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Counter-Counter-Apologetics 1: Redeeming Pascal’s Wager

When I first started to get into apologetics, one of the first sites I stumbled upon was Iron Chariots, a counter-apologetics site.

This site’s mission statement is “Iron Chariots is intended to provide information on apologetics and counter-apologetics. We’ll be collecting common arguments and providing responses, information and resources to help counter the glut of misinformation and poor arguments which masquerade as “evidence” for religious claims. ”

Note especially the scare quotes they use around evidence. This is a tactic atheists are very prone to using. Anything they disagree with, they put quotes around to make it look less true. Atheists are “right.” See? Fun, isn’t it? Does it do anything of value? No.

Anyway, it was sort of disturbing to see that there are those who are trying any means necessary to get around theism. I left the site a little scared, wondering if Christian Apologetics was all it is said to be. Well it is. After much more studying and forgetting completely about this site, I stumbled back upon it the other day, and decided to see what the anti-theists are saying about apologetics. Not much of value, in my opinion. And because I feel like it, I’m going to start countering their counter apologetics in a series of posts that will happen randomly interspersed with my others. These posts won’t just include arguments from this site, but will also include things like my counter for the “Argument from Atheism” (AKA “One Step Further Argument”).

This article will focus on Pascal’s Wager. Before I proceed, I should note that I absolutely do not think Pascal’s Wager is a good tool for witnessing, nor is it all that great as an argument. But it is, I think valid, and while it should not be used as a reason to believe, it does provide what, in logic, is called a dilemma for the atheists.

Pascal’s Wager is essentially as follows: God exists or He does not exist. If He does exist, there is infinite reward for believing in Him, but infinite loss for not believing in Him. If He does not exist, there is nothing to lose. “Nothing to lose, everything to gain,” is often the summing-up of this dilemma.

Iron Chariots accurately, in my opinion, points out that there isn’t nothing to lose by disbelieving. If there is no God then,

“For one thing, if you go through life believing a lie, that is a bad thing in itself. Besides that, there is more to being a believer than just saying “Okay, I believe now” and getting on with your life. Serious believers spend a lot of their time in church, and contribute a lot of money as well. There’s a reason why some towns have very affluent looking buildings for churches, and why large and elaborate cathedrals are possible: they’re funded by folks who donate a tenth of their income throughout their lives to tithing. This is surely quite a waste if the object of worship isn’t real.”

The article then goes on a rant about property taxes, persecution, etc., things which will not be discussed here because, frankly, I find these arguments ineffably dull, though I may be forced to talk about them in the future.

So yes, I concede that there is a reward for not believing if there is no God. They also accurately show that there can be finite rewards for believing in God even if He doesn’t exist, because of psychological benefits, society, etc. Unfortunately, they plug these positives into a table of good life vs. bad life instead of actually in Pascal’s Wager. So I’ll just do the work for them.

Pascal’s Wager
God Exists |      God Doesn’t Exist
Belief           ∞ +            |     Finite +
Disbelief    |  ∞ –          |      Finite +

Okay so the table isn’t working so well. I think it can be figured out. Anyway, the main argument is that there is after all, a reward for not believing if there is no God. The problem is that even if that reward outweighs the finite reward of believing in a non-existant God, that still must be weighed against the infinite negative of not believing if there is a God. The argument that there is a reward for not believing, so it is logical to not believe breaks down when you weigh the infinite negative of disbelief if God exists verses the finite positive of disbelief if God does not.

There is one final point I’d like to make. That is, that the same site continues to argue that another problem is which god to believe in. I’d like to counter that by saying that isn’t the point of Pascal’s Wager. Belief in a god is better than belief in no god, because the probability for infinite reward still increases (in that it will be 1/however many gods to choose from) verses the probability for infinite negative (which would be certain if there is a God). So Pascal’s Wager still stands. I grant that the probability increase would be very low, so some may then argue that it’s not worth giving up the finite reward of not believing in a god. The response could then be that there is still a granted finite reward in believing in a god if god doesn’t exist, and any increase in probability for infinite gain verses infinite loss would outweigh the any loss of finite reward that could be gained from disbelief. In other words, the increased probability plus the finite reward of believing in a god would outweigh the definite probability of infinite negative if there is a God combined with the finite reward of not believing in a God.

Sorry for the drawn out post, but I wanted to respond thoroughly. There is more I’d like to say, but that’s where I’ll end for now.

Freedom of Will/Divine Omniscience continued

On other sites (well, facebook anyway), the previous post generated a lot of interest, so I decided to continue with a very brief discussion raising a couple extra points.

The two main problems I have with any view other than divine omniscience AND human freedom (specifically, molinism) is that those who reject divine omniscience seem to reject Biblical teaching on this doctrine. There are plenty of verses that talk about God knowing all things. He even challenges those who would be gods to tell the future.

The most convincing case, however, in my opinion, is the fact that there is prophecy throughout scripture, given by God. Not only that, but Jesus himself prophesies. Also, the writers of the gospels continue to say things about Jesus that are prophecies fulfilled. Finally, Jesus predicting Judas’s betrayal and Peter’s denial can only be explained by his foreknowledge of such events. While some may assert that Jesus intuited such events, this derives them of all theological significance. Thus, those who do not want to deprive the gospel message and Jesus’ divinity, I believe, must adhere to omniscience.

Similarly, there is a vital (I think) flaw in those who assert that our free will doesn’t exist or that it is just an illusion. This flaw is the fall into sin. If God knows all things, and our free will is only an illusion to us, then we fell into sin by his knowledge AND will.

Theologically, God foreknowing man’s fall into sin is not an issue (another vast subject), but it would be for those who do not believe we have free will.

The Compatibility of Human Freedom and Omniscience

Note: The following argument is largely directly derived from William Lane Craig’s “The Only Wise God”

How is it that we have freedom if God already knows our action before we do it?

The main thing to understand here is that the so-called problem here is based more on fatalism than anything else.

The premise is this: If God is omniscient, then anything He knows is true, by necessity. So, if He knows the future, then we do not have free choice because we cannot make something He knows be wrong. Therefore, if He knows, say, that I will post this, then I MUST, I simply cannot do anything else, because God cannot err.

The simplest way to answer this, is to address the argument itself and prove that this argument is actually a logical fallacy.

The syllogism can be stated as follows (Craig):

1. Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen.

2. If God is omniscient, God foreknows x.

3. Therefore, x will necessarily happen.

Now this seems like common sense. But, let’s look at another syllogism that is based on the same logic.

1. Necessarily, if I am a bachelor, than I am unmarried.

2. I am a bachelor.

3. Therefore, I am necessarily unmarried.

So now we see the logical fallacy, for it is obvious that I, as a bachelor, am not unmarried BY NECESSITY, but because I simply have not chosen to marry yet. In fact, I hope to marry someday, but according to this syllogism, which is constructed exactly the same as the first, I would not, by necessity, EVER be married.

It should then be obvious that there is a complete logical fallacy in asserting the former syllogism.

In this brief discussion, I have only one more point to make. That is this kind of theological fatalism, which asserts the first syllogism, is no different from Greek philosophical fatalism. Adding the “omniscience of God” into the equation is just a substitute for knowledge in general.

For example, there is no difference in saying that “If God is omniscient and has foreknowledge, then what He knows MUST happen” and “If there is a true statement about the future, that statement MUST happen.”

Substituting God for a true statement about the future is just a way to add another layer of confusion into this fallacious assertion of fatalism (Craig). In a syllogism, I could put it as follows:

1. Person A knows that it is true that Person B will do X.

2. It would be a contradiction to say that “It is both true and false that Person B will do x”

3. Therefore, person B must do X.

Plugging God into the equation is, in my opinion, more of a scare tactic for fatalism than anything else. A logical fallacy is a logical fallacy, no matter who is involved. The syllogism could also be:

1. It is true that person B will do X.

2. It would be a contradiction to say that “It is both true and false that person B will do x”

3. Therefore, person B must do X.

These statements fall to the same fallacy as the one with God’s knowledge being necessarily true. The point is that ANY true statement is true, so it can’t be false.

Therefore, human freedom IS compatible with divine foreknowledge, because knowledge of something’s factual status does not determine the fact.

This is already longer than I wanted it to be, if anyone wants more I’d be glad to expand on it.

Source:

Craig, William Lane. “The Only Wise God.”

Why this blog?

I’ll start by simply stating the purpose of this blog. I’m going to use it to talk about mostly topics related to Christian Apologetics, though I may use it for other things.

Doctrinally, I’m Lutheran. I believe in Jesus Christ as God and Savior. I believe in the Triune God, the innerrancy of scripture, the depravity of man, etc. What this blog is going to be about, however, is less doctrinal apologetics and more philosophical apologetics.

I’ll make another post as soon as I can.