I remember recently I was talking to someone and they asserted that Christianity and science simply don’t mix. Often I run into the idea that somehow Christianity hinders science (and a great many people seem to believe science can hinder Christianity as well!).This is not only wrong, it is historically and demonstrably wrong. Science as it stands today would not exist if it were not for Christianity.
Christian presuppositions allowed science to develop. Science was built on the presupposition that God was rational. Because the universe was created by this rational God, “Christian Philosophers linked rationality with the empirical, inductive method” (Schmidt, 218). These philosophers included such giants as William of Ockham (1285-1347) and Francis Bacon (1561-1626).
Lynn White states that “From the thirteenth century onward to the eighteenth, every major scientist, in effect, explained his motivations in religious terms” (Quoted in Schmidt, 222). But it wasn’t just the motivations that were explained in religious terms. Too often it is the case that people argue, fallaciously, that they were only Christian because of the time these scientists were born into. They were too afraid, it is alleged, to state their true beliefs. Not only is this utterly without evidence, but it could not be farther from the truth. Many of these scientists spent as much time on theology as they did on science. They credited God with their discoveries. They believed that God had set the universe up in such a way as to be explored by His people. These convictions permeated the writings of scientists.
Alvin Schmidt, in his monumental work, How Chistianity Changed the World, outlines how Christianity changed science on every level. Gregor Mendel, Leonardo Da Vinci, Andreas Vesalius, Copernicus, Johannes Kepler, Galileo, Isaac Newton, Liebniz, Pascal, Ohm, Andre Ampere, Kelvin, Boyle, and Pasteur are just a few of the almost limitless examples. All of these were Christians. It is wholly fallacious to assert that science and Christianity do not mix.
Some might immediately attack Christianity when names like Galileo are brought up. The problem with this is twofold:
1) In the case of Galileo or Copernicus, Christians were actually supporting these astronomers, just Christians of a different variety (Lutherans backed Copernicus financially and offered encouragement and support, while Roman Catholics, still basing their assumptions on Aristotelian astronomy, persecuted him [Schmidt, 231])
2) These men were, themselves, Christian. It’s easy to argue that Christians were putting down science when one can point to cases of persecution, but these men were Christians!
Perhaps it is now, however, that Christianity is opposed to science. Perhaps in the modern day, Christians are not scientists. This is not true. Take the case of Francis Collins, for example. He is the scientist who was the head of the human genome project. He is also a devout Christian and the author of The Language of God, in which he argues that science has lead him even more into his belief in God.
It is simply not the case that Christianity and science do not mix. Christian presuppositions allowed for the development of the empirical method. Christian philosophers and scientists were the “giants” on whom people like Newton (and modern scientists) built their theories (Newton himself asserts this). Science is just another of the many areas Christianity has helped transform for the better. Science can rightly say, “Thanks, Christianity.”
Sources:
Collins, Francis. The Language of God. 2007.
Schmidt, Alvin. How Christianity Changed the World. Zondervan. 2004.
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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from citations, which are the property of their respective owners) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.
This is another post in my series on the origins of life, the debate/argument within Christianity. See other posts in this series here.
I recently finished reading The Making of an Atheist by James S. Spiegel and while the book was by no means about the origins of life, one quote in particular made me think about this series I’ve been doing. Spiegel writes, “Once life appears, the only remaining rational debate should be among theists–as to how God did it, whether through special creation, natural selection, or some combination of these means. The issue of origins should be an in-house theistic debate” (50, emphasis mine).
I tend to agree. This series of posts seeks to foster that very in-house debate. Intelligent Design is another option I will explore in this ongoing series.
Intelligent design (hereafter ID) is often dismissed outright in discussions of this sort. Creationists see it as evolution-in-disguise, while theistic evolutionists view it as creationism-in-disguise. So what is it? Some of this aversion may be due to the fact that the modern ID movement suffered greatly in its definitions. Initially, due to the wide range of scholars involved, it weakened its scientific position in favor of a more theological one. Recently, however, this has been turned about.There is much discussion among theists and non-theists alike about the viability of ID, but it seems clear that ID is here to stay. Books like Signature in the Cell by Stephen Meyer continue to draw flak from all sides, but they also continue to push thinking minds to stretch and consider the ideas contained therein.
William Dembski is seen by some as the father of the modern ID movement. His book, Intelligent Design is a good introduction (though it is quite heavy both scientifically and philosophically) to the movement.
“Intelligent design is three things,” according to Dembski, “a scientific research program that investigates the effect of intelligent causes; an intellectual movement that challenges Darwinism and its naturalistic legacy; and a way of understanding divine action” (Dembski, 13). ID is based on empirically testing for design within systems (109). According to ID, mutation-selection mechanisms cannot account for the diversity of life (113).
How exactly is design discovered empirically? It is based on probability calculus, among other means (130). Central to ID is the notion of “irreducible complexity”. “A system is irreducibly complex if it consists of several interrelated parts so that removing even one part completely destroys the system’s function” (147). Dembski argues that this is a fully empirical question, “individually knocking out each protein constituting a biochemical system will determine whether function is lost. If it is, we are dealing with an irreducibly complex system. Protein knock-out experiments of this sort are routine in biology” (149).
Another important notion is complex specified information. This needs explanation, and it is explanation that naturalistic evolution cannot provide (167-169).
Dembski’s book is monumentally important for those Christians wanting to explore the origins debate. In the appendix he answers many of the objections to ID (God of the gaps, not science, etc.).
Theologically, ID could be subject to the same objections I would raise against theistic evolution. Why death before sin? Specifically, why human death before sin? Interestingly, ID can serve of an example of what a friend of mine suggested in my first post on Old Earth Creationism: combining various explanations as one sees fit. Take Hugh Ross’s RTB model, which argues that humans are specially created. One could easily combine this model with ID to make the model even more challenging to standard evolutionary models. Not only that, but this avoids the theological error inherent in theistic evolution (more on theistic evolution and possible ways to solve this problem in an upcoming post).
I have never claimed to be a scientist. The more science I read, the more I realize that in such a vast ocean of work, I can never even begin to unearth the tip of the iceberg. Thus, my scientific analysis of ID amounts, basically, to only being able to judge it on what I know. I have read rebuttals to arguments for irreducible complexity, but I remain unconvinced by these rebuttals. I find Dembski’s argument rather convincing, though some examples he uses may need to be rethought.
Thus, after my first go-round, in which I explored theistic evolution, old earth creationism, young earth creationism, and intelligent design, I must say that my mind is less muddled than before. Picking and choosing from these theories can be quite fun. Not only that, but it can expand one’s faith walk. I encourage fellow Christians to expand their borders. Think about these hard questions. Most importantly, judge all things by God’s Word, the Bible. The Word of God stands, unchanged, forever. Jesus has died for our sins once for all. This does not change. Science continually changes (not an argument against science). The Christian should base his/her worldview on the foundation: Christ the Cornerstone.
I’m looking forward to round two!
Dembski, William. Intelligent Design. IVP Academic. 1999.
Spiegel, James. The Making of an Atheist. Moody Publishers. 2010.
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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from citations, which are the property of their respective owners) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.
Naturalism is self-defeating.
Naturalism’s “Grand Story” (I’m unsure of who exactly coined this phrase) includes evolution as the means by which humanity arrived on earth. I’m not here to debate that. Rather, I think that Alvin Plantinga’s “Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism” has some fairly hefty weight (see Warrant The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief for this argument). The argument basically goes like this:
1) On naturalism, evolution selected for our cognitive system
2) On evolution, it is what is beneficial for survival that is selected (with some exceptions–some animals are just unlucky)
3) Therefore, our cognitive system was selected for survival
4) What is beneficial for survival is not necessarily what is true (in an objective sense)
5) Therefore, we can’t know (on naturalism) that our cognitive system is truth-seeking
6) If we can’t trust our cognitive system, but we come to the conclusion that naturalism is true, then we can’t trust this conclusion
7) Therefore, naturalism is self-defeating
Now take 4). It seems to be clearly true that evolution does not select for true belief, if it selects for beliefs at all. Take an example I stole from Plantinga earlier (here)
“Tim the Tiger lover and Suzy the Warrior.
“Tim the Tiger Lover has formed false beliefs that a) wild tigers are warm and cuddly and b) the best way to pet them is to sneak away from them silently. Suzy the Warrior has formed the beliefs that a) wild tigers are ferocious critters and b) they must be killed to insure the survival of mankind.
“Tim and Suzy are walking through the jungle one day, when they spot in the distance a tiger. Now, Tim immediately begins joyfully sneaking away, believing that he will soon be petting that warm, cuddly tiger. Suzy dashes forward to attempt to strangle the beast with her bare hands. Suzy dies, though it seems clear that her beliefs were at least partially true (wild tigers are indeed ferocious). Tim, however, succeeds in escaping and surviving, despite this not actually being his goal.
“Now, on naturalism, it seems quite obvious that Tim has succeeded. He has survived, and will thus pass his genes on to the next generation. Indeed, it seems quite likely he will pass along his false beliefs as well. For let us modify the scenario only slightly and say that it was quite dark. While Suzy was being torn to bits by the tiger, Tim happened upon a tiger cub or some other beast he took to be a tiger cub. He immediately, happily danced with it and cuddled it for a while before sneaking away to go home, having quite happily reinforced his false beliefs. So Tim, with his false beliefs enforced by some data that they are in fact true (after all, he sneaked away quietly from the tiger and managed to pet tigers), also manages to survive, and therefore pass along his genes and his false beliefs” (Wartick).
To put it another way:
Take N to be metaphysical naturalism, P to be probability, R is the proposition that our cognitive facilities are reliable, and E is the proposition that our cognitive facilities have developed directly by way of the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary theory directs our attention.
Now P(R/N&E) seems to be low (see above). “One who accepts N… has a defeater for R. This induces a defeater, for him, for any belief produced by his cognitive facilities, including N itself; hence, ordinary naturalism is self-defeating” (Plantinga, 231).
Thus, it seems unlikely to me that naturalism can even find grounds for warranted belief on its own basis for warrant. But that’s not where the problems end. Naturalism has a major problem with consciousness.
Naturalism cannot explain consciousness.
I quote my fellow blogger, Chris Reese and outline what physicalist philosophers are saying about consciousness:
[P]hilosopher of mind . . . Ned Block . . . confesses that we have
no idea how consciousness could have emerged from nonconscious matter: “we have nothing—zilch—worthy of being called a research programme…. Researchers are stumped.”6Berkeley’s John Searle says this is a “leading problem in the biological sciences.”7
Jaegwon Kim notes our “inability” to understand consciousness in an “essentially physical” world.8
Colin McGinn observes that consciousness seems like “a radical novelty in the universe”; 9 he wonders how our “technicolour” awareness could “arise from soggy grey matter.”10
David Papineau wonders why consciousness emerges: “to this question physicalists’ ‘theories of consciousness’ seem to provide no answer.”11
If, however, we have been made by a supremely self-aware Being, then the existence of consciousness has a plausible context.
Physicalism goes so far as to deny consciousness. I take it as self-evident that I do have consciousness. It seems entirely unintelligible to me to deny this. But then naturalists cannot even explain it. They are unable to understand it in a “physical” world. Perhaps the answer is that there is more to the world than the physical. But due to the presuppositions of the naturalist, they cannot accept this possibility.
Naturalism denies freedom of the will.
Freedom of the will is another problem for the naturalist. If all we are is, ultimately, matter in motion, then how is that we have freedom of the will? Since the big bang, matter has simply been bumping against each other in a way that was determined by the big bang. Every path is planned out by the laws of nature.
Thus, naturalism denies freedom of the will, it denies consciousness, and it refutes itself. These are but a few problems I raise against naturalism (see my other posts on the topic here and here). I thus deny naturalism its right for philosophical dominance of my (free) mind.
Sources:
Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford. 2000.
Wartick, J.W. “Naturalism and Groundless Truth.” https://jwwartick.com/2010/01/02/naturalism-and-groundless-truth/
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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from citations, which are the property of their respective owners) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.
One of the most common objections I see to Christianity is a citation from Scripture (or a long list of citations from Scripture) which someone takes to be contradictory, evil, or something else such that it somehow discredits Christianity and the Bible.
While I do not think there are contradictions in the Bible (though there may be apparent contradictions), I do think that those who make citations or lists do have a point. As Christians, it is vitally important to take what the Bible says seriously. Contemplative reading of Scripture can often lead to questions or difficulties that one may wish to answer. Interestingly, while the unbeliever generally takes these difficulties to be intractable problems that inevitably should destroy faith, the believer can approach such difficulties with an attitude that actually uses such difficulties as opportunities to increase in one’s understanding of Scripture.
It is only fair that I share my presuppositions immediately. I believe the Bible is the Holy, inerrant (in the autographs) Word of God. It is the source for sound doctrine, but its central message is Christ Jesus my Lord. Other presuppositions can be viewed on my “About” page.
Thus, I begin a series of posts discussing various Bible difficulties. These difficulties may include apparent contradictions, hard sayings, hard stories, etc. This series will explore Bible difficulties on a verse-by-verse basis, addressing whatever verses I find interesting at any given time. It will utilize an understanding of Greek and Hebrew, as well as commentaries and apologetics works. This post serves both as an the introduction and place for links to the other posts in this series (similar to the Evolution-Creation-ID debate links here).
Bible Difficulties 1 Judges 11:29-40
Bible Difficulties 2: Adopting the Attitude of the Ethiopian (Acts 8:27 and following)
I recently watched “The Blind Side” in a local dollar theatre. I know, it’s out on DVD/Blu-Ray. I am slow to see movies sometimes!
Anyway, I thought it was an absolutely wonderful movie. It raised some questions in my mind:
1) What can we do as Christians to change the situation of inner city violence, drugs, and other crime?
2) How are Christians to live in society? How can we step up and become leaders in our communities for change and reform?
3) What can I (specifically, but anyone can apply this to him/herself) do to help the poor and downtrodden in our society?
It was a very powerful movie, with Christian undertones. It has lead me to seek answers to these questions. I’d appreciate any feedback/suggestions. What do you think we can do?
The Making of an Atheist by James S. Spiegel is a dangerous book. The subtitle illustrates this well: “How Immorality Leads to Unbelief”. Spiegel’s thesis is that “Atheism is not at all a consequence of intellectual doubts. Such doubts are mere symptoms of the root cause–moral rebellion. For the atheist, the missing ingredient is not evidence but obedience” (11, his emphasis). Just above this statement is this similarly strongly worded proposal: “Perhaps we should consider the possibility that skeptical objections are the atheists’ facade, a scholarly veneer masking the real causes of their unbelief–causes that are moral and psychological in nature” (11, his emphasis).
I call the book dangerous for a few reasons. It is dangerous because Spiegel dares to assert something that Scripture holds to be quite true: there are cognitive consequences of sin. It is dangerous because the book unapologetically argues that atheism’s core tenants can be turned about; rather than atheism being a rationally superior view to theism, Spiegel argues that atheists are subject to the very objections they often raise against theism: it arises from psychological and moral deficiencies. Spiegel knows this book is dangerous. He writes “My thesis is an uncomfortable one. To suggest that religious skepticism is, at bottom, a moral problem will likely draw the ire of many people” (16).
Anyone who makes claims like these had better be prepared to back them up. Spiegel points to the oft-quoted passage from Thomas Nagel as a beginning for this discussion. Nagel writes “I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God, and, naturally, hope that I’m right about my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that” (quoted in Spiegel, 10-11). This powerful quote serves as a backdrop for much of the book.
Spiegel starts off with an analysis of atheism. He points out that the “objection from evil” (the problem of evil) may not be so strong after all. He (rightly, I think) notes that “from a naturalist standpoint the objection from evil is incoherent” (27). This is because naturalism cannot have objective right and wrong. For this and other reasons, the most “powerful” objection to theism is dismissed and avoided.
This chapter has an important concession on Spiegel’s part. He notes that some of the things atheists point out (immoral activity in the church is one example) are indeed problems. Malpractice of believers is indeed something to point out and condemn. But the point is that these things are not objections to theistic belief, rather commentaries on the believers (38).
After a brief argument against atheism and an introductory level explanation of the teleological argument, Spiegel gets into the meat of his book: the causes of atheism. Following Paul C. Vitz, Spiegel argues that one psychological reason for the rejection of theism is a broken relationship with one’s earthly father (64). Spiegel forwards this as a kind of psychological argument against atheism. Just as Freud (and others) would like to argue that theism is mere wish-fulfillment put into practice with the “father figure in the sky”, so, here, Spiegel argues that atheism could be (in some cases) due to a rejection of that true father figure in the sky, as broken relationships are projected onto (and against) the Heavenly Father. “Human beings were made in God’s image, and the father-child relationship mirrors that as God’s ‘offspring'” (69).
Spiegel follows this interesting argument with an equally enlightening discussion in the (im)morality of many top atheistic scholars. He quotes Aldous Huxley, who states “Those who detect no meaning in the world generally do so because… it suits their books that the world should be meaningless” (73). This rejection of meaning allows immorality. If God exists, there is clearly an objective moral standard. Thus, by rejecting God, this standard doesn’t exist. Immorality can proceed freely.
There is another important point later in this same chapter: “one may willfully refuse to believe certain truths, even when there is strong evidence for them” (83). This is followed by an exploration of what this can mean. He quotes William James, who states, “If your heart does not want a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make you believe in one” (84). Ultimately, Spiegel argues, atheists choose not to believe (86).
This choice is made against a presupposed backdrop. Simply put, everyone has a kind of “paradigm” of background beliefs that filters and limits their selection of propositions to believe. Spiegel demonstrates that this happens even among the venerated field of science. There is no such thing as a truly objective human being (92-93). What this means to his thesis, then, is that by selecting a paradigm in which the standard of truth is such that it excludes theism, an atheist will never accept theism on any amount of evidence. Rather, they must make a complete paradigm shift that allows for such a reality (100ff).
This section of the book ends with Spiegel’s assertion that the descent into atheism is a willful rejection of God, made apart from evidence (or a perceived lack thereof). Further, sin can harden one’s heart against God, thus enforcing a paradigm that is anti-theistic in nature (113-114).
The Making of an Atheist closes with a section on the “Blessings of Theism.” Here, Spiegel simply lays out the blessings spelled out in Scripture that are ours in theism. He argues we should live a virtuous life. We have the right to thank and praise God. We can live as humble believers in Christ. I wish that Spiegel had included some of the blessings of Christ in this section, but I suppose that’s not the thesis of his book. One final important point Spiegel makes actually takes place in the endnotes in this last section. Spiegel states that “we should constantly examine and reform these beliefs in light of Scripture and sound reasoning” (141). I think this is an excellent point.
Overall, The Making of an Atheist is a fast read. It’s definitely written for the lay person, though it has enough philosophy in there to keep those looking for a bit of a deeper read engaged. It’s short (less than 150 pages), so it won’t take long to finish. Spiegel’s points are solid and I will explore his conclusions further. Spiegel’s “dangerous book” is very successful.
This post is a collection of links to the series I’m doing on the “Argument within Christianity.” I’d make it all nice and pretty if I wasn’t computer illiterate. I will update this post as my series continues.
Introductory Post “The Argument Within Christianity: Evolution, Intelligent Design, or Creationism?”
Theistic Evolution 1 Theistic Evolution 2 Theistic Evolution 3 Theistic Evolution 4
Old Earth Creationism 1 Old Earth Creationism 2 Old Earth Creationism 3
Young Earth Creationism 1 Young Earth Creationism 2 Young Earth Creationism 3 Young Earth Creationism 4
Intelligent Design 1 Intelligent Design 2 Intelligent Design 3
Christian Presuppositions and Science
The Interaction of Science and Faith
Guest Post 1: Matt Moss Part 1 – Part 2 – Part 3 – Part 4 – Part 5
This post is part of a series on Jesus: The Living God. View other posts here.
Recently I wrote a guest post for a fellow Christian blogger (an excellent site, check it out), Chris Reese, on N.T. Wright’s Climax of the Covenant. I wanted to re-blog it for my site and add a bit to it.
A subject that is often ignored within discussions of who Christ is involves Covenant theology, specifically, the theology of the Torah. How exactly does Christ relate to the Covenant that God made with the people of Israel? N.T. Wright discusses this very issue in his book, The Climax of the Covenant.
First, what is the Torah? The Torah, in Wright’s usage, is not just the Mosaic books of the Bible or the Law, but the promise of God to His people, Israel. He states that “…the law… was regarded not merely as a general code of ethics, but as the charter of Israel’s national life” (24). The problem was, of course, that God demanded perfect obedience to the Torah, to the Law. As His covenant people, Israel was to keep the Torah and to cherish it. But Israel constantly strayed. Thus, the power of the Torah became death, the consequence of sin (209).
So how could Israel fulfill the Torah? The short answer is that Israel simply could not. It demanded perfection, and the people of Israel could not be perfect. God had to intervene directly in history in order to accomplish His covenant with His people, and to open this covenant up to all people.
And how did this happen? First, note the relationship between Christ, Adam, and humanity. Wright notes that “Adam has [for the rabbis of Israel] become embodied already in Israel, the people of the Torah, and in her future hope” (25). This, in turn, must be viewed in light that “Israel, the family of Abraham, is God’s true humanity. Her land is God’s land. Her enemies are God’s enemies” (23). This reflects back on the Torah, as discussed above. It is the “charter of Israel’s national life” (24). So there is a relationship between Adam and Israel–Adam, Wright argues, is to be understood as Israel. Jesus Christ, then, became a New Adam for a New Israel. By acting as the New Adam and redeeming Israel, He fulfilled the Torah and seal the charter of Israel. Not only that, but He opened this charter, this Covenant, to all people.
“Jesus, as last Adam, had revealed what God’s saving plan for the world had really been… by enacting it, becoming obedient to death, even the death of the cross” (40). The resurrection confirmed Jesus as Christ–Messiah.
Finally, how could God keep this promise in light of the failure of Israel (and mankind at large) to keep the Torah? Christ, argues Wright, is the “Climax” of the covenant. “The Messiah is the fulfillment of the long purposes of Israel’s God” (241). How does this happen? Wright argues that the “…answer must be that sin, by causing death, stood in the way of the divine intention of giving life; when, on the cross, God condemns sin… then sin is powerless to prevent the gift of life” (209). God’s plan of salvation “always involved a dramatic break, a cross and a resurrection written into the very fabric of history” (241, emphasis his). Thus, Torah and Covenant Theology can be summed up by saying that “Christ on the cross is thus the goal of the Torah” (243, emphasis his). It is in Christ that we become the people of God.
Source:
Wright, N.T. The Climax of the Covenant. Fortress Press. 1991.
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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from cited material which is the property of its respective owner[s]) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.
I’m continually frustrated when the concept of freedom of the will comes up among people, even in Christian circles, because it seems that inevitably people start to deny that freedom of the will is incompatible with the God of Classical Theism. I am a firm believer in human freedom of the will and I believe it is fully compatible with omniscience. (Though I do not deny that our human will is corrupted by the fall into sin and that salvation is the act of God, not a work of man… These things are most certainly true.)
Generally the objection is something like this: If God knows everything and is all-powerful, then everything is pre-determined.
I still have not seen any solid argument for why this should be the case whatsoever. The key, as I understand it, is the connection between foreknowledge and causation.
I don’t see any reason to believe that if a being that is omnipotent and omniscient knows that x will happen, that being somehow causes or determines that x must happen. Why should this be the case? Simply knowing with certainty what will happen in the future does not somehow mean that this being has somehow made a causal link between its knowledge and the future, rather, it just means that this being knows what any other being is going to do.
What connection is there between knowledge of an event in the future and determining it? I’d like any kind of analytic argument to try to deny that human freedom and omniscience are compatible.
I’ve argued elsewhere that these concepts are compatible, and I’d like to make this point more clear now.
Take “P” to mean “God [in Classical Theism–i.e. omniscient, omnipotent, etc.] knows in advance that some event, x, will happen”
Take “Q” to mean “some event, x, will happen”
1. □(P⊃Q)
2. P
3. Therefore, Q
I wanted to draw it in symbolic logic to make my point as clear as possible. It is necessarily true that if God knows x will happen, then x will happen. But then if one takes these terms, God knowing x will happen only means that x will happen, not that x will happen necessarily. Certainly, God’s foreknowledge of an event means that that event will happen, but it does not mean that the event could not have happened otherwise. If an event happens necessarily, that means the event could not have happened otherwise, but God’s foreknowledge of an event doesn’t somehow transfer necessity to the event, it only means that the event will happen. It could have been otherwise, in which case, God’s knowledge would have been different. The problem many people make is that they try to make the syllogism:
1. □(P⊃Q)
2. P
3. Therefore, □Q
This is actually an invalid argument. The only thing that follows from □(P⊃Q) is that, “necessarily, if P then Q,” not “if P, then, necessarily Q.”
It is true that “necessarily, if God knows that some event, x, will happen, then some event, x, will happen”… but then it doesn’t follow from this that some event, x, happens necessarily. Thus, the event x is not predetermined simply by God’s foreknowledge of an event.
The objection is sometimes simply put forward as: Necessarily, God cannot error in his knowledge. If God knows some event x, will happen, then x will happen. Therefore, necessarily, x will happen.
Take P and Q as above
Take R to be “God cannot error in his knowledge”
1. □R
2. P⊃Q
3. Q
Again, this simply is an unsound and invalid argument. Simply stating that □R doesn’t show that for every event x that God knows, □x. It simply means that □R. R does not have a causal link to x (or Q above). It is true that □R on Classical Theism, but this does not mean that □Q or □P. There must be some argument to make P or Q necessary in order for there to be some kind of predetermined future, and I have no idea how an argument like that might go.There are ways that I can think of to formulate it, but it involves simply assuming that □R means that □P or □Q, so it would then be question-begging.
Perhaps I could take an example. Let’s say that I’m going to go to classes tomorrow (and I do hope I will, I don’t like missing classes!). God knows in advance that I’m going to go to classes tomorrow. His knowledge of this event means that it will happen, but it doesn’t mean that I couldn’t choose to stay in and sleep for a while, or play my new copy of Final Fantasy XIII, or do something more useless with my time. If I chose to, say, play Final Fantasy XIII (a strong temptation!), then God simply would have known that I would play FFXIII. His knowledge does not determine the outcome, His knowledge is simply of the outcome.
I’m open to hearing any analytic argument that manages to show how necessity can be transferred to events simply by God’s knowledge of them, but I’m skeptical as to the prospects of whether it can be done.
This argument can be seen in William Lane Craig’s writings like The Only Wise God and also in his podcast episodes on the doctrine of God.
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The preceding post is the property of J.W. Wartick (apart from citations, which are the property of their respective owners) and should not be reproduced in part or in whole without the expressed consent of the author.
This is part in a series of posts I’m working on concerning the “Argument within Christianity” on the origins of the universe and life. Other posts can be viewed here.
Young Earth Creationism holds that the Genesis 1-3 account is to be literally read. The days mentioned are literal 24-hour days. The Creation account is not metaphorical or some kind of theological rendition of Creation, but is a literal, scientifically accurate (when science is viewed through this lens) account of the origin of the universe.
Central to Young Earth Creationists (hereafter YECs) is the idea that people can look at the exact same scientific data and take different interpretations. I remember a man coming to speak on campus about YEC and he said that he looks at the exact same evidence as other scientists, and simply comes away with a different interpretation.
So what does it mean to take the same evidence and look at it with different interpretations? One is the age of the earth. A prominent and important site for YEC scientists is the Mount St. Helens eruption site. This site has provided a number of startling findings. Specifically, YECs point to the layers of sediment deposited by the volcano as showing there could be a different interpretation of geologic time. In the space of a few days, Mount St. Helens deposited up to 600 feet of sediment. This sediment looks like the sedimentary deposits found throughout the geologic record across the world (Morris). Other evidence includes the fact that a canyon formed, complete with a redirected river flowing through it, trees were deposited standing up (similar to petrified forests), and peat moss deposits that could eventually lead to coal (Morris).
Thus, YECs take this as evidence for the Genesis account and creation in a few ways. First, if there was a worldwide flood, then it is possible that there would exist worldwide sedimentary deposits that are quite uniform. If canyons can form so quickly from a volcano, then could not other canyons that are often cited as having taken millions of years to form have been formed by an event like the flood or other volcanic activity surrounding the Flood (Morris)?
It seems like, on a YEC perspective, the Flood is the answer to a great many questions, including the evidence from geology for the age of the earth (YECs would say it is sediment deposited and compacted by the flood), canyons, fossils, etc.
I always find things like this greatly appealing, but I do have a few problems. I must stress again that I am not a scientist. Thus, I am not someone to go through and evaluate scientific claims in any scholarly fashion, as I don’t have the knowledge to do so. I try to stay on top of things by reading reports, whatever books I have or get a hold of that have to do with science, but the bottom line is that it isn’t my main interest. Anyway, these are the problems I have, with my layman’s knowledge of science:
1. What about evidence from astronomy for the age of the universe?
2. How does one go about putting things like this into a scientific model (again, not that this is the standard for truth of any claim, but it is the standard for science, and if the YEC perspective wants to compete on this level, it must provide a competing model that involves tests)?
3. Can we really take evidence from something like the Mount St. Helens eruption and assume things about the Flood because of it?
4. Where is the positive case? Rather than attacking all other views, where is the scientific case building bottom up a YEC explanation of the universe? I think this is absolutely essential for YEC to offer any competition to Old Earth Creationism, Theistic Evolution, or Intelligent Design. Hugh Ross has done well for the OEC view (here), but as far as I know, YECs have no comparable case.
Sources:
Morris, Dr. John D. “Lessons from Mount St. Helens.” http://www.icr.org/article/lessons-from-mount-st-helens/.
My notes from a talk on campus which I don’t feel like looking up a way to officially cite
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