e. Stalin killing millions of his own people. Also, this argument seems to smack of a double standard, because again, Harris specifically points to rationality as being the judge by which people can disassociate with people of the same background (i.e. atheist). If this is the standard, then those who kill in the name of Christ can be discounted as well.

I, however, don’t want to argue that atheists are violent automatically, and I believe it is wholly false to do so for religious people, especially in light of the evidence (like that of wars).
“1. God is morally perfect   and   2. God commands killing
are incompatible…alternative readily makes itself available: 3. There are some whose moral depravity is such that God will not suffer them to live”

Of course, this only works (assuming for the moment that it does in fact work) if you assume that number 1 is in fact true. I have no reason to suppose this. I would further suggest that this argument places the proverbial cart before the horse. To judge an entity as morally perfect in advance, and then proceed to insist that all of his actions are moral because of this and based on nothing else – certainly nothing objective – is completely backwards for a reasoning animal.

I expect this may come up in our future dialogue, so I’ll leave it at that.

I do indeed assume that God is morally perfect in that post because the argument is against Christian theism, which asserts that God is morally perfect. The argument says that those two points within Christian belief are incompatible. So it is a completely valid presupposition.

Further, Alvin Plantinga points out in “God, Freedom, and Evil” that the theistic definition of God is a maximally great being—maximally great would include maximally great in morality, hence God is morally perfect.

To argue with me on that point is to miss the entire argument. Theists are attacked on their own idea that God is morally perfect, so that premise is simply granted for anti-theists to argue against.

“…clearly not recording stories of massed killings in the name of the Lord for the sake of showing God’s moral imperfections (which, I would argue, points even more towards the innerrancy of Scripture, but that’s a whole other issue),”

Yes, the idea that the more outlandish the possibility, the more true is the statement. I’ve heard many versions of that very peculiar argument, but I wouldn’t mind hearing yours at some future point. This is why the tacking on of miracles to the old, rather dry bible, had such a profound effect. Sadly, it works.
Interesting use of adjectives there. What this paragraph has shown is simply an argument based on nothing. I could call atheists anti-theistic arguments dry and old and have similar logical effect—none. Please refrain from such terminology in the future of our debate. I’d like to keep it at a more intellectual level.

Further I’m not sure what you’re implying when you say the “tacking on of miracles.” Surely you are not implying that miracles were written into Scripture later. That would be an interesting argument to make, and the burden of proof would certainly be on the affirmative.
“Those who argue that the God of the Bible is evil are merely skimming scripture for verses they believe will back them up in out-of-context situations.”

That’s a rather rash and sweeping generalization. Along with many other theists, you rest on the position that if one does not come to the same conclusion as you have, that they must not have read it. I imagine you know full well this is not the case.

I would further submit, that there is simply no context that one can place some stories of the bible in, to somehow make them justifiable (sending bears to rip apart children for teasing a bald man comes to mind, and that’s one of the less extreme stories. There is no proper context for this that would elevate to some moral platitude, no moral justification whatsoever. It’s a disgusting little story used to frighten people, and nothing more).

Are you suggesting that you have the authority to interpret Scripture? Reading is not equivalent to understanding. There is a long line of people whose lives have been dedicated to hermeneutics, exegesis, and other methods of studying scripture who have not come to the conclusion that it endorses violence. The church fathers, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, countless studies in Systematic Theology,  and modern voices in the church (Bonhoeffer, Van Til, Walthier [maybe not so modern]) and the like can all be found to assert a central teaching that Christ is Lord and savior. The teachings of Christianity are not of violence. To take the extremists as the norm is to be intellectually dishonest.

Not only that, but to claim that one outside the church (i.e. yourself) can find scriptural authority to back up violence the church has endorsed is to employ the argument from authority. You’re claiming yourself as the authority on scriptural intepretation and as the authority to judge the motivations of the church now, or hundreds or thousands of years ago. That alone is enough to reject such an argument. I’ll not deny that you can read the Bible, but to argue that you have better knowledge of it and its meaning than those within the religion, with accumulated knowledge of thousands of years, is false. And I can say all of this without appealing to God. There’s simply no way to justify you placing yourself in the position to interpret scripture over and above the actual authorities on the text.

Now this is also an argument from authority, but one that trumps yours. And an argument from authority, whilst weak and not formally valid in logic, is informally an argument that can be made within the structure of logic—in that we can show that people who are experts in the field (not us) have this position. The problem is that your authority (yourself) is not even close to the authority of thousands of years of accumulated students of Scripture backed up by entire fields of study that are governed by the rules of logic and have an intimate knowledge of the religion.

“by the assertion that God’s role as Judge could mean He cannot allow certain evils to pass unpunished.”

Again, the evil of teasing a man about his baldness required that children be mauled by bears? Is this god’s idea of the punishment fitting the crime?

“but it is also to argue without a knowledge of the culture that such a text originated from.”
Again, children – teasing – bears. In any age, that is simply sick. We can get more into other stories of course, that one is just so elegantly morbid, it served well.

I don’t really want to go through and discuss every violent story in Scripture. But if you’d like to, I’d willingly go over each one at length. Because the bear story is a hard one, it bears (pun unintentional) repeating:

“From there Elisha went up to Bethel. As he was walking along the road, some youths’ came out of the town and jeered at him. ‘Go on up, you baldhead!’ they said. “Go on up, you baldhead!’  He turned around, looked at them and called down a curse on them in the name of the LORD. Then two bears came out of the woods and mauled forty-two of the youths.” -2 Kings 2:23-24.

An initial point I’d make would be to point out that we are not the judges of the world, God is (according to my worldview—which whoever brings this argument up is arguing against, so my presupposition is valid). Therefore we do not define what is “morbid” or “sick,” God does. Arguing that God is evil because of this act is to stand in judgment of God. This is unacceptable from a theistic view which presupposes His supremacy.

But I do believe a better explanation is needed in this case. I used a couple sources here, but my main one was Geisler’s “The Big Book of Bible Difficulties.”

1. These men were holding the prophet of God in contempt (see previous chapters and verses to see just how God selected this prophet). This was no innocent mocking, but a direct attack on God’s authority, as Elisha was acting as the voice of God to the people. Hence, these young men were mocking the voice of God.

2. These young men were not innocent. Their great number compared to Elisha shows the danger he was in, especially in light of their sin of mocking God. Not only that, but it says the young men came out of town to jeer at him. They didn’t want the confines and authority of the city to limit the actions they could take. Calling him a ‘baldhead’—a reference to the baldness of the lepers was another sign of the contempt with which they held Elisha. He was not safe.

3. Elisha’s curse served as a warning and a sign. He was God’s prophet, and God would not suffer threats or mocking.

4. The nature of their mocking becomes clearer looking at what they say. “Go on up…” When looking at what had happened just before (Elijah ascending into heaven), it can be seen that this was essentially a challenge to Elisha’s authority as God’s prophet. The Hebrew word here, alah refers to “ascend.” It is the same Hebrew word used in 2 Kings 2:11 to describe Elijah’s being taken into heaven. What cannot be seen in the English is revealed in the Hebrew.

God’s punishment can then be seen as protecting His prophet, a warning, an act of Divine Judgment, and a confirmation of Elijah as prophet.
“This is an issue of semantics and I’m willing to concede the point that Harris does not adhere to Jainism.”

Though I appreciate the concession, I have to make this clear.
‘Semantics’ is generally conjured when the difference between words is somewhat trivial, and not important to the point being made. When you pronounce a very well known atheist who’s made it his work to combat religion, an adherent to a religion, that is certainly not just semantics, but an egregious error that I felt needed correction.

“Though it is clear that he has some interesting views on spirituality”

I believe you are referring to the fact that he practices meditation perhaps? I’m not clear on the significance of this? To be clear, it is meditation utterly devoid of anything ‘supernatural’ if that helps.

I was hoping we wouldn’t have to get into this.  http://skepdic.com/news/newsletter74.html#3 “Harris presents himself and atheism as rational, yet he doesn’t apply very rigorous standards of rationality when dealing with the subjects of reincarnation and the paranormal.”

“’These are people who have spent a fair amount of time looking at the data,’ Harris explains. The author … Dean Radin … proclaims: ‘Psi [mind power] has been shown to exist in thousands of experiments.’”

“That Harris would take seriously Stevenson’s beliefs about xenoglossy is disconcerting.”

I also find it hard to believe that this is coming from a man who claims to be a voice of reason. Harris indicates that Stevenson’s stories about xenoglossy are either true or they’re fraudulent, which is a false dichotomy. Stevenson could have gotten the translation wrong, he might be gullible, he may have made a mistake, he may be  exaggerating, or  he could be a pious fraud. Harris says that he can’t see how something could be a fraud if it makes so many people miserable. What about religion?”

“The fact that I have not spent any time on this should suggest how worthy of my time I think such a project would be. Still, I found these books interesting, and I cannot categorically dismiss their contents in the way that I can dismiss the claims of religious dogmatists.”- Harris

http://atheism.about.com/od/godlessatheistpolitics/tp/SamHarrisProfileBeliefs.htm

“Most criticism of Sam Harris comes from religious theists, but secular atheists have also found things to disagree with. The most prominent criticisms from atheists probably focus on his ideas about “rational” spirituality and mysticism which sound to many like little better than the sort of mysticism served up by traditional religions. Harris argues that “we cannot live by reason alone” and that it’s possible to tune one’s brain to perceive the world differently than usual and that this lies at the heart of spiritual traditions, including religious ones. He believes it’s important to cultivate skills in this area, not just to cultivate skills at skepticism, science, and critical thinking.”

Quotes from The End of Faith:

“There is clearly a sacred dimension to our existence, and coming to terms with it could well be the highest purpose of human life.”

“Spirituality can be—indeed, must be—deeply rational.”

“Clearly, it must be possible to bring reason, spirituality, and ethics together in our thinking about the world. This would be the beginning of a rational approach to our deepest personal concerns. It would also be the end of faith.”
“combined to his specific exclusion of Eastern religions from his general attack on religion show at least a predisposition”

Predisposition? No, I wouldn’t extrapolate that at all. If anything, I would guess (and that seems to be what we are doing now), that he prioritizing. That is, focusing his efforts on the religions he sees as the largest threat to our well being (i.e., the Abrahamic faiths).

“Fair enough, then I’ll say that these men were atheists. The people who did violence and were Christian can still be compared to as a legitimate analogy. Atheists who do violence. Christians who do violence. I’d argue both are bad.”

Yes, of course both are bad. No one in their right mind would argue other wise in my opinion. The point being, that a theist has a book chock full of violence that their god has committed or commanded others to commit, on which they base their morality. They have used this for centuries to justify some very nasty behavior indeed!
The key difference when one tried to attach some act to an atheist ‘because’ he is atheist, is that there are no such texts, tenets, dogma, etc. as mentioned. I’m repeating myself too much now, I’m sure you’ve understood.

I’m repeating myself too much too. As my friend pointed out, justifying claims doesn’t make something true or valid. Eisegesis is not the same as exegesis.

“Belief in a God can, however, give an objective standard by which all actions must be judged. Thus there is a better basis by which to reject certain actions than if there is no objective standard.”

I’ve more responses to this than would be manageable. I’d like to merge it with the above questions of objective vs. subjective morality above, and give them a separate debate. It deserves and requires it in my opinion, as I hear nothing more frequently from theists, than the morality questions.

Agreed.

“To argue that Christianity is violent is to go against the core teachings of Christianity from its founding”

Yet it stands in direct opposition to the reality of what the religion has produced in practice. In this case, the intent of the original if it is as you posit, and I’ve no particular reason to object, does nothing to rescue the reality of what it has been, in reality, in practice. The reality trumps the ideal.

Reform in the Church has been needed in the past and will be needed again.

“as we do have a strict definition of what it means to be Christian in the Bible.”

Again, those 30,000 sects scream loudly that the clarity you believe you have is either an illusion, or 29,999 sects have it wrong, and you got very, very lucky by picking precisely the right meaning. Additionally, that number is undoubtedly much larger concerning those that disagree on the meaning. Certainly even you, in your own congregation, disagree about the meaning of some text with another in your flock. I pick that number because it is easily understood.

You’re confusing doctrinal differences with theological ones. Christianity is built on Christ as savior and Lord. The “30,000 sects” have disagreements about things that are not the core of Christianity. I trust I will not have to repeat this again.

“Christians who use the Scripture to justify violence have missed what Christ himself says about violence.”

Ah, but we just got a little closer. I don’t deny this. I am not necessarily saying that all the evils done in the name of the bible, were done in the “true spirit” of what Christ taught.
But it is this vast majority, that are in your eyes ‘getting it wrong’, that comprise the religion, and dictate the policies of the religion on massive scales. It is they that are fighting the wars, killing the doctors, withholding the birth control, mutilating the genitals, retarding scientific progress, urging the end times by deliberately flaming the wars in the middle east, interjecting their pseudoscience into public classrooms, wedging their warped agendas into politics, into ours laws…it is they that OWN your religion and always have. If you are this type of Christian that I think you are claiming to be, you are indeed a minority, and you should be as horrified by their actions as I am. They are a death cult, pure and simple. And these are only the more overt damages caused by religion, speaking nothing yet of the psychological injuries it necessitates among other things.

Ad hominem attacks against Christian actions don’t dispute the truth claims of Christianity. They can dispute individual doctrinal stances, of which there are many differences.

Also, “retarding scientific progress?” That’s utterly false. Newton? Copernicus? Galileo? Pascal? Boyle? Leibnitz? Francis Collins? Bacon? Kepler? Descartes? Faraday? Mendel? Kelvin? Planck? Need I go on? Theists. All of them. I could make a longer list. I’m sure these names are easily recognized. Einstein was a deist, not an atheist. It seems clear that there have been a number of rather major scientific discoveries by theists. I challenge you to claim that someone like, oh, Gregor Mendel, was “retarded” by religion.  These men were not “retarded” by their faith.

“Conceded. Though the atheism you are describing is a “soft atheism” that goes against the definition of atheism as seen in both the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy”

I would actually refer you, rather than a definition in a book, to the real world community of atheists, where the type of atheism you seem to think is universal, is quite the minority.
http://richarddawkins.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=742
This is one sampling of the community at Richard Dawkins’ forums. Your version of atheism is trumped roughly 2.5 to 1. Incidentally, if you’re still searching for your ‘real’ atheist, they are there as well, and would love to speak with you I’m sure!

Argumentum ad populum. Here you’re arguing from consensus in order to redefine a word. “My version of atheism” is that which simply defines the term. Logically, your claim of a 2.5 to 1 ratio does absolutely nothing to the definition of atheism.

Also I’d at least like to think a book has a better chance of getting it right than a forum on the internet. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy and the Encyclopedia of Philosophy seem to me better sources from which to define a term.

I never claimed my idea of atheism is universal. I claim that those who assert their atheism are actually just agnostics in disguise.
regarding this; “the definition of atheist was written by a soft atheist, afraid to embrace the totality of the stance.”

That’s just silly. I would say ‘offensive’, but I don’t offend easily. The majority of atheists I have met and spoken with (no small number), adopt the position they do because it is the intellectually honest position to take.
One can not know with complete certainty that ‘anything’ does not exist (or for that matter, does exist if you’re in the solipsist camp), and this is conceded by any thinking person. It is simply not possible. To claim such a thing involves FAITH, which most rational minds I’ve encountered, have little use for. It is not out of fear as you suggest, but out of integrity evolving from a carefully thinking, reasoning, logical mind.

“One can not know with complete certainty that ‘anything’ does not exist.” Hence the problem with atheism. Interestingly, “not knowing” is agnosticism.

“This seems ad hominem to me. Rather than attacking any specific argument, he is attacking, say, Catholics, for preaching abstinence”

The argument he puts forth throughout is essentially, that religion does harm. He lists in your example, many ways in which religion is doing harm. I see no ad hominem attack. Perhaps the personal nature of the address is what’s distressing you. It is, more than a formal argument here (which would take a very different form), as if he were standing before a room of people speaking to them. It certainly does contain emotional appeal, granted. But i would hesitate to call it ad hominem, as he is directly addressing the ills he claims are doing the harm.

But what is it that he is arguing then? If he’s arguing that religious people can be violent, I’d agree. If he’s arguing Christians have used scripture to justify violence through eisegesis—incorrect interpretation of the text—I agree. But it seems that he is trying to discredit Christianity with his argument, an argument that is arguing against the people within a religion, not against the beliefs of that religion. Hence it is ad hominem… unless he is simply arguing for reform within the church.
“Another thing I’d love to point out is that Harris is a wonderful example of the argument from atheism”

You’ll get no argument from me on that. I find the argument quite silly. I can appreciate what its inventor might have been trying to do, but I find the delivery completely sloppy, and as you say, never should have included the word ‘atheist’. I find it to be a play on words that just didn’t work well.

I’m glad.

**The following was moved to the end to act as a conclusion. I will break from form some for this reason, but I trust the ideas conveyed are still quite rational, and offer some insight…**

“As far as whether Christianity sanctions bad things, I think that is nothing but an unfair charge…It seems clear that the Christianity Christ preaches is not one that condones violence. ”

That is ‘seems clear’ to you is of little consequence to the reality that it is most certainly NOT clear to many, many millions who use it as their moral compass.

This would be one of the major points of contention. Allow me a bit of a diatribe in an attempt to explain…

But this is not now, nor apparently has it ever been, what the church (and ergo the majority its followers) has actually done in practice. This is indeed, the ultimate no true Scotsman fallacy here.
That the church itself, the institution that presumably has the clearest understanding of the meanings contained within the bible, has been the perpetrator of such unimaginable evil (just peruse the medieval torture devices crafted and implemented by the church for a tiny sampling of its horrific past) is precisely the point.
If the church itself, responsible for disseminating this sacred information to the masses, has acted thusly – what are the masses to take from this? The result is unavoidable – the hatred, bigotry, paranoia, intolerance, etc. that we see daily from the religious. They are only regurgitating what the church has fed them for centuries. This in no way exonerates them from responsibility of course, but certainly the vile men at the top of the heap have much to answer for. This is the ‘religion’ that those like myself are speaking of.

The cry I hear again and again, invariably, is that the other guy simply didn’t understand what the bible really said, or meant. But the one speaking of course, ‘has it’. They, of all the millions of believers present and past, understand the word of God like no other. They have unlocked the code at the end of the labyrinth which is the text of The Holy Bible. This would help explain the 30000+ sects of Christianity. There is simply no consensus as to what the book means or even what it says for that matter, and that, coupled with the unending amount of the physical and psychological brutality it contains…it is no wonder that such evil is committed in its name. It could hardly have resulted in anything else.

I suggest, that complete and unquestioning FAITH without reason or logic or evidence of any sort is the true violence. Blind faith in another man’s doctrine is a violence to the mind – a thinking, reasoning mind, which is truly the only thing that gives us our privileged status on this rock. Through faith, one seeks to extinguish this, and they succeed.
It was after all men that wrote these texts, codified them, rewrote them, translated them, added bits, subtracted bits, enforced them through the ages. And what evidence have we that these men had the authority to do so? These men told us so. They were instructed by God directly the theist proclaims. And we know this, as well, precisely because these men said they were.

At the end of the day though, honestly ask yourself, do you think that I or any other atheist cares in the least what thoughts you have in your mind? What faith you claim to have in some matter? It is precisely because of all of the things mentioned that we would even bat an eye towards a man of faith. I can’t imaging having given such things a second thought if it weren’t for the actions of the theist down through history, and more importantly to me – right now. I am perfectly content having someone believe whatever it is they choose…if they can refrain from attempting to force it on any one else.
So far, theists have been notoriously, almost constitutionally incapable of doing this. That, is the problem with religion.

The “no true Scotsman” argument applies if and only if there is no definition of what it means to be whatever it is that is being argued. Christianity has a clear definition within the Bible, complete with the command “Love your neighbor as yourself.” Any who does not follow that command and claims a Christian action is indeed not a true Christian, based on the central text of the religion.

I, too, shall now conclude.

Christianity has been the central belief of the Western world for well over a thousand years. During this time, there have been huge leaps in science, medicine, human freedom, and the like. The greatest discoveries in the history of science have all been made within a Christian era.

The Bible stands as a whole. Taking any single verse outside of the context and not allow it to be interpreted by the whole of Scripture is arguing from selective observation—a logical fallacy. One need only look at Systematic Theology and find that violence is not the result of the church, it is the aberration. I’m not claiming that I know Scripture well enough to interpret it perfectly. I’m claiming that thousands of scholars of the Bible over the past two thousand years do know it well enough to interpret it correctly. Those who have used it for violence suffer either the flaw of selective observation or they simply use emotional appeals—not scriptural ones—to make their point.

Christ Himself is the Light of the World. Christians are told in Ephesians 5:1-2: “Be imitators of God, therefore, as dearly loved children and live a life of love, just as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us as a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God.” Scripture teaches clearly a life of love and peace for the Christian.

St. Augustine, in one of the greatest works in Christianity, “City of God” says of the Kingdom of God in Book II, Chapter 29, “The Heavenly City outshines Rome, beyond comparison. There, instead of victory, is truth; instead of high rank, holiness; instead of peace, felicity; instead of life, eternity.” This is what Christians look forward to: a city in which the standards of this world are no more. A city where holiness, truth, and felicity are enjoyed for eternity.

He says of a Christian life in Book XIV, Chapter 7: “When a man’s resolve is to love God, and to love his neighbor as himself, not according to man’s standards but according to God’s, he is undoubtedly said to be a man of good will, because of this love.”

The core of Christian faith is not doctrinal concerns over baptism, communion, or the like. Christians believe in the Triune God and Jesus as Lord and Savior. And the commands that are given are to love God and neighbor.

I close, with the words of Peter in 1 Peter 4:11, “If anyone speaks, he should do it as one speaking the very words of God. If anyone serves, he should do it with the strength God provides, so that in all things God may be praised through Jesus Christ. To him be the glory and the power for ever and ever. Amen.”

Physicalism: Does it really have explanatory power?

Physicalism–the view that the human body is wholly physical–claims to have better explanatory power (and indeed, the only explanatory power) than other world views. Is this really true?

One way to defeat such a claim is to show that physcalism does not actually have such a monopoly on explanatory power. I believe that dualism offers just such a defeater:

The main argument I have against physicalism (and hence, for dualism) is that there are things in existence that physicalism cannot account for. These things include, but are not limited to:

1) There is causation. Physicalism essentially seems to claim that a thought or an idea, an emotion, is identical to the cause. In other words, touching part of the brain with an electrode, which triggers a sensation, IS the sensation. What physicalism then states is that things are not responses to emotions, they just are the emotion. But that is seemingly false, for all that is proven is that the mind is causally connected to the brain, not that they are identical. There is no part of the brain, for example, that is a memory. It may be shown that one can cause a memory to occur with stimulation, but that only proves that some memory (B) is caused by some firing of a neuron (A). But A is not B.

Take, for example, the idea within physicalism that love is the chemical reactions and neurological firings in the brain: love (B) is caused by chemicals (A). To say that the chemical is love is not true, for a chemical is ontologically different from an emotion—consider this example: if I conceive of a pink elephant, does that mean that whatever neurons need to fire in order to bring that thought into my brain are indeed a pink elephant (Moreland, 234)? Or do they merely cause the image of a pink elephant to appear? Likewise with any real object or imagining. These things are not physically contained in our brain, nor are they actually the chemicals or neurons themselves, they can simply be caused by such mechanical things. That does not make them identical. A may cause B, but A is not B.

2) Self-presenting properties. There are things that present themselves directly to the subject, and are considered wholly mental in nature. Things like love, the experience of red, thinking that three is an odd number—these things are directly present to a subject because that subject has them immediately in his/her field of consciousness. Two evidences exist for these properties: the first is that one can have private access to mental properties, but not physical properties… and the second is that one can know at least some of one’s own mental properties incorrigibly. People can know things themselves that they cannot be wrong about. In other words, I can know without question what the color green appears to be to me. No one else can know that.

3) The subjective nature of experience. This is called the “knowledge argument.”  This one is something that is hard to explain without using an example (ty to J.P. Moreland for this). Suppose there is a deaf scientist who is the single leading expert on the neurology of hearing. It would be possible for him to know and describe everything involved in the physical aspects of hearing… yet not actually have knowledge of hearing itself. This experience is essential and subjective. It is also outside of the realm of physicalism to explain.

4) Intentionality. We can have an ‘ofness’ or ‘aboutness’ with our action that is inexplicable through physical needs. “Mental states have a directness that is intrinsic to them (Moreland 237).” In other words, many mental states are of or about something: fear of something, thoughts about something, etc. Now, there doesn’t seem to be any way to reduce something such as a thought about something to a physical explanation. In other words, the ‘aboutness’ of a thought defies physical explanation.

These are just a few arguments against physicalism. There are a couple more that could be made, but that would make this longer than I think it needs to be. Further, each individual kind of physicalism is subject to a wide array of critiques.
Moreland, J.P. & William Lane Craig. “Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview.”

Hijacking Ockham’s Razor

It is interesting to me that whenever I speak of wielding Ockham’s Razor for the case of theism, people, including and not at all limited to theists, insist that I’ll only lose. I strongly believe this is due to a misrepresentation of Ockham’s principle.

William of Ockham was nothing if not a Christian. He did indeed recommend a rigorous empricism, but it should be recognized as to what kind of empiricism he was suggesting. Ockham believed “in God, father almighty; which I understand thus, that everything which does not involve a manifest contradiction is to be attributed to the divine power (Lawhead, 210).”  It is important to understand that this was Ockham’s presupposition in his empiricism: that God’s omnipotence was first and foremost.

I would suggest that William of Ockham would disagree completely with the idea that his principle, known popularly as Occam’s Razor or Ockham’s Razor, could be used to exclude God from any explanation. The principle itself states, according to Ockham, that “What can be explained on fewer principles is explained needlesssly by more (210).”

Anti-theists in general seem to reinterpret this as “A naturalistic explanation is the only one.” Now, I do not mean at all to disregard Ockham’s own empiricism, but would it not seem that his original statement would not, given his own presupposition, exclude theism in any account? Not only that, but it would seem to suggest that theistic accounts are better because they are indeed simpler, by virtue of less principles. “God upholds the universe” could be used to explain almost infinite systems within the universe. That statement seems at face value much simpler than naturalistic explanations of events such as the Earth’s movement, gravity, life’s origins, etc. Now, I am not suggesting the use of Ockham’s Razor to halt scientific inquiry, but I would suggest that the hijacking that has occurred goes entirely against the principle’s presupposition, which is that, barring contradictions (and a scientific explanation of an event does not contradict a theistic explanation, it merely explains how God may do something), things are to be attributed to divine power.

Scientific inquiry can only explain how things work, it cannot exclude God from any equation. Using a principle such as Ockham’s Razor to try to argue against theism not only goes against the very nature of the principle, but it hijacks it entirely. Naturalism, in my opinion, tends to do that with most things. If it can’t explain something, it changes the definition. This has been done in science as well. The definition of science was changed to be exclude any supernatural explanations. While that is a topic for a different debate, I just think it is interesting that when naturalism fails, as it inevitably does, proponents of it cheat. Ockham’s Razor is just another way in which they do so.

Source:

Lawhead, William. “The Voyage of Discovery.” 2007. Wadsworth Thompson Learning.

Counter-Counter Apologetics 2: Gross Misunderstandings of the Ontological Argument

In this second in my series countering counter-apologetics, I will examine arguments that are supposed to counter the Ontological Argument, which I personally believe is both logically valid and unavoidably true.

There are two main sources I will use to show the anti-theistic counter. Iron Chariots and Richard Dawkins. It is telling that I personally believe that Iron Chariots, a Wikipedia-offshoot site for counter-apologetics manages to make a better case than Richard Dawkins.

The Ontological Argument comes in a very wide range of forms. There is no way I could discuss all of them individually in a limited space, so I won’t. What I will do is simply lay out a very basic template that underlies most ontological arguments, show the counter-arguments and counter those.

The Ontological Argument is basically as follows:

1. It is possible there is a being that is the greatest conceivable being.

2. That which exists in reality is greater than that which exists in the understanding.

3. Therefore, the greatest possible being must exist in reality by definition.

This is by far the most basic possible way I could strip the argument down. I’d like to put a mini disclaimer here and say I am no professional philosopher, so I may have taken too many of the finer points out of the Ontological Argument, but I think this is the best summing up.

There are a few ways that anti-theists attempt to counter this argument, by making a parody of it, by challenging the first premise, or by judging it as unintelligible.

I will deal with the latter argument first. The challenge is made that the Ontological Argument is unintelligible. This is, I believe, the general point Richard Dawkins is trying to make in his amateurish attack on theistic arguments in The God Delusion. He points to a few things in order to try to get around it. The first is reducing the argument to the “language of the playground (104).” I might point out that I would gladly put his entire book in such language, because I wholly agree with him when he states that “I am a scientist rather than a philosopher (107).” Poking fun at an argument is an interesting tactic, but wholly ineffective. I honestly have nothing more to say about this first apparent attack, because all it shows is Dawkins’ own ineffectual method of argumentation: discarding the rules of philosophy in favor of elitest bickering.

His second attack is stating that, “The very idea that grand conclusions could follow from such logomachist trickery offends me aesthetically, so I must take care to refrain from brandying words like ‘fool (105).'” Dawkins breaks his own rule several times, not using the word fool, but berating the religious in general throughout his book. Further, the fact that logic offends him aesthetically speaks volumes for the amount of mastery he has over philosophy. His claim that an argument such as the ontological one is “trickery” really does nothing to the argument, because once again it’s not actually an attack on any of the premises, but rather simply being offended by a logically sound argument.

In his third approach, Dawkisn simply tries to point to the argument as unintelligible by quoting a story of a debate between Euler and Diderot, in which Euler was said to have stated “Monsieur [sic], (a+b^n)/n=x therefore God exists!” I’m not entirely sure I’m drawing the correct conclusion from Dawkins random placement of this quote in his supposed dismantling of various theistic arguments, but it seems he’s comparing the Ontological Argument to just pulling random things out of a hat. Unfortunately, that is not the case, because the Ontological Argument is logically valid, and the only way to get around it is to challenge a premise, which Dawkins either can’t, due to his ineptness with philosophy, or won’t, due to his general misrepresentation of theism in general, do.

Further, how exactly is it that the ontological argument is unintelligible? It states simply that it is possible to think of a being that is the greatest of all. That’s not so hard to comprehend. The argument doesn’t depend on us being able to conceive of this being in its entirety, just to have a concept of possibility. This idea that God is possible is intelligible to even those children who would use the “playground language” dawkins attempts to reduce the Ontological Argument to. The other points of the Ontological Argument follow, so the argument itself is intelligible.

Iron Chariots takes a different route, presenting some of the more interesting challenges to the Ontological Argument (in fairness to Dawkins, he did show a parody of the argument, but I don’t think it’s any better or worse than those presented at Iron Chariots).

The Ontological Argument is generally thought to be most susceptible to parodies. This is essentially taking an argument and constructing a new argument with the same logical structure to come to an absurd conclusion.

Iron Chariots presents three parodies. They are all almost identical, so I shall show the two classic versions:

“Unicorns:

1. Let us define a unicorn as a magical equine being that has one horn, and that exists.
2. By the above definition, such a being must necessarily exist.
3. Therefore unicorns exist.

Shangri-La:

1. Shangri-La is the greatest place on earth.
2. A place that exists is greater than one that doesn’t.
3. Therefore, Shangri-La exists. (Iron Chariots) “

The problem with these parodies is that they seem to miss the entire point of the Ontological Argument, which is that it is discussing a necessary being. Unicorns, by definition, are contingent beings. That is, their existence is not necessary, they are not necessary in our universe for our universe to be as it is. The same goes for locations such as Shangri-La. The theistic God, however, has tied into the concept necessity. According to theism, God is not a contingent being, but a necessary one. Therefore, these parodies don’t actually do anything to the Ontological Argument because they missed one of the core premises. Now I will concede my mini-Ontological Arugment doesn’t explicitly state necessity, but other versions do. It can also be shown through logical analysis that these kind of paraodies are invalid.

The final attempt at invalidating the Ontological Argument is another parody, known as “Gasking’s Proof”:

1. The creation of the universe is the greatest achievement imaginable.
2. The merit of an achievement consists of its intrinsic greatness and the ability of its creator.
3. The greater the handicap to the creator, the greater the achievement (would you be more impressed by Turner painting a beautiful landscape or a blind one-armed dwarf?)
4. The biggest handicap to a creator would be non-existence
5. Therefore if we suppose that the universe is the creation of an existing creator, we can conceive a greater being — namely, one who created everything while not existing.
6. Therefore, God does not exist.

There are many problems with this attempt to parody the Ontological Argument and prove God doesn’t exist. These are all problems with the premises. Premise 1 states that the creation of the universe is the greatest achievement imaginable. How so? Are there not achievements that could be greater? Could not the greatest achievement be creating infinite universes? For the sake of argument, however, I’ll concede step 1. Premises 3 and 4, I believe, has the greatest problems. Premise 3 assumes that doing things with a handicap makes something logically greater. I’d love to see a proof of this. The premise makes an appeal to common sense, but that is invalid in logic. I’m not at all convinced that having a handicap and doing something makes that achievement itself greater. This is made more problematic by the fact that premise 1 points to the universe as being the greatest achievement. This would seem to mean that an achievement is a finished product, not the steps leading up to the product.

For example, the Cubs winning the World Series after over a century without doing so may seem a greater achievement than the Yankees doing so, but it would be hard to show that logically, for both have the World Series as the finished product. I’m willing to grant premise 3, however, just for the sake of argument.

Premise 4 is where the argument really breaks apart. How is it that non-existence is a handicap? Handicaps can only be applied to things that do exist. To imply that something has a handicap assumes implicitly that it exists. Thus, premise 4 essentially says that a being both exists and does not exist, which is logically impossible. I assume that this premise was in order to counter the idea that existing-in-reality is greater than existing-in-understanding, but note that both of these are existing. In other words, the choice in the Ontological Argument is not saying that something that doesn’t exist exists, just that something that exists-in-the-understanding rather exists-in-reality. Premise 4 is therefore completely invalid both logically and in relation to the Ontological Argument.

I may talk further about Ontological Arguments, but that’s what I have for now. As William Lane Craig states, the Ontological argument leaves anti-theists with no way out. If the concept of the theistic God is even possible, than God exists, necessarily.

Counter-Counter-Apologetics 1: Redeeming Pascal’s Wager

When I first started to get into apologetics, one of the first sites I stumbled upon was Iron Chariots, a counter-apologetics site.

This site’s mission statement is “Iron Chariots is intended to provide information on apologetics and counter-apologetics. We’ll be collecting common arguments and providing responses, information and resources to help counter the glut of misinformation and poor arguments which masquerade as “evidence” for religious claims. ”

Note especially the scare quotes they use around evidence. This is a tactic atheists are very prone to using. Anything they disagree with, they put quotes around to make it look less true. Atheists are “right.” See? Fun, isn’t it? Does it do anything of value? No.

Anyway, it was sort of disturbing to see that there are those who are trying any means necessary to get around theism. I left the site a little scared, wondering if Christian Apologetics was all it is said to be. Well it is. After much more studying and forgetting completely about this site, I stumbled back upon it the other day, and decided to see what the anti-theists are saying about apologetics. Not much of value, in my opinion. And because I feel like it, I’m going to start countering their counter apologetics in a series of posts that will happen randomly interspersed with my others. These posts won’t just include arguments from this site, but will also include things like my counter for the “Argument from Atheism” (AKA “One Step Further Argument”).

This article will focus on Pascal’s Wager. Before I proceed, I should note that I absolutely do not think Pascal’s Wager is a good tool for witnessing, nor is it all that great as an argument. But it is, I think valid, and while it should not be used as a reason to believe, it does provide what, in logic, is called a dilemma for the atheists.

Pascal’s Wager is essentially as follows: God exists or He does not exist. If He does exist, there is infinite reward for believing in Him, but infinite loss for not believing in Him. If He does not exist, there is nothing to lose. “Nothing to lose, everything to gain,” is often the summing-up of this dilemma.

Iron Chariots accurately, in my opinion, points out that there isn’t nothing to lose by disbelieving. If there is no God then,

“For one thing, if you go through life believing a lie, that is a bad thing in itself. Besides that, there is more to being a believer than just saying “Okay, I believe now” and getting on with your life. Serious believers spend a lot of their time in church, and contribute a lot of money as well. There’s a reason why some towns have very affluent looking buildings for churches, and why large and elaborate cathedrals are possible: they’re funded by folks who donate a tenth of their income throughout their lives to tithing. This is surely quite a waste if the object of worship isn’t real.”

The article then goes on a rant about property taxes, persecution, etc., things which will not be discussed here because, frankly, I find these arguments ineffably dull, though I may be forced to talk about them in the future.

So yes, I concede that there is a reward for not believing if there is no God. They also accurately show that there can be finite rewards for believing in God even if He doesn’t exist, because of psychological benefits, society, etc. Unfortunately, they plug these positives into a table of good life vs. bad life instead of actually in Pascal’s Wager. So I’ll just do the work for them.

Pascal’s Wager
God Exists |      God Doesn’t Exist
Belief           ∞ +            |     Finite +
Disbelief    |  ∞ –          |      Finite +

Okay so the table isn’t working so well. I think it can be figured out. Anyway, the main argument is that there is after all, a reward for not believing if there is no God. The problem is that even if that reward outweighs the finite reward of believing in a non-existant God, that still must be weighed against the infinite negative of not believing if there is a God. The argument that there is a reward for not believing, so it is logical to not believe breaks down when you weigh the infinite negative of disbelief if God exists verses the finite positive of disbelief if God does not.

There is one final point I’d like to make. That is, that the same site continues to argue that another problem is which god to believe in. I’d like to counter that by saying that isn’t the point of Pascal’s Wager. Belief in a god is better than belief in no god, because the probability for infinite reward still increases (in that it will be 1/however many gods to choose from) verses the probability for infinite negative (which would be certain if there is a God). So Pascal’s Wager still stands. I grant that the probability increase would be very low, so some may then argue that it’s not worth giving up the finite reward of not believing in a god. The response could then be that there is still a granted finite reward in believing in a god if god doesn’t exist, and any increase in probability for infinite gain verses infinite loss would outweigh the any loss of finite reward that could be gained from disbelief. In other words, the increased probability plus the finite reward of believing in a god would outweigh the definite probability of infinite negative if there is a God combined with the finite reward of not believing in a God.

Sorry for the drawn out post, but I wanted to respond thoroughly. There is more I’d like to say, but that’s where I’ll end for now.