The “violinist analogy” is an argument for the permissiveness of abortion. It is based on granting that the unborn is a human person, but argues that it is still permissible to kill the unborn because it may be justified as “non-intentional killing.” The argument originated with Judith Jarvis Thomson, to the best of my knowledge. She put the analogy like so:
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. [If he is unplugged from you now, he will die; but] in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you. (Thomson, cited below)
The argument seems to have much force. After all, who wouldn’t agree that you may be well within your rights to unplug yourself from this violinist. You aren’t obligated to him in any way.
There are a number of glaring difficulties with this argument (see this post for one argument against it), but the one I want to focus on now is tied to the recent controversy over the allegations of Planned Parenthood selling body parts. I’ve already pointed out one of the biggest problems is the question of “Whose body parts are they?” However, we may see that this controversy also undercuts the violinist analogy in a very brutal way.
Thomson has clearly massaged the analogy to make it seem fairly innocuous. After all, unplugging the violinist is fairly non-violent, right? You’re just having him removed from you so that you are no longer in the state of having to support him with your own body. But Thomson’s analogy needs to be amended. After all, Planned Parenthood itself acknowledges that they’re getting body parts from abortions and donating them. Thus, we might now fix Thomson’s argument for her to make it more accurate.
When the choice is made to “unplug” the violinist, it isn’t just unplugging him. Instead, those doing the unplugging are concerned with making sure that the violinist’s body parts come unplugged intact. They thus break his body apart in such a way as to preserve the heart, liver, brain, and other parts which might be used for science or saving the lives of other people. The violinist is not merely unplugged, but torn quite literally limb-from-limb in order to remove him.
Clearly, Thomson’s analogy has missed this point–a point Planned Parenthood itself acknowledges. For some reason, Thomson decided to smooth over these clinical facts in her “defense of abortion,” choosing instead to present it as something as simple and innocent as an “unplugging.” But the reality is that the analogy should point out that the choice involved is not merely to unplug the violinist but rather to have him effectively ripped from the one to whom he is hooked up in such a way that dismembers him.
There is good news, though: the parts of the violinist can now be used for research!
Thomson, J. “A Defense of Abortion”. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1:1 (Autumn 1971): 47–66. Citation and quote found on Wikipedia.
Be sure to check out my other posts in which I argue for the pro-life position. Particularly relevant to the present discussion are “From conception, a human” and “The issue at the heart of the abortion debate.”
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A recent innovation within the pro-choice repertoire of arguments doubles as perhaps the most chilling argument to date: namely, that abortion is justified as non-intentional killing of an infant.
Judith Jarvis Thomson is a proponent of this view. She argues that while the fetus has a right to life, that does not mean that permissibly kill it (“A Defense of Abortion”, 174-175). She argues that “[t]here is a distinction between intentional killing… and bringing about death as a side effect, and instances of choosing not to make a great sacrifice [carrying the fetus to delivery], rather than refusing to make a small one. Thus, many abortions are morally right” (Patrick Lee, 11o).
Thomson infamously uses an analogy of a violinist and the violinist appreciation society. Suppose there is a famous violinist who is dying, and the violinist appreciation society discovers you are the only living match for her blood type. While you’re sleeping, they hook your vitals up to the violinists in order to keep you both alive. You only need to stay in this bedridden state for 9 months, and then she’ll have recovered. Would you be culpable for cutting off the treatment?
Intuitively, the answer seems to be no. The problem is when Thomson uses this analogy for pregnancy. For one, pregnancy is the result of a choice (other than in the case of rape), whereas the violinist was hooked up against someone’s will. Second, mothers have a duty to protect their children. Thomson agrees that the fetus is a human person, but then seems to think that the mother has no duty to protect this human person. Third, “…the child is committing no injustice against [the mother]. The baby is not forcing himself or herself on the woman, but is simply growing and developing in a way quite natural to him or her. The baby is not performing any action that could in any way be construed as aimed at violating the mother” (Patrick Lee, 129).
There are other problems with this view, of course. For example, what if caring for a three year old is deemed a “great burden”; perhaps even a burden which is as great as pregnancy. Should mothers and fathers be allowed to cut off care, thus leading to the “side-effect” death of the toddler?
Another problem is that Thomson’s view depends totally upon the distinction between “intentional killing” and causing death as a “side-effect.” Thomson argues that it is permissible to bring about death as a “side effect” as opposed to intentionally killing an infant. There are two ways to argue against Thomson. The first is to deny her major premise, namely, that abortion is non-intentional killing. One could argue that in every case, abortion brings about the intended death of an infant. Such an argument has initial plausibility, but mostly falls apart when one considers that in at least some cases the death of the infant really is a “side-effect.” Consider the case in which a woman “dislikes the prospect of bodily changes due to pregnancy” (Lee, 115). In such a case, the woman’s intent is to prevent the bodily changes. That the infant is killed in the process is an unintended, but known side-effect of terminating the pregnancy.
In light of this, a more fruitful counter is to deny that Thomson’s conclusion follows from her argument. One could argue that abortion is morally wrong for, among other reasons: 1) the parent has a responsibility to the child (again, contra Thomson’s scenario) and 2) the harm of destroying one’s life is significantly greater than the harm of things such bodily changes.
Justifying 1) should be intuitively obvious, but consider Patrick Lee’s example in Abortion and Unborn Human Life:
Suppose I am in a motorboat in a lake and speeding past the pier I knock… four children into the lake…. I am responsible for their being in a dependency condition [like that of the fetus upon the mother], and… I owe it to them to go back and try to help them out of the water, lest they drown. However… I might also claim that I was only responsible for their being in the water, not for their being in an imperiled condition. It is not my fault… that they do not know how to swim… But clearly, it is specious to distinguish between my causing them to be in the water (for which I am responsible) and their being in a dependency condition due to their inability to swim… (Patrick Lee, 122-123)
Thomson would have us believe that we should draw such distinctions, which are indeed specious. The mother is responsible for her child.
Similarly, 2) also defeats Thomson’s argument. Lee points out that “Death is not just worse in degree than the difficulties involved in pregnancy; it is worse in kind” (128). To kill an infant in order to avoid pregnancy is to confuse not only the degree of “difficulty” but also the kind of difficulty involved.
If either 1) or 2) is correct, Thomson’s argument fails. In order to deny 1), the advocate of abortion must deny that parents have responsibility for their children. In order to deny 2), the advocate of abortion must show that killing someone is no better or worse than putting them in the state of pregnancy. Either alternative is totally implausible. Therefore, abortion is not justified as non-intentional killing.
Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion” in The Problem of Abortion, ed. Joel Feinberg (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1984), 173-187.
Patrick Lee, Abortion and Unborn Human Life, 2nd edition (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 2010).
The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from citations, which are the property of their respective owners) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author. All content on this site is the property of J.W. Wartick and is made available for individual and personal usage. If you cite from these documents, whether for personal or professional purposes, please give appropriate citation and provide a link to the original URL. By viewing any part of this site, you are agreeing to this usage policy.