J.W. Wartick

Thoughts on “The Blind Side”

I recently watched “The Blind Side” in a local dollar theatre. I know, it’s out on DVD/Blu-Ray. I am slow to see movies sometimes!

Anyway, I thought it was an absolutely wonderful movie. It raised some questions in my mind:

1) What can we do as Christians to change the situation of inner city violence, drugs, and other crime?

2) How are Christians to live in society? How can we step up and become leaders in our communities for change and reform?

3) What can I (specifically, but anyone can apply this to him/herself) do to help the poor and downtrodden in our society?

It was a very powerful movie, with Christian undertones. It has lead me to seek answers to these questions. I’d appreciate any feedback/suggestions. What do you think we can do?

Abortion: What logical arguments are there?

I’ve written about abortion before a few times. In fact, in my last post on the topic, I issued a challenge:

“I challenge anyone who is pro-choice to attempt to justify their position while maintaining some kind of civility. I challenge them to think about their position, and the ramifications that the arguments they make carry.”

No one accepted that challenge, despite over 200 views of that post since I wrote it.

What arguments are there for abortion that actually can logically justify it? I don’t think there are any. The key is the realization that we are indeed talking about human beings. There is no way to deny scientifically or philosophically that the unborn “fetus” (baby) is human. It is an established, empirical fact. What else could it be? A fish? No, it is a human fetus, and it is a human being, complete with a completely unique set of DNA, a 50% chance of being a different gender, and (often) a different blood type.

The question then is, according to those who are pro-choice, whether this “human being” is a person? While some may balk at such a strange question, that is indeed the question those within the pro-choice camp must put forth, for once it is acknowledged that a fetus is a human being, one must look to other means by which to justify killing this human being.

The argument is often made that while it is inside the mother, it is part of her. This is, in fact, completely false. Something that is part of the mother will have the same DNA as the mother, it will have the same blood type. An arm is not the same as a fetus.

To finally make this point as clear as possible, I cite none other than the “Pro-Choice Action Network”, which states “..even though a fetus is biologically human, it’s definitely not a person (legally and socially), and it’s questionable whether it’s a human being (physically)” (Arthur, cited below). Even the “Pro-Choice Action network freely acknowledges that the fetus is biologically human. The question they try to press is whether its a person. Further, they try to question “whether it’s a human being (physically)”. I don’t even know what this means. What is the difference between being biologically human and physically human? I see no difference whatsoever. It’s telling that these are the hairs the pro-choice network must try to split to make their case.

How is it that being transported outside the mother magically turns a baby into a “person”? Take an example of a baby premature by three months. What makes the 6-month old baby inside the mother less of a person than that baby outside of the mother?

Let’s turn again to Joyce Arthur’s article for the Pro-Choice Action network. “Another key difference is that a fetus doesn’t just depend on a woman’s body for survival, it actually resides inside her body. Persons, by definition, must be separate individuals who operate independently of others. They do not gain the status of persons by virtue of living inside the body of another person – the very thought is inherently ridiculous, even offensive” (Arthur, cited below).

I’m curious as to who made this definition of persons. Not only that, but I’m curious as to how this means that babies are persons? Babies cannot operate independently of others. They will die if left alone. Are babies no longer “persons”? Further, we see a wonderful example of the “straw man” fallacy here. The argument pro-life individuals make is not that babies gain the status of persons “by virtue of living inside the body of another person”. No, the argument is that babies gain the status of persons by being human beings. No other reason is needed. Personhood is not something to be bought and sold, defined and taken away. It’s not something to be arbitrarily defined as we see fit. That is exactly how such people as Hitler managed to murder millions of people. When we redefine personhood to fit our desires, we kill persons.

The chilling response is often that we can somehow justify killing this baby, for it is a “choice.” As Magda Denes wrote, “I do think abortion is murder–of a very special and necessary sort” (quoted in Alcorn, 99 [cited below]). How is it that murder is ever “necessary”? What other cases of murder can be “necessary” if there is such a thing as a “necessary” murder?

I’m confused as to what arguments remain. The inconsistencies in the pro-choice camp abound. They acknowledge that a baby outside the mother at 8 months is indeed a person and should not be killed, but that same baby, most would say, could be killed just hours before its birth! What kind of “logic” is this? Where will it lead? Where has it lead already?

I reissue my challenge to any pro-choice individual. Make your case. Make it without using ad hominems. Make it, acknowledging that science has shown that the fetus is human. Make your case for “necessary” murder of human beings.

Sources:

Alcorn, Randy. Pro Life Answers to Pro Choice Arguments. Multnomah Books. 2000.

Arthur, Joyce. “The Fetus Focus Fallacy.” The Pro-Choice Action Network. http://www.prochoiceactionnetwork-canada.org/articles/fetus-focus-fallacy.shtml. Accessed March 24, 2010.

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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from cited material which is the property of its respective owner[s]) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

Book Review: “The Making of an Atheist” by James S. Spiegel

The Making of an Atheist by James S. Spiegel is a dangerous book. The subtitle illustrates this well: “How Immorality Leads to Unbelief”. Spiegel’s thesis is that “Atheism is not at all a consequence of intellectual doubts. Such doubts are mere symptoms of the root cause–moral rebellion. For the atheist, the missing ingredient is not evidence but obedience” (11, his emphasis). Just above this statement is this similarly strongly worded proposal: “Perhaps we should consider the possibility that skeptical objections are the atheists’ facade, a scholarly veneer masking the real causes of their unbelief–causes that are moral and psychological in nature” (11, his emphasis).

I call the book dangerous for a few reasons. It is dangerous because Spiegel dares to assert something that Scripture holds to be quite true: there are cognitive consequences of sin. It is dangerous because the book unapologetically argues that atheism’s core tenants can be turned about; rather than atheism being a rationally superior view to theism, Spiegel argues that atheists are subject to the very objections they often raise against theism: it arises from psychological and moral deficiencies. Spiegel knows this book is dangerous. He writes “My thesis is an uncomfortable one. To suggest that religious skepticism is, at bottom, a moral problem will likely draw the ire of many people” (16).

Anyone who makes claims like these had better be prepared to back them up. Spiegel points to the oft-quoted passage from Thomas Nagel as a beginning for this discussion. Nagel writes “I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God, and, naturally, hope that I’m right about my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that” (quoted in Spiegel, 10-11). This powerful quote serves as a backdrop for much of the book.

Spiegel starts off with an analysis of atheism. He points out that the “objection from evil” (the problem of evil) may not be so strong after all. He (rightly, I think) notes that “from a naturalist standpoint the objection from evil is incoherent” (27). This is because naturalism cannot have objective right and wrong. For this and other reasons, the most “powerful” objection to theism is dismissed and avoided.

This chapter has an important concession on Spiegel’s part. He notes that some of the things atheists point out (immoral activity in the church is one example) are indeed problems. Malpractice of believers is indeed something to point out and condemn. But the point is that these things are not objections to theistic belief, rather commentaries on the believers (38).

After a brief argument against atheism and an introductory level explanation of the teleological argument, Spiegel gets into the meat of his book: the causes of atheism. Following Paul C. Vitz, Spiegel argues that one psychological reason for the rejection of theism is a broken relationship with one’s earthly father (64). Spiegel forwards this as a kind of psychological argument against atheism. Just as Freud (and others) would like to argue that theism is mere wish-fulfillment put into practice with the “father figure in the sky”, so, here, Spiegel argues that atheism could be (in some cases) due to a rejection of that true father figure in the sky, as broken relationships are projected onto (and against) the Heavenly Father. “Human beings were made in God’s image, and the father-child relationship mirrors that as God’s ‘offspring'” (69).

Spiegel follows this interesting argument with an equally enlightening discussion in the (im)morality of many top atheistic scholars. He quotes Aldous Huxley, who states “Those who detect no meaning in the world generally do so because… it suits their books that the world should be meaningless” (73). This rejection of meaning allows immorality. If God exists, there is clearly an objective moral standard. Thus, by rejecting God, this standard doesn’t exist. Immorality can proceed freely.

There is another important point later in this same chapter: “one may willfully refuse to believe certain truths, even when there is strong evidence for them” (83). This is followed by an exploration of what this can mean. He quotes William James, who states, “If your heart does not want a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make you believe in one” (84). Ultimately, Spiegel argues, atheists choose not to believe (86).

This choice is made against a presupposed backdrop. Simply put, everyone has a kind of “paradigm” of background beliefs that filters and limits their selection of propositions to believe. Spiegel demonstrates that this happens even among the venerated field of science. There is no such thing as a truly objective human being (92-93). What this means to his thesis, then, is that by selecting a paradigm in which the standard of truth is such that it excludes theism, an atheist will never accept theism on any amount of evidence. Rather, they must make a complete paradigm shift that allows for such a reality (100ff).

This section of the book ends with Spiegel’s assertion that the descent into atheism is a willful rejection of God, made apart from evidence (or a perceived lack thereof). Further, sin can harden one’s heart against God, thus enforcing a paradigm that is anti-theistic in nature (113-114).

The Making of an Atheist closes with a section on the “Blessings of Theism.” Here, Spiegel simply lays out the blessings spelled out in Scripture that are ours in theism. He argues we should live a virtuous life. We have the right to thank and praise God. We can live as humble believers in Christ. I wish that Spiegel had included some of the blessings of Christ in this section, but I suppose that’s not the thesis of his book. One final important point Spiegel makes actually takes place in the endnotes in this last section. Spiegel states that “we should constantly examine and reform these beliefs in light of Scripture and sound reasoning” (141). I think this is an excellent point.

Overall, The Making of an Atheist is a fast read. It’s definitely written for the lay person, though it has enough philosophy in there to keep those looking for a bit of a deeper read engaged. It’s short (less than 150 pages), so it won’t take long to finish. Spiegel’s points are solid and I will explore his conclusions further. Spiegel’s “dangerous book” is very successful.

The Origins Debate Within Christianity

This post is a collection of links to the series I’m doing on the “Argument within Christianity.” I’d make it all nice and pretty if I wasn’t computer illiterate. I will update this post as my series continues.

Introductory Post “The Argument Within Christianity: Evolution, Intelligent Design, or Creationism?”

Theistic Evolution 1 Theistic Evolution 2 Theistic Evolution 3 Theistic Evolution 4

Old Earth Creationism 1 Old Earth Creationism 2 Old Earth Creationism 3

Young Earth Creationism 1 Young Earth Creationism 2 Young Earth Creationism 3 Young Earth Creationism 4

Intelligent Design 1 Intelligent Design 2 Intelligent Design 3

Christian Presuppositions and Science

The Interaction of Science and Faith

Guest Post 1: Matt Moss Part 1 – Part 2 – Part 3 – Part 4 – Part 5

The Covenant and Christ

This post is part of a series on Jesus: The Living God. View other posts here.

Recently I wrote a guest post for a fellow Christian blogger (an excellent site, check it out), Chris Reese, on N.T. Wright’s Climax of the Covenant. I wanted to re-blog it for my site and add a bit to it.

A subject that is often ignored within discussions of who Christ is involves Covenant theology, specifically, the theology of the Torah. How exactly does Christ relate to the Covenant that God made with the people of Israel? N.T. Wright discusses this very issue in his book, The Climax of the Covenant.

First, what is the Torah? The Torah, in Wright’s usage, is not just the Mosaic books of the Bible or the Law, but the promise of God to His people, Israel. He states that “…the law… was regarded not merely as a general code of ethics, but as the charter of Israel’s national life” (24). The problem was, of course, that God demanded perfect obedience to the Torah, to the Law. As His covenant people, Israel was to keep the Torah and to cherish it. But Israel constantly strayed. Thus, the power of the Torah became death, the consequence of sin (209).

So how could Israel fulfill the Torah? The short answer is that Israel simply could not. It demanded perfection, and the people of Israel could not be perfect. God had to intervene directly in history in order to accomplish His covenant with His people, and to open this covenant up to all people.

And how did this happen? First, note the relationship between Christ, Adam, and humanity. Wright notes that “Adam has [for the rabbis of Israel] become embodied already in Israel, the people of the Torah, and in her future hope” (25). This, in turn, must be viewed in light that “Israel, the family of Abraham, is God’s true humanity. Her land is God’s land. Her enemies are God’s enemies” (23). This reflects back on the Torah, as discussed above. It is the “charter of Israel’s national life” (24). So there is a relationship between Adam and Israel–Adam, Wright argues, is to be understood as Israel. Jesus Christ, then, became a New Adam for a New Israel. By acting as the New Adam and redeeming Israel, He fulfilled the Torah and seal the charter of Israel. Not only that, but He opened this charter, this Covenant, to all people.

“Jesus, as last Adam, had revealed what God’s saving plan for the world had really been… by enacting it, becoming obedient to death, even the death of the cross” (40). The resurrection confirmed Jesus as Christ–Messiah.

Finally, how could God keep this promise in light of the failure of Israel (and mankind at large) to keep the Torah? Christ, argues Wright, is the “Climax” of the covenant. “The Messiah is the fulfillment of the long purposes of Israel’s God” (241). How does this happen? Wright argues that the “…answer must be that sin, by causing death, stood in the way of the divine intention of giving life; when, on the cross, God condemns sin… then sin is powerless to prevent the gift of life” (209). God’s plan of salvation “always involved a dramatic break, a cross and a resurrection written into the very fabric of history” (241, emphasis his). Thus, Torah and Covenant Theology can be summed up by saying that “Christ on the cross is thus the goal of the Torah” (243, emphasis his). It is in Christ that we become the people of God.

Source:

Wright, N.T. The Climax of the Covenant. Fortress Press. 1991.

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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from cited material which is the property of its respective owner[s]) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

Omniscience, Necessity, and Human Freedom

I’m continually frustrated when the concept of freedom of the will comes up among people, even in Christian circles, because it seems that inevitably people start to deny that freedom of the will is incompatible with the God of Classical Theism. I am a firm believer in human freedom of the will and I believe it is fully compatible with omniscience. (Though I do not deny that our human will is corrupted by the fall into sin and that salvation is the act of God, not a work of man… These things are most certainly true.)

Generally the objection is something like this: If God knows everything and is all-powerful, then everything is pre-determined.

I still have not seen any solid argument for why this should be the case whatsoever. The key, as I understand it, is the connection between foreknowledge and causation.

I don’t see any reason to believe that if a being that is omnipotent and omniscient knows that x will happen, that being somehow causes or determines that x must happen. Why should this be the case? Simply knowing with certainty what will happen in the future does not somehow mean that this being has somehow made a causal link between its knowledge and the future, rather, it just means that this being knows what any other being is going to do.

What connection is there between knowledge of an event in the future and determining it? I’d like any kind of analytic argument to try to deny that human freedom and omniscience are compatible.

I’ve argued elsewhere that these concepts are compatible, and I’d like to make this point more clear now.

Take “P” to mean “God [in Classical Theism–i.e. omniscient, omnipotent, etc.] knows in advance that some event, x, will happen”

Take “Q” to mean “some event, x, will happen”

1. □(P⊃Q)

2. P

3. Therefore, Q

I wanted to draw it in symbolic logic to make my point as clear as possible. It is necessarily true that if God knows x will happen, then x will happen. But then if one takes these terms, God knowing x will happen only means that x will happen, not that x will happen necessarily. Certainly, God’s foreknowledge of an event means that that event will happen, but it does not mean that the event could not have happened otherwise. If an event happens necessarily, that means the event could not have happened otherwise, but God’s foreknowledge of an event doesn’t somehow transfer necessity to the event, it only means that the event will happen. It could have been otherwise, in which case, God’s knowledge would have been different. The problem many people make is that they try to make the syllogism:

1. □(P⊃Q)

2. P

3. Therefore, □Q

This is actually an invalid argument. The only thing that follows from □(P⊃Q) is that, “necessarily, if P then Q,” not “if P, then, necessarily Q.”

It is true that “necessarily, if God knows that some event, x, will happen, then some event, x, will happen”… but then it doesn’t follow from this that some event, x, happens necessarily. Thus, the event x is not predetermined simply by God’s foreknowledge of an event.

The objection is sometimes simply put forward as: Necessarily, God cannot error in his knowledge. If God knows some event x, will happen, then x will happen. Therefore, necessarily, x will happen.

Take P and Q as above

Take R to be “God cannot error in his knowledge”

1. □R

2. P⊃Q

3. Q

Again, this simply is an unsound and invalid argument. Simply stating that □R doesn’t show that for every event x that God knows, □x. It simply means that □R. R does not have a causal link to x (or Q above). It is true that □R on Classical Theism, but this does not mean that □Q or □P. There must be some argument to make P or Q necessary in order for there to be some kind of predetermined future, and I have no idea how an argument like that might go.There are ways that I can think of to formulate it, but it involves simply assuming that □R means that □P or □Q, so it would then be question-begging.

Perhaps I could take an example. Let’s say that I’m going to go to classes tomorrow (and I do hope I will, I don’t like missing classes!). God knows in advance that I’m going to go to classes tomorrow. His knowledge of this event means that it will happen, but it doesn’t mean that I couldn’t choose to stay in and sleep for a while, or play my new copy of Final Fantasy XIII, or do something more useless with my time. If I chose to, say, play Final Fantasy XIII (a strong temptation!), then God simply would have known that I would play FFXIII. His knowledge does not determine the outcome, His knowledge is simply of the outcome.

I’m open to hearing any analytic argument that manages to show how necessity can be transferred to events simply by God’s knowledge of them, but I’m skeptical as to the prospects of whether it can be done.

This argument can be seen in William Lane Craig’s writings like The Only Wise God and also in his podcast episodes on the doctrine of God.

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The Dialogue Proceeds: Young Earth Creationism

This is part in a series of posts I’m working on concerning the “Argument within Christianity” on the origins of the universe and life. Other posts can be viewed here.

Young Earth Creationism holds that the Genesis 1-3 account is to be literally read. The days mentioned are literal 24-hour days. The Creation account is not metaphorical or some kind of theological rendition of Creation, but is a literal, scientifically accurate (when science is viewed through this lens) account of the origin of the universe.

Central to Young Earth Creationists (hereafter YECs) is the idea that people can look at the exact same scientific data and take different interpretations. I remember a man coming to speak on campus about YEC and he said that he looks at the exact same evidence as other scientists, and simply comes away with a different interpretation.

So what does it mean to take the same evidence and look at it with different interpretations? One is the age of the earth. A prominent and important site for YEC scientists is the Mount St. Helens eruption site. This site has provided a number of startling findings. Specifically, YECs point to the layers of sediment deposited by the volcano as showing there could be a different interpretation of geologic time. In the space of a few days, Mount St. Helens deposited up to 600 feet of sediment. This sediment looks like the sedimentary deposits found throughout the geologic record across the world (Morris). Other evidence includes the fact that a canyon formed, complete with a redirected river flowing through it, trees were deposited standing up (similar to petrified forests), and peat moss deposits that could eventually lead to coal (Morris).

Thus, YECs take this as evidence for the Genesis account and creation in a few ways. First, if there was a worldwide flood, then it is possible that there would exist worldwide sedimentary deposits that are quite uniform. If canyons can form so quickly from a volcano, then could not other canyons that are often cited as having taken millions of years to form have been formed by an event like the flood or other volcanic activity surrounding the Flood (Morris)?

It seems like, on a YEC perspective, the Flood is the answer to a great many questions, including the evidence from geology for the age of the earth (YECs would say it is sediment deposited and compacted by the flood), canyons, fossils, etc.

I always find things like this greatly appealing, but I do have a few problems. I must stress again that I am not a scientist. Thus, I am not someone to go through and evaluate scientific claims in any scholarly fashion, as I don’t have the knowledge to do so. I try to stay on top of things by reading reports, whatever books I have or get a hold of that have to do with science, but the bottom line is that it isn’t my main interest. Anyway, these are the problems I have, with my layman’s knowledge of science:

1. What about evidence from astronomy for the age of the universe?

2. How does one go about putting things like this into a scientific model (again, not that this is the standard for truth of any claim, but it is the standard for science, and if the YEC perspective wants to compete on this level, it must provide a competing model that involves tests)?

3. Can we really take evidence from something like the Mount St. Helens eruption and assume things about the Flood because of it?

4. Where is the positive case? Rather than attacking all other views, where is the scientific case building bottom up a YEC explanation of the universe? I think this is absolutely essential for YEC to offer any competition to Old Earth Creationism, Theistic Evolution, or Intelligent Design. Hugh Ross has done well for the OEC view (here), but as far as I know, YECs have no comparable case.

Sources:

Morris, Dr. John D. “Lessons from Mount St. Helens.” http://www.icr.org/article/lessons-from-mount-st-helens/.

My notes from a talk on campus which I don’t feel like looking up a way to officially cite

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An Authoritative Call: Remembering that God is God

“Who is God?”

“What does God mean to us?”

These are questions that are central to existence. If God does indeed exist (argued elsewhere, see here) then they are of supreme importance. There are no questions that can be more important.

God, being sovereign, could make demands on humans. Why should God choose to interact with humans who are in a state of rebellion against him? This is not legalism, rather it is an assertion about God. God is sovereign and could have plans for all humans. It seems that the God of Classical Theism does indeed have such plans for all people (perhaps citing verses like Jeremiah 29:11 “For I know the plans I have for you, declares the LORD, plans for welfare and not for evil, to give you a future and a hope”). But the God of Classical theism is inherently personal, and this is a point that is often missed.

A God who is personal is necessarily relational. Thus, when one is pondering questions of God’s existence or purpose, etc., a valid question to ask is “What is my relation with God?” Why should God choose to interact with those who are scornful, mocking, or blaspheming Him?

I think this is vitally important to the question that precedes the two I began this post with: “Does God exist?” Those who are asking this may do well to ponder what the implications of God’s existence would be while they are thinking about this question. If one is asking such a question, while knowingly being biased against a positive answer, acting against what one knows such a God may demand (i.e. some kind of obedience), or outright rebelling or blaspheming against God, it may indeed be the case that a God who is morally perfect and sovereign could freely choose to withhold evidence. And this withholding would not be in order to keep God’s existence from a person, but as a teaching exercise, a means with which to shape a person as they continue to wonder about God’s existence or purposes.

This, I propose that the questions “Who is God?” and “What does God mean to us [me]?” should actually precede, rather than follow, the question “Does God exist?” Walls against evidence can be built. People can freely choose to deny any evidence for the existence of God or put the question up to a test of validity that no arguments could meet. Such attitudes should–must–be avoided. I’m not trying to preach legalism here, nor am I arguing that it is our actions that can somehow get us right with God (rather, it is Christ’s atoning sacrifice for our sin that grants us entry into the Kingdom of God), but I am arguing that those who do not believe in God and honestly wish to pursue the question should think about one’s own attitude and purpose in such an investigation. If one approaches with a Russell-like attitude of “I’ll just tell God when I die that the evidence wasn’t good enough”, one should not expect any amount of evidence to sway them, simply because of such an attitude.

Again, God is personal and therefore relational. If this is the case, why should not evidence for the existence of God manifest itself in such ways? Why shouldn’t it be purposively available or such that it makes demands upon individuals? Why should evidence for God’s existence be sterile, lacking any kind of emotional interaction with the being that is its referent? If God exists, then this is exactly the kind of evidence we should expect: relational, interaction-based, purposively available evidence.

Now I think that we can get this interaction-based evidence in places like the Bible. I believe that the Bible is the book whose author is always present, a quote I’ve heard somewhere and can’t seem to find who it is from. If one were to read the Bible with a mindset open to God’s interaction rather than trying to find contradictions, inconsistencies, “evils”, and the like, one might find more there than meets the eye.

Thus, I argue, the question “Does God exist?” should be viewed in light of who that God may be. If the God of Classical Theism exists, if the God of Christianity exists, then one may do well to remember that this God can issue an authoritative call–a call to repentance, a call from the Holy Spirit to a right relationship with God in Christ. This God can and does make demands. This God can and does offer salvation. This God is relational. Whenever exploring the questions about God, we do well to remember that God is God.

This post came from the fact that I’ve still been contemplating Paul K. Moser’s book, The Elusive God and the questions he raises throughout the book. I think that I will probably rewrite my review at some point, because the more I think about it, the more important I think his points are.

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The Argument Continues: Old Earth Creationism

This is the third post in an ongoing series discussing the origins debate within Christianity. Click here for more posts in this series.

Before I delve too deeply into this post I wanted to raise a point a dear friend of mine made in a discussion we had recently. As Christians, there really is no need to jump on board with any of these labels. We don’t need to sit back, look at all the evidence, and then call ourselves theistic evolutionists, advocates of intelligent design, creationists, or any other label. Really, we’re all Christians, and we can take our Christian belief with us in this debate. My own presuppositions are of course that the Bible is the innerrant word of God, that the Ecumenical Creeds accurately describe the beliefs of the catholic faith, and that this faith is what saves (Ephesians 2:8-9), by the power of the Holy Spirit, the love of God the Father, and the salvation of our Lord Jesus Christ. Thus, while this debate is certainly an interesting, mind-bending task, we shouldn’t feel any need to jump on board any bandwagon. If, as Christians, we see merit in the Young Earth Creationist camp, but also some merit in the Old Earth Camp, we have no reason not to take what we believe from each side. Similarly, if we really think Theistic Evolution is where it’s at, but see some validity in the Intelligent Design arguments, there is no reason to not combine both. We don’t need to assign labels to ourselves.

There is no reason to treat these things like political parties and then duke it out. Instead, we can use our Christian presuppositions to engage this dialogue. Thus, while I am exploring these issues, keep in mind that this is what I am trying to do. I want to allow God’s work (nature) to speak for itself and I know that this work does not contradict His Word (Scripture). So let’s let the dialogue continue, shall we?

I must make a clarification here and say that my definition of “Old Earth Creationism” is incorrect. Old Earth Creationism is, rather, the belief that the Biblical account of Creation is correct, as are many of the findings of mainstream science (i.e. the universe is billions of years old, etc.). Old Earth Creationism (hereafter OEC) contains a huge variety of beliefs in its camp, so keep that in mind when discussing these issues.

My reading for OEC was the book More than a Theory by Hugh Ross. I’m not going to outline everything Hugh Ross is saying. Instead, I’ll present briefly the OEC beliefs he is arguing for (including the theological stance), outline the “testable model for creation” that Ross argues for, and analyze as I can.

Hugh Ross states that there is no reason why people who desire to remain true to the Word of God need to reject the current scientific consensus on issues like the age of the universe, the Big Bang, and the like. Rather, Ross argues that Christians can accept all of these things and even find them in Scripture. Ross makes the argument that in Genesis, the days can indeed many period of times, citing the familiar argument that the very same word in Hebrew (yohm) is used in order to state the periods in which God created the world. but also to imply analogously that God’s time is not our time, for a thousand years to God are as a day to us (Psalm 90:4). I tend to agree with Ross on this point. I don’t see any definitive reason to take the Hebrew word yohm to mean twenty-four hours, necessarily, as it is used in other ways throughout the Hebrew Scriptures.

A key point for argument within Ross’s creation model (he calls it the “Reasons to Believe” model, and I will refer to it as the RTB model from now on) is the use of Scripture. Rather than citing the more commonly used Psalm 19, Ross turns to Psalm 104 to argue that Scripture outlined scientific findings before they happened (85).

Ross also argues that the various references to God stretching out the heavens “like a tent” is wholly compatible with the Big Bang theory of universal origins, according to which our universe is still expanding (as a tent).

Perhaps the most important piece of interpretation Ross offers for this debate within Christianity is his rebuttal to the “original sin” challenge to any who argue evolution could have been used by God (see the post on theistic evolution, linked above). Ross argues that Adam and Eve were indeed specially created and that death, both physical and (potentially) spiritual were the consequences to mankind of sin. “The whole of Scripture confirms that only humans, among all life created on Earth, can (and do) sin. Therefore, this ‘death through sin’ applies to humans alone, not to plants and animals. In addition, the passage [Romans 5:12] states specifically that this ‘death came to all men.’ It does not say ‘to all creation’ or ‘to all creatures.’ The verses make no apparent reference to plant or animal life, nor do other parallel passages…” (85). Later, Ross argues that this claim for the special creation of man is not unscientific, as he offers reasons to reject man’s evolutionary ancestry from primates (181ff).

I think that this is Ross’ best point. If his RTB model does indeed avoid the weighty challenge of “original sin,” he has hit upon something major within Christianity.

Now, the model itself. Ross never really comes out in the book and says “This is the RTB model”, rather, he presents sort of an outline:

“The Universe:

• began once in finite time
• has a beginning that coincides with the beginning of space and time
• was not made from that which is material, visible, or detectable
• continuously expands from the beginning
• is governed by the laws of physics
• manifests precise fine-tuning for humanity’s benefit
• has enormous volume, encompassing an “uncountable” (to ancient peoples) number of stars
• contains stars that differ from one another and eventually stop shining
• will someday cease to exist

“Earth, which

• emerged from the cosmos at a specific time
• was enshrouded by an opaque cloud layer in the beginning
• began with an ocean that covered its whole surface
• was precisely fine-tuned for humanity’s benefit
• contains resources essential for launching and sustaining human civilization
• has a Sun and Moon and other astronomical companions specially designed to benefit life and humanity
• carries finite resources and time-limiting conditions for sustaining human civilization

“Life, which

• began early in Earth’s history
• began under hostile conditions
• began by divine intervention
• began with optimal ecological relationships
• began with optimal design for environmental conditions
• appeared in abundance, in diversity, and for long eras for the specific benefit of humanity
• started as physical only (most life-forms); then soulish creatures (many species) appeared; and finally, one spiritual species was introduced–an original pair of humans and all their descendants
• progresses from the simple to complex through a series of extinction and replacement (speciation events
• reflects shared common designs
• in its soulish characteristics, appears designed to serve and/or please humanity

“Humanity, which

• arrived late in Earth’s history
• resulted from divine intervention
• represents the culmination of God’s creation work on earth
• remains the only earthly creature with a spiritual nature
• descended from one man and one woman who lived in a God-designed garden near the juncture of Africa, Asia, and Europe
• migrated rapidly from area of origin shortly after the flood of Noah’s time
• experienced a significant drop in the potential life span after the time of the flood
• genetically bottlenecked at a later date for males than for females…
• was gifted from the outset with attributes needed for functioning in a high-tech civilization (89-91)”

The major point that jumps out at me about this model is the “soulish” creatures. Ross argues that some animals, like birds, dogs, cats, etc. are “soulish” and are better able to relate to mankind, thus pointing to design of life for humanity. I don’t think he develops this point strongly, nor does he present Biblical evidence for this point. I don’t see it as all that important, however.

Ross’ scientific argument is strong as far as I can tell, but as I said in the first post in this series, I am no scientist. Ross essentially accepts that the big bang was the start of the universe (and space-time), that the placement of earth was fine-tuned to an extremely minuscule accuracy, that life on earth was supernaturally generated, that life evolved (but was guided or “designed”), and that mankind was specifically created. This is the very basic outline. I will be discussing individual parts in future posts about OEC.

Overall, Ross makes a rather powerful argument throughout the work for the scientific and Biblical backing for most of the steps of the model outlined above. I’m not going to go into each specific step here, but I will in future posts. For now, I will say that I think Ross is definitely on to something here. I’m still mulling over his interpretation of Scripture, but I appreciate his no-nonsense approach. He clearly states that the Bible is authoritative and without error. Once I finished this book I was really excited to write this post out and get on to more reading from other sides of the debate. I’ll be looking into more stuff from the RTB model, as well.

One can read more about the RTB model at this site.

Source:

Ross, Hugh. More than a Theory. Baker Books. 2009.

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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick, apart from any quotations, and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.

The Ontological Argument: Therefore God Exists

The Ontological Argument is probably the most widely misunderstood and maligned of all the theistic arguments. Counters to it often entail little more than mud-slinging, calling such an argument “wordplay” or “trickery,” but few get to the meat of the argument. Often counter-arguments include attempts to parody the argument (as here) or a dismissive strategy. But does anyone truly confront the argument? Rarely. Here I’ll present two forms of the ontological argument, and discuss them in some detail.

The first version of the argument that I will present is Alvin Plantinga’s “Victorious Modal” version of the argument. I actually don’t think this is the strongest version of the ontological argument, but it is one step towards the strongest version. First, the argument:

“1) The property of being maximally great is exemplified in some possible world

2) The property of being maximally great is equivalent, by definition, to the property of being maximally excellent in every possible world

3) The property of being maximally excellent entails the properties of [at least] omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection

4) A universal property is one that is exemplified in every possible world or none

5) Any property that is equivalent to some property that holds in every possible world is a universal property

Therefore,

6) There exists a being that is essentially omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect (God) (Maydole, 573)”

Now let’s analyze this argument. The long story short is that this argument is logically valid. The conclusions follow from the premises. This can be shown with deductive symbolic logic (Maydole, 590). Thus, one cannot argue against it as being invalid, rather, the argument must be attacked for soundness.

Let’s sum it up in easier-to-understand language, shall we? The first premise simply claims that in some possible world (out of infinite or nearly infinite), the property of “maximal greatness” is exemplified, that is, some body has this property. Premise 2) argues that this property is equivalent to maximal excellence, which is explained in 3) as (basically) the attributes generally believed to be possessed by God in classical theism. Premise 4) states the obviously true statement that if a property is universal it is in either every possible world or none. This is a simple tautology, it is true by definition. One could just as easily say a property that exists in every possible world or none is universal. X = X, this is true. Then, Plantinga argues 5) that maximal greatness is a universal property. This is key to understanding the argument. Basically, in his book God, Freedom, and Evil (and elsewhere), Plantinga makes the point that if a being is maximally great, then that simply entails being maximally great in all possible worlds. For a being that is maximally great in, say 200 worlds is not  greater than one that exists in 2,000, but then this continues up the ladder until you have a being that is maximally great in all possible worlds, which then excludes the possibility of other beings with that property (for they would then, necessarily, not be the maximally great being). Finally, premise 6) follows from the previous premises (for if the maximally great/excellent being exists in all possible worlds, it exists in our own).

The question for this argument is then whether it is true. The premise on which this argument hinges is 1) “The property of being maximally great is exemplified in some possible world”. This seems to be perfectly clear. Denial of this premise means that one would have to argue that it is logically impossible for maximal greatness to be exemplified in any possible world at all, not just our own. This means someone must have infinite knowledge of all possible worlds. Therefore, it seems as though this argument is almost airtight. But suppose someone insists that one can deny premise 1), well then the whole argument falls apart. I must admit I don’t see how anyone could logically do so, but I don’t doubt that people will do so. So if someone wants to deny premise 1), and then–in my opinion–become rather dishonest intellectually, they can deny the soundness of the argument.

I don’t think that there is a way around this argument, but it is actually possible to make the Ontological Argument even stronger.

The most powerful version of the ontological argument, in my opinion, is presented in the book God and Necessity by Stephen E. Parrish (previously discussed here).

The argument goes as follows:

1) The concept of the GPB is coherent (and thus broadly logically possible)

2) Necessarily, a being who is the GPB is necessarily existent, and would have (at least) omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection essentially.

3) If the concept of the GPB is coherent, then it exists in all possible worlds.

4) But if it exists in all possible worlds, then it exists in the actual world.

5) The GPB exists (Parrish, 82)

This argument is also deductively valid. Premise 1) argues that the Greatest Possible Being is coherent–that is, there is no logical contradiction within such a being. 2) further defines what a GPB would be (Plantinga’s argument outlines this thoroughly). Premise 3) states the major part of the argument in a different way. Rather than arguing that it is possible that “maximal greatness” is exemplified in some possible world, Parrish argues that the concept of the GPB entails logical necessity along with such maximal greatness, and thus 3) follows from the previous premises, just as Plantinga’s version of the argument does. The key is to remember that in Parrish’s version of the argument, the coherence of the GPB is what is important, not the possibility (for if it is coherent, it is possible). 4) This is tautologically true. 5) follows from the previous premises.

What Parrish does here is actually takes out the possibility of denying premise 1) in Plantinga’s argument. Let’s look into this closely. Parrish argues that the concept of the Greatest Possible Being is coherent. Why is this so important? Well, because if we grant for a moment that the GPB exists, such a being could not fail to exist due to some kind of chance mistake or having some other being or thing prevent the GPB’s existence (Parrish, 105). The first point (that chance could not prevent the GPB’s existence) is true because the GPB would be logically necessary (it would either exist or not exist in all possible worlds). This claim is reinforced by the idea of maximal greatness being a universal property (above). The second point (nothing else could prevent the GPB’s existence) seems quite obvious. If there were a being or body or thing, etc. that could prevent the GPB’s existence, the GPB would clearly not be the Greatest Possible Being. If some other being were powerful enough to prevent the GPB’s existence, then that being would be greater.

So the only thing that could prevent  the GPB from existing is self-contradiction within the concept.

Why is this? Well, after a little investigation it seems pretty clear. If the GPB is a coherent (and logically possible) concept, then such a being does exist. Let us say that the GPB is coherent. Let us then take some world, W, and see whether the GPB can fail to exist.

The  concept of the GPB includes logical necessity in all possible worlds. The GPB has all the properties of maximal greatness. This means that these properties are universals. We can simply refer back to the argument above. If the GPB exists and has omnipotence, omniscience, etc. then it must exist universally, because, again, if some being is the GPB in only 200/1,000,000,000 possible worlds, the being that is GPB in 2,000 is greater. But this seems ridiculous, for the truly Greatest Possible Being must exist in all of them, for if there was a possibility for some being to exist in all the worlds that the GPB exists in +1 and exemplify the maximally great attributes, then that being would be the GPB (and the previous one would not really have omniscience, etc., for the GPB would be more powerful, existing in all possible worlds, and being sovereign in all possible worlds) . Now let us return to W. It now seems completely clear that W could not be such that, if the GPB is coherent (and therefore possible), W could not fail to exemplify the GPB.

But have we then demonstrated that coherence is really the issue here? Is it possible that we are just thinking up some thing, calling it the GPB, and then arguing it into “supposed” existence? Logically, it does not seem so.

The reason is because we are arguing that the GPB entails these properties. Things have, essentially properties. I exemplify the property of “having fingers.” I also exemplify the properties of “being finite,” “being human,” “having two feet,” etc. These properties don’t belong to me simply because someone sat around and decided to assign them to me, rather they belong to me because of the kind of thing I am. (Parrish argues similarly, 55). But in the same way, we could answer such objections by saying that these properties are part of the concept of God because that’s the kind of thing God is. Certainly, there have been all kinds of “gods” claimed throughout history that are finite in power or activity, but those aren’t the “gods” whose existence we are arguing for. Rather, we are arguing for the existence of the God of classical theism, and that God has such properties as necessary existence (in the analytic sense), omnipotence, omniscience, etc. This objection really doesn’t have any weight. But again, let’s assume for the sake of argument that it does.

Let’s assume that the objection may be true. We are just taking some “X” and arbitrarily saying that it is omnipotent, necessary, etc. Does that preclude such an object existing? I don’t see how this could be true. But even further, some claim that this doesn’t match up with Christianity’s concept of God. This seems preposterous. One needs only to open a  Bible to find that, while words like “omnipotence” are not used, words like “Almighty”, “Most High”, and the like constantly are. And what kind of objection is this really? Is the person making this objection going to concede that it is possible that there exists some nearly-omnipotent-but-not-actually-omnipotent creator of the universe? No, the objection is beyond logic and into emotional repugnance at the thought of God actually existing.

But we can even go further. For let us simply define God as the Greatest Possible being. This seems like it could very easily operate as a definition of what  “God” is, at least on classical theism. Well then, what properties might this Greatest Possible Being have? And then we simply build them up. Omnipotence seems obvious, as does omniscience, as does necessity, etc. So this isn’t some arbitrary assigning-to of properties, but rather such properties are part of the GPB simply because of what the GPB actually is, if the GPB existed.

Now we can return to the matter at hand. Does God exist? Well it follows from all of this that yes, God does exist. The theist has established that there are some arguments that deductively prove that God does exist. The only “way out” for the atheist is to attack premise one and argue that the concept of the GPB is, in fact, contradictory. And let’s be honest, there have been many attempts to do so. I can’t possibly go into all of them here, but I can state simply that I remain unconvinced. Often these arguments are things like “Omnipotence and omniscience are impossible to have, because if God knows in advance what He’s going to do, He can’t do anything else!” This argument is obviously false, for simply knowing what is going to happen is not causation. I know that a sheep is an animal, this does not cause the sheep to be an animal. I know that I am going to finish typing this post, that does not cause me to do so. Rather, I choose to continue typing and finish this post.

Of course, one might say “You can’t really know you’re going to finish this post! Your computer might explode and you may get brain washed, etc.” Well that is a whole different debate, but I think that such objections, ironically, actually apply not at all to God. For if God is omniscient and omnipotent, it seems clear that God actually would be above such things! For nothing could prevent God from finishing something He knows He’s going to do! Not only that, but God’s knowledge is such that He actually would know He is going to do something, and freely chooses to do so. I don’t see why God’s foreknowledge of an event somehow limits omnipotence, especially when one considers that God is part of agent-causation, so God chooses to do the things He is going to do. Thus, the argument falls apart.

But now I’m already farther off track than I was (and thus preventing myself from finishing this post, AH the irony!). Suffice to say that I very much doubt that any objection to the coherence of the GPB even comes close to succeeding. But then, if that is true, God exists.

Therefore God exists.

(Edit: I’ve included below a proof of Plantinga’s argument)

Let
Ax=df x is maximally great
Bx=df x is maximally excellent
W (Y) =df Y is a universal property
Ox = df x is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect 1) ◊ (∃x)Ax pr
2) □(x)(Ax iff □Bx) pr
3) □(x)(Bx⊃Ox) pr
4) (Y)[W(Y) iff (□(∃x)Yx ∨ (□~(∃x)Yx)] pr
5) (Y)[(∃Z)□(x)(Yx iff □Zx)⊃ W(Y)] pr
6) (∃Z)□(x)(Ax iff □Zx) 2, Existential Generalization
7) [(∃Z)□(x)(Ax iff □Zx)⊃W(A)] 5, Universal Instantiation
8 ) W(A) iff (□(∃x)Ax ∨ (□~(∃x)Ax) 4, Universal Instantiation
9) W (A) 6, 7 Modus Ponens
10) W(A)⊃ (□(∃x)Ax ∨ (□~(∃x)Ax) 8, Equivalence, Simplification
11) □(∃x)Ax (□~(∃x)Ax) 9, 10 Modus Ponens
12) ~◊~~(∃x)Ax ∨ (□(∃x)Ax) 11, Communication, Modal Equivalence
13) ◊(∃x)Ax ⊃ □(∃x)Ax Double Negation, Impl
14) □(∃x)Ax 1, 13 Modus Ponens
15) □(x)(Ax iff □Bx) ⊃ (□(∃x)Ax ⊃ □(∃x)□Bx) theorem
16) □(∃x)□Bx 14, 15 Modus Ponens (twice)
17) □(x)(Bx ⊃ Ox) ⊃ (□(∃x)□Bx ⊃ □(∃x)□Ox theorem
18) □(∃x)□Bx 16, 17 Modus Ponens (twice)
19) (∃x)□Bx 18, Necessity Elimination
(taken directly from Maydole)

Sources:

Maydole, Robert E. “The Ontological Argument.” The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Edited William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland. Blackwell, 2009.

Parrish, Stephen E. God and Necessity. University Press of America. 1997.

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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from citations, which are the property of their respective owners) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.